The culpability of comfort: a practical theology of white resistance to critical anti-racist pedagogy by Hauge, Daniel James
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2021
The culpability of comfort: a
practical theology of white





SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY 
Dissertation 
THE CULPABILITY OF COMFORT: A PRACTICAL THEOLOGY OF WHITE 
RESISTANCE TO CRITICAL ANTI-RACIST PEDAGOGY 
by 
DANIEL JAMES HAUGE 
B.A., Western Washington University, 1996 
M.Div., Regent College, 2002 
S.T.M., Boston University School of Theology, 2014 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
2021 
©  2021 by 
     Daniel James Hauge 
     All Rights Reserved except for chapter 4, 
     which is © 2015 ProQuest 
Approved by 
First Reader   _____________________________________________________ 
   Steven Sandage, Ph.D. 
   Albert and Jessie Danielsen Professor of Pastoral Psychology and   
     Theology 
Second Reader _____________________________________________________ 
   Courtney Goto, Ph.D. 
   Associate Professor of Religious Education 
DEDICATION 
For Ana María, who loves me and believes in me 
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to begin by thanking my family. It is easy to take a supportive environment 
for granted, but the fact that I never had to doubt my family’s love, or that they believed 
in my value and would support me no matter what, is a huge reason why I am able to do 
what I do. 
To all of my Seattle folks from Quest Church, Emerald City Bible Fellowship, New 
Horizons Ministries, and the people who give them life and who I have the privilege of 
calling my community, particularly Zac, Jon, Hala, Frank, Zadok, Deanza, Solomon, Ron 
and Linda, and so many others. You have taught me, challenged me, and given me space 
to learn, stumble, and grow in the most caring environment anyone could want. Wherever 
I go in this world, you will always be my home base away from home. 
To Steve Sandage, Courtney Goto, and the amazingly supportive faculty and staff at 
Boston University School of Theology. Your respect for me and my work, your 
challenging feedback, and your ethos of care and support has been essential in helping 
me get this project completed. I do not take for granted what a blessing it is to have an 
advisor who does not just support me as a student but who has offered friendship and 
collaboration as a colleague. And special thanks to Phillis Sheppard for advising me my 
first semester, and whose work was the initial inspiration and influence on this project. 
To a fantastic group of colleagues and friends at the School of Theology, including 
lunches with Sheila, walks to church with Yara, weekly dinners with Holly, Kristen, and 
Jessica, and life-giving conversations with Hyebin, Kate, Kathryn, Tom, Callid, David, 
and so many others. Special thanks to Hope Central Church and the Arts Religion and 
Culture community for providing a needed space for refuge, challenge, and belonging. 
To Amy, who knows me as well as pretty much anyone and who has pushed, prodded, 
listened, and fiercely loved for over twenty years. And to Priya, who remains the person 
most responsible for the direction my life and vocation has taken. 
And finally to Ana María, who has never stopped believing in me or this project even 
when I found it hardest to keep believing myself. Te quiero monotones, mi corazón. 
v
THE CULPABILITY OF COMFORT: A PRACTICAL THEOLOGY OF WHITE 
RESISTANCE TO CRITICAL ANTI-RACIST PEDAGOGY 
DANIEL HAUGE 
Boston University School of Theology, 2021 
Major Professor:    Steven Sandage, Albert and Jessie Danielsen Professor of Pastoral   
         Psychology and Theology 
ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation develops a liberationist practical theology of white emotioned 
resistance to critical anti-racist education. Its central argument is that white resistant 
discourse and emotional reactions in response to anti-racist pedagogy reflect the 
influence of social location on white people's psychological development, which forms 
comfortable intuitive attachments to the white hegemonic social milieu. These 
attachments constitute psychic incentives to preserve that milieu, which operate alongside 
conscious anti-racist commitments, resulting in disorientation and distress when the 
contradictions between those motivations are exposed in anti-racist classroom settings. 
This psychodynamic analysis serves as the basis for examining the theological 
implications of white resistance and, by extension, white social formation, which 
devalues mutual encounter across difference and constrains white people's ability to 
conceptualize shared culpability in generating oppressive social norms. 
 This dissertation employs an interdisciplinary method that integrates theories of 
social practice, critical whiteness theory, and developmental psychology. The first chapter 
vi
examines the relationship of habitual practices to structures of oppression, drawing upon 
Sally Haslanger’s theory of practice and Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus. The 
second chapter reviews qualitative research conducted in the field of multicultural 
antiracist education, which analyzes white resistant behaviors and discursive patterns in 
the classroom. The third chapter engages with critical whiteness scholars Barbara 
Applebaum, Jennifer Mueller, and Linda Martín-Alcoff, specifically as they theorize the 
nature of white resistance as a series of strategies to preserve moral identity and social 
power. 
 The fourth chapter responds to these theories with a psychodynamic approach 
developed in conversation with Phillis Sheppard’s reformulation of Heinz Kohut’s self 
psychology. This analysis is followed in the fifth chapter by a theological interpretation 
of white resistance and the oppressive potential of social norms, drawing upon the work 
of Willie James Jennings, Katie Walker Grimes, and Mayra Rivera. The final chapter 
outlines pastoral and pedagogical concerns relevant to helping white people process the 
vulnerability inherent in having one’s sense of self implicated in structural oppression. 
Analyzing white resistance through a psychodynamic lens provides new directions for 
research within practical theology and critical whiteness studies on strategy and efficacy 
of anti-racist pedagogy. 
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But it is not permissible that the authors of devastation should also be innocent. It is the 
innocence which constitutes the crime. 
— James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time 
viii
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 For anti-racist educators committed to teaching white people to understand and 
dismantle the workings of white hegemony, one of the most common challenges is 
navigating our defensive, at times perplexed reactions to the idea that we share 
responsibility for enacting a social system of oppression. Critical whiteness theorists 
operate from the premise that racism is properly understood as a system of power 
disparities in which white people inevitably participate, whether consciously or 
unwittingly. In the words of critical whiteness scholar and educator Barbara Applebaum, 
“white people, through the practices of whiteness and by benefiting from white privilege, 
contribute to the maintenance of systemic injustice,” and moreover, “they are complicit in 
sustaining the system even when they do not intend to or are unaware that they do so.”  1
This conception of white complicity challenges pervasive conceptions of racism as a 
conscious, animus-driven intention to harm people solely on account of their race. Even 
as high-profile events of racist terror within the last decade have catalyzed a growing 
public discourse around racism in contemporary society, significant numbers of white 
people persist in objecting to the idea that racism is a social structure in which we  all 2
benefit and share complicity. 
 Barbara Applebaum, Being White, Being Good: White Complicity, White Moral Responsibility, 1
and Social Justice Pedagogy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 3-4.
 Throughout this dissertation I use an inclusive first-person plural when referring to white people 2
as a social category, which reflects the fact that I write from a positionality shaped by and 
complicit with the phenomena I am analyzing.
2
 One way this tension manifests itself is that critical antiracism, which I define as 
analysis and advocacy grounded in critical theoretical understandings of racism as an 
entrenched hierarchical system of institutional structures and social norms,  often 3
generates white emotioned resistance  in anti-racist pedagogical settings. This resistance 4
involves patterns of emotionally charged behavior and discourse, consistently observed 
by critical anti-racist educators and researchers, which either deflect or deny the premise 
that white people as a group share culpability for white hegemony and have an ethical 
responsibility to pursue racial justice.  White emotioned resistance can range from angry 5
insistence that “blaming all whites for racism is racist,” to quiet withdrawal from class 
discussion in confusion over why one’s question “showed their privilege.” 
 This dissertation develops a liberationist practical theology of white emotioned 
resistance to critical anti-racist pedagogy, which I conceptualize as a practice that 
 For a summary of the development of critical race theory and its challenge to individualist 3
understandings of racism, see Kimberlé Crenshaw et al., ed., introduction to Critical Race 
Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement (New York: The New Press, 1995). For 
analysis of structural racism as a political system, see Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists: 
Color-blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 2014); Matthew Desmond and Mustafa Emirbayer. “What is Racial 
Domination?” Du Bois Review 6, no. 2 (2009): 335-55.
 I adopt the term “emotioned” from Jennifer S. Trainor, Rethinking Racism: Emotion, 4
Persuasion, and Literacy Education in an All-white High School (Carbondale, IL: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2008), 3. Trainor uses “emotioned” in place of “emotional” to 
emphasize “emotional regulation taking place through institutional and cultural practices,” rather 
than focusing only on the individual feelings themselves.
 I define “racial justice” following Matthew Desmond and Mustafa Emirbayer, “To Imagine and 5
Pursue Racial Justice,” Race Ethnicity and Education 15 (2012): 263: Racial justice “abolishes 
ethnic hierarchies and racial domination. All people, whites and non-whites, immigrants and 
native-born citizens, are not simply tolerated; they are valued and, as much as possible, are 
understood—their differences and similarities acknowledged, accepted, and welcomed.”
3
emerges from broader practices of white social and psychological formation. 
Liberationist practical theology, as Katherine Turpin describes, “pursues praxis, the rich 
interplay of theory and practice, which increases justice and recognition of the full 
humanity and equality of all persons.”  In its endeavor to pursue a praxis of justice, the 6
subfield incorporates the guiding commitments of liberation theology into its analysis and 
reflection on everyday practice, as well as critical theoretical approaches to power 
relations which inform critical whiteness studies. Critical theory and liberationist 
approaches both “focus on the manner in which everyday practices may often 
unknowingly replicate or reproduce unequal distributions of resources, differential 
valuing of persons and experiences, and oppressive ‘common sense’ understandings of 
the world.”  Liberationist practical theology thus entails, as Kathleen Cahalan affirms, 7
“critically assessing the oppressive tendencies embedded in such practices and 
refashioning them according to just and dialogical values.”  This approach to practical 8
theology prioritizes a commitment to exposing and dismantling practices which 
contribute to oppression, with particular attention to the role of reflexive behaviors and 
commonplace attitudes in reinforcing unjust social hierarchies. 
 Katherine Turpin, “Liberationist Practical Theology,” in Opening the Field of Practical 6
Theology: An Introduction, ed. Kathleen A. Cahalan and Gordon S. Mikoski (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 153.
 Turpin, “Liberationist Practical Theology,” 157-58.7
 Kathleen Cahalan, “Three Approaches to Practical Theology, Theological Education, and the 8
Church's Ministry,” International Journal of Practical Theology 9, no. 1 (2005): 85.
4
 The question which drives my research method and choice of disciplinary 
partners involves a persistent tension between white people’s subjective experience of 
emotioned resistance as a spontaneous, authentic response to having our worldview and 
moral identity threatened, and critical whiteness analysis which frames emotioned 
resistance as a set of strategic moves in the interests of preserving white hegemony. 
Applebaum, for example, maintains that white resistant discourses “work to obstruct 
engagement so that deliberations about one’s complicity in systemic oppression can be 
avoided.”  I argue that critical analysis of white emotioned resistance as strategic can be 9
reconciled with the experience of white emotioned resistance as spontaneous if we 
analyze the phenomena through the lens of developmental psychology. My central thesis 
is that white people’s social location of relative power and privilege influences our 
psychological development to generate an intuitive sense of comfortable attachment  to 10
the white hegemonic social milieu. White comfort with social norms, white perception 
(or lack thereof) of structural power, and white intuitive skepticism about culpability in 
systemic racism all contain an embedded psychological and affective dimension. 
Understanding this aspect of white social formation has potential implications for helping 
 Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 43.9
 Throughout this dissertation my use of the term “attachment” and “affective attachment” is 10
distinct from how it is used in attachment theory as developed by John Bowlby and Mary 
Ainsworth (see John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss [New York: Basic Books, 1969]; Mario 
Mikulincer and Phillip R. Shaver, Attachment in Adulthood: Structure, Dynamics, and Change, 
Second ed. [New York: Guilford Press, 2016]). While my approach, which draws from the self 
psychology of Heinz Kohut, is interested in the influence of relational dynamics on psychological 
development, I use “attachment” in a more general sense to refer to emotional and affective 
responses of comfort and security connected to particular socio-cultural environments.
5
design antiracist pedagogy, and for informing pastoral efforts to encourage white people 
to work through our emotioned resistance and cultivate a sense of shared responsibility 
for transforming social norms and supporting structural changes. 
 The question of how emotioned white resistance contributes to the perpetuation of 
white hegemony, even alongside institutional commitments to dismantle it, is ultimately a 
theological issue. Diagnosing a system as oppressive and violent as U.S. racism is a 
necessary element of honoring the inherent dignity of humanity in all its diversity, and 
liberating all people into their right to human flourishing. Liberationist, womanist, 
postcolonial, and decolonial theologies envision a sociability characterized by human 
flourishing, in which all peoples enjoy full recognition of their intrinsic worth and dignity 
and have access to the material resources necessary for uninhibited creativity and 
thriving, healthy communities.  White hegemony thwarts human flourishing, as it 11
disproportionately reserves for white people the social conditions for the recognition of 
human value, stifles diversity of creative expression, and robs people of color of access to 
resources needed for survival. 
 White emotioned resistance to critical antiracism impedes the structural changes 
necessary for human flourishing and thus constitutes one dimension of what Emilie 
Townes calls the cultural production of evil.  By reflexively reacting to preserve 12
 See Rubem Alves, A Theology of Human Hope (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1969); Keri 11
Day, Religious Resistance to Neoliberalism: Womanist and Black Feminist Perspectives (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
 Emilie Townes, Womanist Ethics and the Cultural Production of Evil (New York: Palgrave 12
Macmillan, 2006).
6
comfortable attachments to the social milieu, white people reinforce the status quo as 
“natural,” taking for granted the very hegemonic order that people of color generally 
experience as a matrix of oppression. For example, critical whiteness researcher and 
educator Jennifer Mueller invited white undergraduates to reflect on their family wealth 
in the context of studying the racial wealth gap. One student wrote, 
Granted, in the past, people of color were not allowed the same opportunities as 
whites and those previous generations were not allowed to build assets based on 
the color of their skin and that is a racial inequality, but I do not feel that this 
translates into a racial inequality today.  13
Responses like this one perform a dual function—they exonerate the white student from 
feeling complicit in structures of racial inequality, but also normalizes contemporary 
inequality in a way that either endorses it or disincentivizes working against it. This state 
of affairs calls for theological reflection on the psychological developmental processes 
which contribute to making systems of oppression feel intuitively natural to those who 
benefit from them, and which perceive an identity threat from critical antiracist analysis. 
Liberationist practical theology has the potential to interpret white emotioned resistance 
through a moral framework grounded in a theological vision of justice and human 
flourishing. 
Synopsis of Method 
 Jennifer Mueller, “Producing Colorblindness: Everyday Mechanisms of White Ignorance,” 13
Social Problems 64, no. 2 (2017): 227-28.
7
 My case study for analysis of white emotioned resistance is a survey of qualitative 
research conducted in the field of education, which analyzes characteristic discursive and 
behavioral patterns employed by white people in response to critical antiracist 
pedagogy.  Barbara Applebaum, Robin DiAngelo, and other critical whiteness educators 14
use classroom anecdotes, focus groups, and in-depth interviews as the basis for analysis 
of behaviors which, according to these scholars, work to preserve white people’s sense of 
moral goodness and the legitimacy of existing social systems. Recurring expressions of 
disorientation, frustration, innocence, and ignorance depicted in this literature suggest 
affective attachments to the racial social order itself, which can co-exist alongside earnest 
commitments to racial justice. My theoretical analysis posits that these attachments are so 
thoroughly inculcated through developmental processes that preserving the status quo 
constitutes a distinct psychic motivation. Anti-racist education literature therefore 
contributes a significant pool of data which can aid in developing an account of the 
psychological operations of racial socialization, with a focus on why common 
manifestations of white resistance take the emotionally reactive forms that they do. 
 In order to interpret these patterns of white resistance and develop practical 
theological reflection on white social formation, I employ an interdisciplinary method 
that integrates theories of social practice, critical whiteness theory, and developmental 
 See Applebaum, Being White, Being Good; Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility: Why It's so Hard 14
for White People to Talk about Racism (Boston: Beacon Press, 2018); Cheryl E. Matias and 
Robin DiAngelo, “Beyond the Face of Race: Emo-Cognitive Explorations of White Neurosis and 
Racial Cray-Cray,” The Journal of Educational Foundations 27, no. 3/4 (2013): 3-20; Alice 
McIntyre, Making Meaning of Whiteness: Exploring Racial Identity with White Teachers, SUNY 
Series, Social Context of Education (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997).
8
psychology. I place critical whiteness theories of power and ignorance in conversation 
with psychodynamic theories to interpret the dissonance between white people’s 
experiences of distress, denial, and resistance to critical antiracism, and critical analyses 
of white resistance as a strategic maneuver to preserve power. Barbara Applebaum 
encapsulates the critical perspective when she stresses that “white people actively, even if 
unconsciously, protect their white innocence through denials of complicity and prevent 
white ignorance from being interrogated.”  While critical whiteness theorists generally 15
acknowledge that much white emotioned resistance happens at the subconscious level, 
they emphasize its role in promoting white groups interests at the social level. 
 I explore what it means to act “actively, even if unconsciously” with regard to 
white resistance by focusing on the influence of social location on psychological 
development, to deepen our understanding of the processes by which white normativity is 
naturalized and reproduced. This integrative approach operates on the premise articulated 
by womanist practical theologian Phillis Sheppard—that “the content of the inner life 
comprises an interaction between self and culture.”  I explore how comfort and 16
familiarity with existing social norms and power relations are inculcated from infancy in 
relation to the wider social milieu, and how this develops psychic incentives to perpetuate 
those norms and relations even alongside conscious intentions to pursue racial equity. 

 Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 46.15
 Phillis Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others in Womanist Practical Theology (New York:   16
Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 9.
9
 The interdisciplinary analysis then grounds my theological reflection, which 
interprets the moral significance of white resistance in three principal moves. First, I 
address the need for white people to learn to interpret the social milieu itself as racialized 
and oppressive rather than neutral, in the sense that white cultural preferences and social 
norms are reified as objective standards. Second, I explore the need for a conceptual 
framework to understand white moral responsibility for systemic racism that accounts for 
white conscious intentions without centering white emotions and interests in the process. 
Finally, I affirm the need to embrace relation in difference, characterized by robust 
mutuality, as an essential element of authentic human flourishing. Moving white people 
through emotioned resistance involves cultivating attachments to a vision of community 
which, in the words of Keri Day, is “committed to celebrating difference as something to 
be valued rather than feared.”  Addressing white resistance as a problem of 17
psychological development rests on the theological premises of the value of human life in 
all of its diversity and the sacred obligation to seek the flourishing of all. 
 These theological reflections on white resistance finally lead to constructive 
suggestions for practice, particularly in refining strategy and ethos for critical antiracist 
pedagogy. I propose that my understanding of the psychodynamics of white resistance 
suggest an approach which combines pedagogies of discomfort with an ethos of 
compassion, albeit with a caveat that white emotions cannot take precedence over the 
pedagogical needs of students of color when classrooms are mixed. I also suggest 
 Day, Religious Resistance to Neoliberalism, 113.17
10
directions for future research, exploring whether cultivating skills of affect regulation or 
distress tolerance might mitigate the presence or the effect of emotioned white resistance. 
Ultimately, I engage in the practical theological task through integrating a descriptive 
analysis explicating the social and psychological dynamics of white resistance with an 
ethical exhortation to cultivating an affinity for diverse and equitable sociality. As Bonnie 
Miller-McLemore affirms, practical theology “not only describes how people live as 
people of faith in communities and society. It also considers how they might do so more 
fully both in and beyond this life and world.”  My analysis of white emotioned 18
resistance is undertaken in the interest of helping equip white people to endure the 
discomfort of identifying and critiquing one’s own white complicity, and investing the 
social norms that we take for granted with moral weight, in the hope that more white 
people might embrace rather than hinder equitable structural transformation. 
Context and Significance of the Problem (I): Institutional Resistance to Racial 
Equity 
Institutional Racism and White Normativity 
 The approach I take in developing a practical theology of emotioned white 
resistance to critical antiracism is formed in response to the broader context of 
institutional resistance to the structural changes necessary for racial justice. 
Programmatic institutional efforts to dismantle systemic racism regularly encounter the 
 Bonnie Miller-McLemore, Christian Theology in Practice: Discovering a Discipline (Grand 18
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 103.
11
persistence of white normativity, which Korie Edwards defines as “the normalization of 
whites' cultural practices, ideologies, and location within the racial hierarchy such that 
how whites do things; their understandings about life, society, and the world; and their 
dominant social location over other racial groups are accepted as ‘just how things are.’”  19
This unfolds both in how institutions resist behavioral change and preserve systemic 
equilibrium,  and in the ability of white individuals to deflect or subvert any substantive 20
interrogation of racial inequity that makes them feel implicated. As a consequence, many 
institutions such as nonprofit organizations, religious bodies, and the academy continue 
to fall short of their expressed ethos and mission to pursue racial inclusion and equity. 
 A growing literature of qualitative studies and first-hand accounts by people of 
color describe the failure of these institutions to adopt cultural practices in line with their 
purported goals. Much of this literature focuses on experiences of scholars of color in 
higher education;  Anne Joh, for example, critiques academic institutions that “neither 21
cultivate institutional will for justice-oriented diversity nor forge new institutional 
 Korie L. Edwards, The Elusive Dream: The Power of Race in Interracial Churches (Oxford: 19
Oxford University Press, 2008), 10. See also Michael Morris, "Standard White: Dismantling 
White Normativity,” California Law Review 104, no. 4 (2016): 949-978; Deepa Bhandaru, "Is 
White Normativity Racist? Michel Foucault and Post-Civil Rights Racism,” Polity 45, no. 2, 
223-44.
 Robin DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” International Journal of Critical Pedagogy 3, no. 3 (2011): 20
58.
 See Sara Ahmed, On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life (Durham, NC: 21
Duke University Press, 2012); Gabriella Gutierrez Y Muhs, Presumed Incompetent The 
Intersections of Race and Class for Women in Academia (Boulder, CO: University Press of 
Colorado, 2012); David Batty, “UK universities condemned for failure to tackle racism,” 
Guardian, July 5, 2019, accessed August 3, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/
jul/05/uk-universities-condemned-for-failure-to-tackle-racism
12
habits.”  Similar frustrations are reported in religious institutions  and non-profit 22 23
organizations, where “cosmetic efforts” toward racial equity leave people of color 
“unable to participate in the development of a culture of inclusion and belonging.”  24
While many of these accounts cite specific racist actions, comments, or blatantly 
discriminatory personnel decisions to support their assessments of institutions, the 
emphasis on institutional habits and culture is also revealing. What is consistently 
described is a social environment which frustrates the efforts of people of color to fully 
contribute to the culture and direction of their organizations and be recognized for their 
contributions. 
Academic Challenges to Critical Antiracism 
 Resistance to critical antiracism is also widespread and growing within the 
academy in a wide array of disciplines. Despite the widespread influence of critical race 
theory in education, law, the humanities, and social sciences, many in those disciplines 
reject its theoretical premises and analysis as counter-intuitive and unnecessarily guilt-
 W. Anne Joh, “On Diversity, Institutional Whiteness and Its Will for Change,” Religious 22
Studies News, May 2014, accessed Oct 27, 2018, https://www.aarweb.org/publications/rsn-
may-2014-on-diversity-institutional-whiteness-and-its-will-for-change.
 See Edwards, The Elusive Dream; Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith, Divided by Faith: 23
Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000); Brandon C. Martinez and Kevin D. Dougherty, “Race, Belonging, and Participation in 
Religious Congregations,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52, no. 4 (2013): 713-32.
 Itzbeth Menjívar, “The Social Justice Sector Has an Internal Racism Problem,” Sojourners, 24
June 11, 2019, accessed August 8, 2019, https://sojo.net/articles/social-justice-sector-has-internal-
racism-problem. See also Jane Ward, “White Normativity: The Cultural Dimensions of Whiteness 
in a Racially Diverse LGBT Organization,” Sociological Perspectives 51, no. 3 (2008): 563-86.
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inducing. Indeed, detractors of critical antiracism would argue that emotioned white 
resistance is a natural and necessary response to a theoretical perspective that is too 
ambiguous to reasonably serve as a causal account of racial inequality and that unjustly 
stigmatizes too wide a range of discourse and behaviors. Conservative journalist and 
author Heather Mac Donald complains that “students specializing in critical race theory 
play the race card incessantly against their fellow students and their professors,”  and 25
that the experiences of racism they describe “can neither be perceived nor measured.”  26
Linguist John McWhorter objects to what he perceives as an overemphasis on latent 
racism in everyday attitudes and practices. “Occasional unsavory incidents,” as he 
describes such practices, “are said to render a university a thoroughly racist 
establishment” without sufficient warrant.  Psychologist John Staddon argues that 27
systemic racism is a “poor concept,” precisely because it interprets racial disparities as 
indicators of an unjust system. At most, according to Staddon, such disparities are 
“possibly, effects of racism in the past. They are not racism now, systemic or otherwise, 
by any reasonable definition. Failure to acknowledge this distinction has unjustly 
stigmatized white people and is a cause of needless conflict.”  28
 Heather Mac Donald, The Diversity Delusion: How Race and Gender Pandering Corrupt the 25
University and Undermine Our Culture (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2018), 64.
 Mac Donald, The Diversity Delusion, 49.26
 John McWhorter, “The Virtue Signalers Won’t Change the World,” Atlantic Monthly, 27
December 23, 2018, accessed August 8, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/
2018/12/why-third-wave-anti-racism-dead-end/578764/
 John Staddon, “How Real is Systemic Racism Today?” Quillette, January 25, 2019, accessed 28
August 3, 2019, https://quillette.com/2019/01/25/how-real-is-systemic-racism-today/
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 One arena in which the attribution of racism to everyday practices and norms is 
contested is the body of research on racial microaggressions, a conceptually broad term 
for everyday words and actions that demean or discriminate at the interpersonal level.  29
Psychologist Scott O. Lilienfeld has challenged the construct validity of 
microaggressions, proposing that the psychological harm reported by students of color in 
response to this category of behaviors most likely indicates temperamental dispositions 
such as negative emotionality on the part of recipients.  While he takes pains to 30
acknowledge the existence of instances of prejudice and indignity, Lilienfeld nevertheless 
expresses concern that attention to subtle, commonplace racial slights “could lower the 
threshold for what is considered hostile or offensive … thereby generating high rates of 
false-positive identifications of innocuous behaviors as microaggressions.”  As with 31
many critiques of critical race frameworks, Lilienfeld’s criteria for adjudicating racism 
consists of the presence of conscious racial animus and intent to inflict harm. His critique 
of the microaggressions concept, like other critiques of critical race frameworks, 
exemplifies the conviction that common discourses which may reflect white normativity 
should not be subject to censure, as long as they do not reflect ill intent. 
 Microaggressions are defined by Derald Wing Sue et al. as “brief and commonplace daily 29
verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that 
communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial slights and insults toward people of color.” 
Sue et al., “Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice,” 
American Psychologist 62, no. 4 (2007): 271.
 Scott O. Lilienfeld, “Microaggressions: Strong Claims, Inadequate Evidence,” Perspectives on 30
Psychological Science 12, no. 1 (2017): 138-69. See also Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning, 
"Microaggression and Moral Cultures,” Comparative Sociology 13, no. 6 (2014): 692-726.
 Lilienfeld, “Microaggressions,” 162.31
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 Political scientist Eric Kaufmann also critiques critical antiracism as an unfair 
condemnation of society that justifiably elicits white resistance, but he does so as an 
advocate of white identity and in-group solidarity in his book Whiteshift: Populism, 
Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities. Kaufmann advocates for the 
preservation of white dominant majority status as a legitimate interest, expressing 
profound skepticism that such an interest constitutes any form of structural racial 
injustice. “Indicators of structures of white oppression have largely disappeared,” he 
argues. “Arguments based on critical race theory, history or income difference do not 
constitute rigorous evidence of a structure of white privilege.”  Kaufmann acknowledges 32
that “[b]eing white in Europe or North America confers some advantage,”  but maintains 33
that that advantage (precisely what critical whiteness theorists identify as white privilege) 
should not be deemed problematic, because “there are other costs to cultural 
egalitarianism… when majority ethnic groups, men, or other advantaged categories are 
prevented from developing their culture and identity, there is a cost to community.” 
34
 Kaufmann argues that racial equality should be seen as one potential social good 
that can be negotiated among other goods such as cohesion and efficiency, but ought not 
be held up as an absolute value. He makes a moral differentiation between white in-group 
 Eric P. Kaufmann, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (New 32
York: Abrams Press, 2019), 330.
 Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 329.33
 Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 330.34
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attachment and out-group hate,  and maintains that “an ethno-traditional national 35
identity which includes a white majority component, isn’t racist.”  The desire to preserve 36
white dominant majority status is legitimate given that it is “psychologically much harder 
to decline than to grow” and an “established population will tend to resist their relative 
decline.”  While Kaufmann distinguishes between ethnic majority identity and national 37
identity, he nevertheless sees the ethnic majority as providing a “key source of civic glue”
—something he views as a necessary component of a healthy society because “national 
cohesion is often a by-product of confident ethnic majorities.”  38
 I spend time with Kaufmann’s analysis at this point in the introduction because he 
makes explicit a series of interconnected ideological beliefs that, I argue, underlie most 
resistance of critical antiracist analysis: First, that the definition of racial oppression must 
be limited to attitudes, behaviors, and policies characterized by overt out-group animus; 
second, that social norms familiar and advantageous to white people do not qualify as 
oppressive but emerge necessarily from white majority status and provide a positive 
element of social cohesion; third, that racial disparities in political, economic, and 
cultural power are regrettable but inevitable consequences of differences between the 
social norms of non-white groups and those of the white majority; and finally, that the 
 Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 368. See also Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Psychology of Prejudice: 35
Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?” Journal of Social Issues 55, no. 3 (1999): 429-44.
 Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 369. 36
 Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 370-71.37
 Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 536.38
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preservation of white normativity therefore constitutes a reasonable and ethically 
justifiable interest. These beliefs, whether explicit or tacit, ground the effort to limit a 
definition of racism as something rare and aberrant rather than something that infuses 
everyday practice. These efforts to resist critical race theory at the institutional level 
reflect, I would argue, the same deeply-rooted and pervasive attachment to white 
normativity that animates white emotioned resistance in classroom contexts. 
Context and Significance of the Problem (II): Theological Analysis of White 
Supremacy 
 In recent decades, liberationist, womanist, constructive, and practical theologies 
have incorporated analysis of reflexive habits and emotioned responses in the way they 
confront systemic white supremacy. Emilie Townes, in Womanist Ethics and the Cultural 
Production of Evil, theorizes whiteness as an aspect of the “fantastic hegemonic 
imagination,” the constructed matrix of images, narratives, and types that shape the 
intuitions and in turn the structures of society, keeping oppressive hierarchies in place.  39
She argues that combatting white hegemony demands that we “tarry more with … how 
whiteness is constructed and how it is maintained as a largely uninterrogated 
phenomenon of alleged neutrality, or worse of being the norm.”  Tom Beaudoin and 40
Katherine Turpin interrogate how the phenomenon of whiteness as the norm has shaped 
the field of practical theology, pointing out that white practical theologians “have not 
 Townes, Womanist Ethics, 7.39
 Townes, Womanist Ethics, 72.40
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often had to give an account of our own cultural norms and dominance … and the 
strengths and limitations of these cultural inflections in the ways that other racialized 
groups have been required to do so.”  They advocate for a strategic construction of white 41
practical theology, that examines and identifies characteristically white cultural patterns 
and ideological assumptions.  42
 To that end, many recent theologies confronting white supremacy have attended 
closely to white embodied and psychic experience. Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s Places 
of Redemption, an ethnographic study of practices in an interracial church that includes 
people with disabilities, devotes much time to examining her own emotioned responses to 
people of color, and she frames her analysis in often visceral language. She recognizes 
her own “feeling of strangeness” amidst a worshiping community predominantly of color 
as an indicator that “my conscious commitments to inclusiveness were not completely 
correlated with my habituated sense of the normal.”  Fulkerson then interprets her 43
experience in the church as indicative of a wider social problem which she describes as a 
wound—specifically, “a situation characterized by interpersonal forms of obliviousness 
and aversiveness marked and sustained by larger social-political processes … a situation 
characterized by a harm that demands redress.”  She acknowledges that identifying such 44
 Tom Beaudoin and Katherine Turpin, “White Practical Theology,” in Cahalan and Mikoski, 41
251.
 Beaudoin and Turpin, “White Practical Theology,” 260.42
 Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Places of Redemption: Theology for a Worldly Church (Oxford: 43
Oxford University Press, 2007), 15.
 Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, 17.44
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obliviousness as the heart of the wound is “already a reflection of my own subject 
position,”  which highlights the fact that even reflexive, visceral responses are socially 45
constructed according to how society ascribes meaning and value to racial identity. By 
connecting her individual embodied experience to broader social forces, and reflecting 
theologically on the harm cause by such patterns and interactions, Fulkerson employs a 
practical theological framework that conceptually influences my own. 
 Other theologians who reflect on white normativity include James Perkinson, 
Elisabeth Vasko, Jeannine Hill Fletcher, and Katie Walker Grimes. Perkinson works with 
a phenomenological perspective on white experience drawing primarily from Du Bois’s 
work on the racialization of consciousness. He describes whiteness as “an almost 
incorrigible lack of awareness of either one’s racial position or of the actual cost to others 
of one’s prosperity.”  Hill Fletcher articulates a similar point, using Joe Feagin’s concept 46
of the white racial frame.  Centuries of overt theological valuation of white people over 47
 Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, 18. For comment on how Fulkerson’s social location shapes 45
her research, see Courtney Goto, Taking on Practical Theology: The Idolization of Context and 
the Hope of Community, Theology in Practice, v. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 136-42. Goto 
acknowledges that Fulkerson “avoids treating her perspective as a given,” but questions whether 
she sufficiently interrogates the power dynamics and potential for exploitation involved in her 
ethnographic project.
 James W. Perkinson, White Theology: Outing Supremacy in Modernity (New York: Palgrave 46
MacMillan, 2004), 89.
 Joe R. Feagin, The White Racial Frame: Centuries of Racial Framing and Counter-framing, 47
2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013).
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other human beings result in ingrained tacit assumptions about the appropriateness of the 
higher status and economic conditions of white people today.  48
 Vasko reflects on whiteness through the category of apathy, focusing on white 
normativity as a form of desensitization to the suffering of those on the underside of 
white supremacist oppression. “The white response to racism,” she asserts, “can largely 
be characterized by dismissal, disregard, and outright denial of black suffering.”  Katie 49
Walker Grimes, in Christ Divided: Antiblackness as Corporate Vice, addresses the issue 
of white complicity and culpability by integrating neuroscientific research on habituated 
behaviors. Similarly to Fulkerson, she reminds us that “although whites frequently deny 
bias with their mouths, they consistently express aversion to blackness with their 
bodies.”  Grimes carefully maintains, however, that the pre-rational nature of behaviors 50
and habits that reproduce white supremacy does not absolve white people of personal 
culpability for racism. Even if white people do not fully comprehend how our actions 
oppress, we are “capable of voluntarily willing in alignment with the habits that [we] did 
not deliberately decide to acquire,”  and are thus motivated to persist in ignorance. 51
 Jeannine Hill Fletcher, The Sin of White Supremacy: Christianity, Racism, and Religious 48
Diversity in America (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2017), 93-94.
 Elisabeth Vasko, Beyond Apathy: A Theology for Bystanders (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 49
2015).
 Katie Walker Grimes, Christ Divided: Antiblackness as Corporate Vice (Minneapolis: 50
Augsburg Fortress, 2017), 91.
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 This brief review of anti-racist theology illustrates how theoretical perspectives on 
white habitual behaviors and emotioned reactions are increasingly informing theological 
conversations. My own contribution to this discussion focuses on the specific phenomena 
of white resistance and employs psychodynamic theory to form an account of how white 
people develop subconscious incentives to preserve white hegemony. I then use this 
psychodynamic analysis as the basis for theological reflection on white people’s ethical 
responsibility to identify how our emotioned white resistant practices contribute to white 
hegemony. What responsibility do we as white people have to interrogate the origin of 
our underlying motivations for resistance to critical antiracist analysis, and to learn what 
practices we need to develop in order to cultivate our moral intuition in new directions? 
These questions call for an approach that integrates pastoral and pedagogical concerns. 
Practical Theological Method: Psychology and Pastoral Implications 
 My integration of psychology as a disciplinary partner in my liberationist 
practical theology of white resistance rests on the premise, as David Hogue explains, that 
the social sciences can “deepen our empirical comprehension of human relational 
processes, thus providing critical new data for theological anthropology.”  I argue that 52
understanding the mechanisms of white hegemony includes analysis of the psychic 
processes at work in generating white emotioned resistance. As Miller-McLemore 
 David Hogue, “Brain Matters: Neuroscience, Empathy, and Pastoral Theology,” Journal of 52
Pastoral Theology 20, no. 2 (2010): 31. See also Miller-McLemore, Christian Theology in 
Practice, 29-32.
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explains, practical theologians who focus on personal formation have in recent decades 
begun “adding to the already demanding need to understand intrapsychic and 
interpersonal dynamics the need to understand social location and identity, political 
policies, and public responsibilities.”  Phillis Sheppard argues for an integrative 53
approach to practical theology which acknowledges the importance of social and cultural 
analysis while claiming that “without a deep engagement with psychoanalytic theory, 
womanist theology cannot fully account for the complexities of black women’s 
experience.”  This paradigm runs through my analysis of the psychological dimensions 54
of white emotioned resistance. Focusing on the role of social location in psychological 
development presumes and demonstrates the broader claim that the social and the 
psychological are aspects of a single system. 
 This emphasis on social structure and context impacts the way practical 
theologians define and respond to pastoral needs. Fulkerson’s depiction of white 
obliviousness as a “wound” exemplifies the need to address everyday habits and practices 
in terms of the suffering they cause for the wider community, rather than an exclusive 
focus on individual or interpersonal distress. Sheppard specifically differentiates her use 
of psychoanalytic theory from a traditional focus on individual differences—she explains 
 Miller-McLemore, Christian Theology in Practice, 95-96. For a full treatment of the 53
importance of social location for pastoral theology, and the use of discourse analysis in analyzing 
subject creation, see Susan J. Dunlap, “Discourse Theory and Pastoral Theology,” in Feminist and 
Womanist Pastoral Theology, ed. Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Brita L. Gill-Austern (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 1999), 133-148.
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 6.54
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that womanist pastoral theologians “look for the ‘overlapping links between experiences’ 
of black women rather than a preoccupation with the individual experience.”  It is this 55
idea of applying developmental psychological insight to “overlapping links between 
experiences” that characterizes my approach to white emotioned resistance. I am less 
interested in the psychological differences between white individuals, though those may 
be significant, than I am interested in characteristic developmental patterns that arise 
from the social location of whiteness in which psychological development takes place. 
 My emphasis here departs from a focus on individual differences which 
characterizes most theoretical approaches in psychology, particularly developmental and 
personality psychology. These approaches focus on individual differences in relatively 
stable personality traits which emerge from the interaction between genetics and the 
particulars of one’s social environment,  as well as differences in behavioral patterns that 56
reflect relational dynamics with caregivers in our formative years. An emphasis on 
individual differences characterizes self psychology as well, but in my engagement with 
that tradition I emphasize the prospect that white people also share certain elements of 
psychological development in common. I argue that because the social milieu 
communicates the value of white identity as normative, it constitutes a common relational 
context in which white people develop our sense of self. This developmental context 
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 18.55
 For an overview of individual difference approaches to the psychology of personality traits, see 56
Mark R. Leary and Rick H. Hoyle, eds., Handbook of Individual Differences in Social Behavior 
(New York: Guilford Press, 2009).
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potentially accounts for some patterns of perception and behavior common to white 
people which exist along with individual differences. In this way I seek to explain aspects 
of the social phenomena of white resistance by theorizing how feelings of identity and 
security are inculcated in individuals through socialization mechanisms. 
 My contribution to the critical whiteness literature on this topic is developed with 
the pastoral question in mind of how to address the resultant feelings of defensiveness 
and disorientation when white people’s sense of moral identity is challenged by critical 
antiracism. It is important to emphasize here that my project must be understood as but 
one dimension of the much larger fight to expose and dismantle systemic racism. 
Addressing white emotioned resistance pedagogically and pastorally should not be 
understood primarily as prioritizing the sensitivities of white people in uncomfortable 
learning situations, but as learning how to direct white emotions in a way that encourages 
heightened self-awareness and increased social analytical skill. A liberationist practical 
theology of white emotioned resistance, then, entails encouraging white people to commit 
to welcome disorientation, vulnerability, and an openness to having our intuitions 
reshaped. It anticipates the discomfort that challenging norms will engender, due to our 
affective attachments to them, and claims that moving through that discomfort is a non-
negotiable dimension of justice. As Elaine Graham tells it, opening ourselves up to 
having our norms challenged is “an encounter with transcendence and authentic faith 
25
occurring at the very point of loss of certainty and self-possession: divine activity and 
presence are encountered in the mystery of alterity.”  57
Practical Theological Method: Theology for Church and Society 
 I also locate my liberationist practical theological approach in the methodological 
space where “all the public, political, social, and psychological issues can be addressed, 
whether they are framed in religious terms or not.”  The prevalence of systemic racism 58
and white resistance in the church mirrors a broader reality affecting all sectors of civic 
life. Indeed, the rise of white nationalist political movements and controversies over 
immigration in recent years are just two significant examples demonstrating the urgency 
of addressing systemic racism in U.S. society as a whole. Moreover, a preponderance of 
the research analyzing and critiquing white hegemony is being conducted in academic 
fields outside of theology. Liberationist practical theology is therefore one part of a much 
larger, theoretically and methodologically diverse discussion, one which is essential to 
the cause of justice in U.S. society and many other societies across the globe. 
 Elaine Graham, Transforming Practice: Pastoral Theology in an Age of Uncertainty (London: 57
Mowbray, 1996), 206-07.
 R. Ruard Ganzevoort, “Forks in the Road when Tracing the Sacred: Practical Theology as 58
Hermeneutics of Lived Religion,” Presidential Address, International Academy of Practical 
Theology, August 3, 2009. See also Mary Elizabeth Moore, “Purposes of Practical Theology: A 
Comparative Analysis between United States Practical Theologians and Johannes van der Ven,” 
in Hermeneutics and Empirical Research in Practical Theology: The Contribution of Empirical 
Theology by Johannes A. Van Der Ven, ed. Chris Hermans and Mary Elizabeth Moore (Leiden: 
Brill Academic Publishers, 2004), 178.
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 Therefore I develop my theological reflections on white resistance, both in its 
descriptive and ethical movements, in the interest of contributing to the wider political 
struggle against white hegemony. With regard to the descriptive task, it is my hope that a 
detailed account of how psychic attachments to white normativity are generated might 
contribute to the strategic thinking of anti-racist educators and practitioners. Critical 
whiteness educators such as Applebaum, DiAngelo, and Zembylas deal extensively with 
the nature and function of emotioned resistance in classroom discussion, and reflect a 
diversity of opinion over how best to respond to it.  Such disagreements reflect a wider 59
discussion whether expressions of empathy help the pedagogical process or whether they 
unjustly prioritize white feelings over the more serious struggles of people of color, and 
absolve white people of the need to develop greater stamina.  I suggest that an account 60
which highlights psychological attachment to the social milieu might inform such a 
discussion. 
 With regard to the ethical task, liberationist practical theology can provide 
resources to help critical theorists and social scientists articulate the core values 
undergirding their projects, particularly in the face of intransigent ideological resistance. 
For example, Eric Kaufmann’s claim that “national cohesion is often a by-product of 
 See Michalinos Zembylas, “Pedagogies of Strategic Empathy: Navigating through the 59
Emotional Complexities of Anti-Racism in Higher Education,” Teaching in Higher Education 17, 
no. 2 (2012); Barbara Applebaum, “Comforting Discomfort as Complicity: White Fragility and 
the Pursuit of Invulnerability,” Hypatia 32, no. 4 (2017): 868.
 DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” 57.60
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confident ethnic majorities”  reflects a choice to prioritize the value of “cohesion” over 61
the value of equity. While few if any white progressives pursuing racial equity in their 
organizations would assent to such a claim, our white normative habitual attitudes and 
behaviors often enact the same underlying value: that organizational cohesion requires 
that change does not exceed the parameters of white comfort. The fact that many white 
people are capable of expanding their comfort zone to accommodate increasing amounts 
of difference does not change the fundamental calculus. Hence the value of a robust 
articulation of the potential for social norms to constitute an oppressive practice, as well 
as a robust affirmation that a good society is one in which human flourishing, respect, 
and value are equally distributed. 
Theoretical Contribution: A Psychoanalytic Approach to a Systemic Problem 
 A central concern of this project is the relationship between subjective white 
intentions and systemic oppression. This reflects a persistent question in discourse on 
systemic oppression—how racism can operate via micro-level norms and intuitions in the 
absence of overt racial animus or beliefs in racial hierarchy. This is not to minimize the 
extent to which overt racism and oppression persist, but to focus on the way white 
skepticism regarding systemic analysis fuels white resistance to structural change. The 
interlocking set of beliefs which I identified as characteristic of academic skepticism of 
critical antiracism have their roots in ideologies of white superiority. Social taboos 
 Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 536.61
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against overt expressions of racism do not extinguish the operations of these ideologies, 
which are, in the words of Kelly Brown Douglas, “embedded within the collective 
psyche.”  Put another way, individual intuitions and structural systems are always 62
inherently co-constituted. 
 The aim of my analysis is to explore just how such embedding takes place, and 
how it persists and resists cognitive commitments to racial equity. The observation that 
avowed progressive white people often act to preserve white supremacy is not new; it has 
been researched extensively in critical whiteness studies. My focus on the role of 
psychological development reflects an interest in exploring the gap between a sincere 
commitment to racial justice and the absence of an intuitive sense of responsibility and 
culpability in the creation of oppressive systems. To put it simply, emotioned resistance to 
critical race analysis within both the academic and popular spheres involves a deeply felt 
impulse that what feels normal cannot be all that bad, and this impulse does not 
evaporate if and when a theoretical critique of systemic racism is embraced. I argue that 
white experiences of disorientation in anti-racist pedagogical settings are symptomatic of 
a socio-psychological formation process that naturalizes the prioritization of our own 
comfort and the imposition of our norms upon others. Theologically speaking, white 
normativity is a form of spiritual formation undertaken by the society as a whole. 
 Kelly Brown Douglas, Stand Your Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God (Maryknoll, 62
NY: Orbis Books, 2015), 112.
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 A focus on white subjective experience is open to several critiques, expressed by 
many critical race scholars and theologians of systemic racism. As Margaret Andersen 
articulates, “racial identity is not just an individualized process but involves the formation 
of social groups organized around material interests with their roots in social structure, 
not just individual consciousness.”  Without sufficient grounding in these sociological 63
realities, Andersen asserts, “much of the writing on whiteness comes across merely as 
white angst.”  Moreover, while the methodology of liberation theology places everyday 64
lived experience at the center of reflection, it is the experience of the oppressed, not the 
oppressor, that functions as the epistemological center. Turpin reminds us that 
“liberationist practical theologians understand that daily life experiences and struggles of 
marginalized persons as an authoritative site of God’s revelation and action.”  65
 The reasons for emphasizing social structures of power over subjective white 
experience are quite valid: socio-critical analyses generally focus on how unjust social 
systems operate independently of conscious intention, how “there are aspects of cultural 
processes that are disavowed by significant parts of society.”  Emphasis on white 66
subjectivity can also distract from analysis of the impact of social structures on oppressed 
 Margaret Andersen, “Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,” in White Out: 63
The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed. Ashley W. Doane and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (New 
York: Routledge, 2003), 29-30.
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peoples. My method, however, operates on the premise that there is value in analyzing 
white subjectivity as long as it is properly contextualized and presented as one constituent 
factor of a broader social system. I am interested in the nature of intuitive reactions and 
behaviors which reinforce social power regardless of conscious intent, because those 
everyday behaviors play an integral role in determining whether structural change is 
undertaken or not, and to what extent. My use of developmental psychology is therefore 
intended to complement rather than challenge structural analyses, based on the premise 
that social systems propagate themselves through subtle habits and emotional attachments 
as much as through ideas. 
 I believe that framing white normativity as a practice has potential to integrate 
critical analysis with theological claims. The ways we invest ethical weight in our 
analysis of social and psychological phenomena ultimately reflect value commitments 
regarding what constitutes healthy and just human relationships. My analysis of the 
psychic and affective elements of white normativity is undertaken, in part, in the hope 
that it might encourage white people to value the self-interrogation of one’s own norms 
and comfort, and how they hinder efforts to pursue transformative change toward racial 
justice. 
Outline of Chapters 
 The first chapter addresses in depth what it means to analyze white normativity as 
a practice. I survey theories of practice within practical theology and in other disciplines, 
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and review the literature of my interdisciplinary partners—critical whiteness theory and 
psychoanalytic theories of race. I explain how the complex, pervasive natures of white 
emotioned resistance and white normativity require an interdisciplinary conversation 
capable of accounting for how individual psychology and social structures are not two 
fundamentally discrete spheres of human activity, but rather different aspects of a fully 
integrated system. Thus I show how integrating developmental psychology with critical 
theoretical perspectives can contribute a more integrative account of how white resistance 
functions. 
 The second chapter is a thorough review of the qualitative research literature by 
critical whiteness education scholars. This research, conducted mostly in education 
departments but also by critical whiteness scholars in philosophical disciplines, consists 
of anecdotes, in-depth interviews, focus groups, and methods of participant observation. I 
organize the qualitative material into a taxonomy of different forms of white resistant 
behavior and discourse, and analyze how those forms of resistance function to protect 
white people’s moral identity and predominant worldviews. In the third chapter, I 
dialogue at length with theoretical interpretations of white resistance from Barbara 
Applebaum, Jennifer Mueller, and Linda Martín-Alcoff, specifically as they address the 
issue of white motivations informing resistant discourse. I engage with post-structural 
theories of discourse and power, epistemologies of ignorance, and phenomenology. I 
analyze their strengths and make a case for supplementing their accounts with my own 
psychoanalytic focused account. 
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 In the fourth chapter I develop my own theory of psychic attachment to the white 
normative social milieu. I survey current psychoanalytic approaches to racism, the 
majority of which focus on analyzing aversive emotions and animus toward groups of 
people based upon phenotypical difference. Contemporary object relations approaches to 
racism and Lacanian theories offer valuable insights concerning the generation of racial 
categories and racist animus, but in contrast, my use of self psychology focuses on 
habituation processes of affinity. Here I draw primarily upon Heinz Kohut’s concept of 
mirroring and the need for cultural selfobjects, and Phillis Sheppard’s critique and 
extension of those concepts in light of the realities of systemic racial oppression. I argue 
that a white hegemonic social environment functions as a kind of selfobject, generating in 
white people an excessively grandiose sense of self that is underdeveloped in its capacity 
to share power and relate across difference. 
 The fifth chapter develops a theology of white social formation, which examines 
how the co-constitution of social location and psychological development naturalizes 
white hegemony, and advocates for a vision of interrelationship across difference that 
expands the scope of human flourishing to all. This will involve reflection on the 
potential for oppression and exclusion within social norms, based on Willie James 
Jennings’s analysis of what he calls the white “aesthetic regime.” I also address how to 
frame white culpability in conversation with Katie Walker Grimes concept of the 
embodied voluntary, arguing that dismantling white normativity requires a commitment 
on the part of white people to problematize our drive for social comfort. I conclude with 
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an affirmation of the need to embrace the disorientation and vulnerability that 
characterizes encounter with difference in culture and norms, drawing upon Mayra 
Rivera’s notion of relational transcendence. While grounded in Christian liberation 
theological commitments, these theological claims will be framed in language directed 
toward the public sphere. 
 I conclude with implications for antiracist pedagogy and pastoral care, in 
particular how to address the psychic distress and disorientation that invariably 
accompanies efforts to expose and disrupt white normativity in all sectors of U.S. society. 
I advocate that critical antiracist education strategies better prepare white people for the 
inevitable psychological challenges, and develop an ethos that values both disruption and 
compassion as ways to move white people from self-protection into an embrace of 
necessary discomfort. 
Epistemic Advantage 
 It is also essential to acknowledge, particularly given the nature of this project, 
that the “researcher brings his or her pre-understanding into the dialogue with the actions, 
meanings, and pre-understandings of the subjects.”  My approach to analyzing white 67
normativity is necessarily shaped by my experiences of resistance when challenged as a 
white person invested in anti-racist work—in other words, by the very social processes 
 Don Browning, A Fundamental Practical Theology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1991), 67
48.
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that I am analyzing. Courtney Goto in Taking On Practical Theology describes the 
importance of identifying and applying one’s epistemic advantage.  This concept is 68
usually applied to people who have experienced oppression, who are forced by their 
circumstances to develop a perspectival advantage in perceiving power structures. 
However, Goto maintains that “with help anyone can develop an epistemic advantage…. 
privileged people can slowly develop sensitivity to perceive and experience what had 
previously escaped their awareness and attention.”  My community, built up over years 69
of experience participating in religious and academic institutions pursuing racial equity, 
has graciously encouraged me in my own process of developing greater epistemic 
sensitivity, and I endeavor to research with their lives and their gifts firmly in mind. 
Of course, whatever epistemic advantage I have been able to develop through life in 
community is still inevitably shaped and limited by formation within my own social 
location. While my interest in psychological development emerges from an honest 
attempt to understand white resistance, my own investment in comfort, self-exoneration, 
and preservation of the status quo inevitably influence the work. Self monitoring is 
insufficient for addressing the epistemic challenges involved, and Emirbayer and 
Desmond argue that racial self-reflexivity “requires a culture of reflexive wisdom 
wherein race analysts pass on to one another their accumulated practical knowledge.”  70
 Goto, Taking on Practical Theology, 68-69.68
 Goto, Taking On Practical Theology, 69.69
 Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond, “Race and Reflexivity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 70
35, no. 4 (April 1, 2012): 591.
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My research process, therefore, incorporates insights from white critical race scholars on 
how to integrate self-reflexivity, as I wrestle with the reality, as Harvey describes, that 
“my social self is formed by the very discourses and structures I attempt to challenge.”  71
 Jennifer Harvey, Whiteness and Morality: Pursuing Racial Justice through Reparations and 71
Sovereignty (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 8.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF WHITE RESISTANCE 
AND NORMATIVITY AS PRACTICES OF OPPRESSION 
 The choice to analyze white emotioned resistance as a social practice within the 
discipline of practical theology reflects my interest in understanding the relationship 
between individual behaviors and systems of social injustice. It involves theological 
reflection on the role social norms and habitual actions play in sustaining white 
hegemony, with an intent of cultivating within white people a greater sense of shared 
responsibility for transforming social norms and supporting structural changes. Within 
that broader interest, this project proposes that emotioned responses of confusion, 
distress, and anger evinced by white people in response to critical anti-racist pedagogy 
constitute a form of practice that arises as a defense when white normativity is challenged 
as a practice of oppression. This chapter argues for understanding both white normativity 
and white emotioned resistance as forms of practice, which are therefore subject to socio-
critical analysis and theological reflection. 
 The idea that habits, norms, and even emotional reactions qualify as practices of 
racial oppression diverges from understandings of moral culpability that emphasize 
individual conscious intention. Barbara Applebaum claims that an ethical emphasis on 
individual intentions “works to conceal the complicity of individuals in the perpetuation 
of systemic injustice.”  Without a clear causal line between ill-intent, action, and resultant 1
 Barbara Applebaum, “In the Name of Morality: Moral Responsibility, Whiteness and Social 1
Justice Education,” Journal Of Moral Education 34, no. 3 (2005): 282. See also Dwight Boyd, 
“The Legacies of Liberalism and Oppressive Relations: Facing a Dilemma for the Subject of 
Moral Education,” Journal of Moral Education 33, no. 1 (2004), 1–22.
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harm, an individualist understanding of moral responsibility renders these systems 
obscure to many white people (as well as to many people of color who operate from 
individualist premises), and I argue in subsequent chapters that this conceptual 
dissonance is a significant generator of emotioned resistance. Framing emotioned white 
resistance and white normativity as practices therefore has the potential to bridge a 
conceptual gap between individualist conceptions of moral responsibility and structural 
understandings of oppression. This agenda reflects core commitments of liberationist 
practical theology: the significance of everyday lived experience as a site of theological 
reflection, and the central role of socialization—both purposeful and automatic—in 
reproducing systems of power. 
 This methodological chapter begins by outlining theories of practice operant in 
practical theology, philosophy, and sociology. I argue that understanding white resistance 
normativity as a practice calls attention to how its commonplace, reflexive operations 
contribute to a normative cultural matrix of oppression. Then I survey the literature of my 
dialogue partner disciplines, critical whiteness studies and psychodynamic theories of 
racism, in preparation for engagement with their theoretical accounts of white emotioned 
resistance and my own proposed intervention which involves analyzing the psychological 
development of attachments to the racialized social milieu. The final part of the chapter 
outlines the contours of the argument for Chapters 2-4 of the dissertation, which focuses 
on interpreting the disconnect between critical whiteness analysis and white subjective 
experience with regard to underlying motivations of resistance. 
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Theoretical Approaches to The Ethical Significance of Everyday Practice 
Theories of Practice in Practical Theology 
 While the field of practical theology encompasses a diversity of theological 
perspectives, subjects of study, and research methods, it holds in common a “focus on the 
lived practices of persons and communities within their social contexts.”  This focus is 2
grounded in the premise that human practices, in addition to being phenomena of 
scholarly interest, constitute a distinct source of knowledge and wisdom. Don Browning 
develops this idea by drawing on Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, or practical reason, 
emphasizing that “practical thinking is the center of human thinking and that theoretical 
and technical thinking are abstractions from practical thinking.”  Phronesis is a way of 3
learning and reasoning through doing, as Bonnie Miller-McLemore explains, and it 
“requires embodiment and community” in order to function.  4
 For many practical theologians, reflection on everyday practices and experiences 
has the potential for generating an enriched understanding of the mystery and value of 
life. Miller-McLemore describes this as lived theology, “extending interest in rituals and 
practices to questions about how theology or knowing and loving the divine takes shape 
 Joyce Ann Mercer, “Interdisciplinarity as a Practical Theological Conundrum,” in Conundrums 2
in Practical Theology, ed. Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Joyce Mercer (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 163.
 Browning, Fundamental Practical Theology, 8.3
 Bonnie Miller-McLemore, “Five Misunderstandings about Practical Theology,” International 4
Journal of Practical Theology 16, no. 1 (2012): 15.
39
in everyday life and how everyday life influences theology.”  Heather Walton cites 5
approvingly the theory of Henri Lefevbre, who “offers a vision of the everyday in which 
it is the site of revelation; a realm of mystery shot through with the tragic; a place of 
profound play secured by marvelous grace of the poetic.”  Analysis of the embedded 6
nature of systemic racism, however, generates a less positive view of everyday practice. 
As both Miller-McLemore and Walton acknowledge, the array of overt and subtle 
practices by which hegemonic structures are preserved requires that we “take into 
account the social, political, and religious contexts of suffering,”  and grapple with “the 7
banality of the everyday that robs us of our humanity.”  While theological reflection on 8
everyday lived experience has the potential to reveal it as a source of poetic grace, 
analysis through the lens of critical race theory reveals it equally as a web of oppression. 
 Liberation theologians share practical theology’s commitment to the centrality of 
lived theology, but they center the lived experience of the oppressed and the need for 
theological reflection to lead to the dismantling of oppressive systems.  In the words of 9
Christopher Rowland, liberation theology “is explored not just in the tutorial or seminar 
 Miller-McLemore, Christian Theology in Practice, 103.5
 Heather Walton, “Seeking Wisdom in Practical Theology: Phronesis, Poetics and Everyday 6
Life,” Practical Theology 7, no. 1 (March 2014): 13.
 Miller-McLemore, Christian Theology in Practice, 151.7
 Walton, “Seeking Wisdom,” 12.8
 Prominent liberation theologies include Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, 9
Politics, and Salvation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988); James Cone, God of the Oppressed 
(New York: Seabury Press, 1975); Delores Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of 
Womanist God-Talk (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993).
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but engages the whole person in the midst of a life of struggle and deprivation.”  10
Rebecca Chopp argues that practical theology needs the challenge of liberation theology, 
for practical reasoning that does not begin with the lived experience of the oppressed is 
guilty of simply reproducing “the constitution of Christianity in bourgeois society as 
individualistic, existentialistic, and private.”  The methodological concerns of liberation 11
theology directly influence later forms of liberationist practical theology, including those 
that analyze how the everyday practices of white people contribute to systemic 
oppression. Jennifer Harvey asserts that white people’s “actions, attitudes, and ways of 
being subvert justice.”  Another way to say this is that practices of white normativity 12
subvert justice, among which I include practices of white emotioned resistance. 
 If practical theology is to address how white hegemony is sustained by everyday 
habits and practices, we must recognize the extent to which the field of practical theology 
itself is implicated in these dynamics. Even as white practical theologians commit to 
analyzing and countering racist oppression, we nevertheless “participate in hierarchies 
and histories of power and privilege, operating according to norms and standards that are 
conceived, determined, and enforced by those with the most social capital,” as Courtney 
Goto describes.  By way of example, Goto describes her experience of the editorial 13
 Rowland, “Introduction,” 2.10
 Rebecca Chopp, "Practical Theology and Liberation,” in Formation and Reflection: The 11
Promise of Practical Theology, ed. Lewis S. Mudge and James L. Poling (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1987), 125.
 Harvey, Whiteness and Morality, 7.12
 Goto, Taking On Practical Theology, 52.13
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process for a collection of essays in practical theology, one cited in this dissertation: 
Opening the Field of Practical Theology: An Introduction. The collection, as Goto 
confirms, was to include three essays devoted to practical theology approaches associated 
with racial identity groups, African-American, US Latino/a, and Asian American. She 
explains that she “appreciated that the editors wanted to include diverse perspectives,” 
and yet, “I wondered why only scholars of color were asked to write the racial chapters, 
while white colleagues were invited to address approaches that are central to (meaning 
‘well studied in’) the discipline.”  Goto stresses that while this “request was not the 14
result of conscious racism on anyone’s part,” it nevertheless constituted “an unwitting 
division of labor that implies and reinforces an assumption that those with power and 
privilege in the field speak about what is privileged … while those who are historically 
marginalized address what is often treated as marginal.”  This anecdote demonstrates 15
how a theological endeavor committed to racial justice can persist in entrenched patterns 
of inequity even in the process of trying to dismantle those systems. 
Theories of Practice in Philosophy and Sociology 
 Courtney Goto, “Writing in Compliance with the Racialized ‘Zoo’ of Practical Theology,” 14
Conundrums in Practical Theology, ed. Bonnie Miller-McLemore and Joyce Mercer (Leiden: 
Brill, 2016), 111.
 Goto, “Writing in Compliance,” 111.15
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 Philosophers and sociologists who theorize practice also include in their analysis 
the importance of socialized habitual behaviors which we do not consciously pursue and 
of which we are not even necessarily aware. According to philosopher Sally Haslanger,  
practices fall along a spectrum from explicitly coordinated behavior that is rule-
governed, intentional, voluntary (e.g., games), to regularities in patterns in 
behavior that are the result of shared cultural schemas or social meanings that 
have been internalized through socialization and shape primitive psychological 
mechanisms governing cognition, affect, and experience (e.g., body comportment, 
verbal inflection).  16
These internalized social meanings, in Haslanger’s account, function very similarly to 
Browning’s concept of “theory-laden” practices. Browning affirms that “All our 
practices, even our religious practices, have theories behind and with them…. We are so 
embedded in our practices, take them so much for granted, that we never take time to 
abstract the theory from the practice and look at it as something in itself.”  Here 17
Browning conceptualizes theory in a way similar to how Haslanger uses social meaning; 
both emphasize that values and understandings about the world are internalized to the 
extent that they inform our habitual behaviors without us having to think about it. 
 This understanding of practice corresponds significantly with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of habitus, which many practical theologians have found helpful. Bourdieu’s 
explanations of how habitus functions involve the processes by which one learns the 
 Sally Haslanger, “What is a Social Practice?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 16
to Philosophy 82 (July 2018): 235. For a definition of schema as used by Haslanger see William 
H. Sewell, “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation,” American Journal of 
Sociology 98, no. 1 (1992): 1-29.
 Browning, Fundamental Practical Theology, 6.17
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values, mores, and norms of one’s community. “Between learning through sheer 
familiarization, in which the learner insensibly and unconsciously acquires the principles 
of an ‘art’ and an art of living … and explicit and express transmission by precept and 
prescription, every society provides structural exercises which tend to transmit a 
particular form of practical mastery.”  What Bourdieu’s analysis fails to account for is 18
the extent to which a racialized society such as the U.S. provides “structural exercises” 
which are designed with one ethnocultural group—white people—in mind, so that 
mastery of the structures is reserved for us at the expense of minoritized groups. But his 
account of these exercises elucidates the process by which white people are socialized. 
 These exercises operate on both conscious and unconscious levels, and entail a 
process of experimentation and feedback in which behaviors, attitudes, and ways of being 
are rewarded or discouraged. As Bourdieu explains in Outline of a Theory of Practice: 
practical evaluation of the likelihood of the success of a given action in a given 
situation brings into play a whole body of wisdom, sayings, commonplaces, 
ethical precepts (“that’s not for the likes of us”) and, at a deeper level, the 
unconscious principles of the ethos which, being the product of a learning process 
dominated by a determinate type of objective realities, determines “reasonable” 
and “unreasonable” conduct for every agent subjected to those regularities.  19
According to David Swartz, the advantage of Bourdieu's position is that it “does not 
oppose individual and society as two separate sorts of being—one external to the other—
but constructs them ‘relationally’ as if they are two dimensions of the same social 
 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 74-75.18
 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19
1977), 77.
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reality.”  Individual and society, on Bourdieu’s account, should not be theorized as a 20
binary but as a mutually constitutive continuum. 
 The interrelation between the individual and society lies at the theoretical core of 
my own analysis of emotioned white resistance. It is the basis for my claim that the 
psychological and the social are always interrelated, and the basis for employing a 
method applying psychodynamic theory to an analysis of oppressive social systems. In a 
racially stratified world, white hegemony is internalized by white people as the normal 
baseline for social experience, which bestows material and psychic rewards for taking 
steps—however minute—to preserve that experience. Bourdieu’s language of 
“reasonable” and “unreasonable” conduct illustrates the subtle ways in which values are 
determined and passed on. Indeed, objectors to anti-racist pedagogy such as Haidt and 
Lukianoff maintain that claims of harm inflicted by microaggressions, cultural 
appropriation, or the use of racist symbology should have to pass a “reasonable person” 
test as to whether they qualify as truly harmful.  Moreover, earnest commitments to 21
social change stall when white people’s intuitive barriers of “reasonableness,” formed 
through the socialization process, are reached. Bourdieu’s habitus thus provides a 
workable framework for analyzing reflexive modes of practice which sustain systemic 
racial oppression. 
 David Swartz, Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of 20
Chicago Press, 1997), 96.
 Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, “The Coddling of the American Mind,” Atlantic Monthly, 21
September 2015, accessed January 19, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/
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 Haslanger’s understanding of practice, which involves internalization processes 
that “shape primitive psychological mechanisms governing cognition, affect, and 
experience,”  is also helpful in understanding the types of emotional white resistance 22
encountered in anti-racist education contexts. One way that deeply internalized social 
practices can manifest themselves is through a dissonance or gap between conscious 
intent and the underlying purpose of one’s actions. Haslanger asserts the need to “allow 
the theoretical possibility that agents can be confused or misled about the social practices 
that they enact … An explanatory social theory may explicitly debunk social self-
understandings by re-describing our social relations in terms we, the participants, would 
reject.”  In subsequent chapters, I will argue that this re-description of social relations is 23
precisely what occurs in pedagogical settings where white people are challenged to 
reinterpret our complicity in systemic racism. The resultant resistance, then, is fueled by 
the intense discomfort of having our self-understandings repudiated by an external source
—in the case of critical race theory, an unfamiliar theoretical paradigm. 
 Haslanger also encourages us to divert our focus from the cognitive absorption of 
practices to pay more attention to what is embodied, reflexive, and felt. For Haslanger, 
this dynamic has ramifications for how we engage with people embedded in attitudes that 
we find problematic. 
And because we are typically fluent, ‘unthinking,’ in the social practices of our 
milieu, debate over the reasons for the practice tend to be otiose. Ideology 
 Haslanger, “What is a Social Practice?” 235.22
 Haslanger, “What is a Social Practice?” 236.23
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involves individual attitudes, but what is missing from the cognitivist account is 
how these attitudes are connected to our unthinking responses, our bodily 
comportment, the social and material realities that constitute our milieu.  24
In this account, unthinking, reflexive actions are practical knowledge in action, albeit 
forms of practical knowledge that do not enrich us with wisdom but rather keep racial 
inequity ensconced in institutions and in society as a whole. I argue that emotioned white 
resistance thus fits conceptually as a form of practice, one which works to counter 
expressed values of equity and preserve oppression. Analyzing white normativity and 
white resistance as practices has the potential to clarify their operations and hopefully 
clarify for white people the need to bring socialized habits under greater ethical scrutiny. 
This project entails using theories of practice familiar to practical theology, but it also 
requires engagement with fields of critical study and social science which analyze white 
normativity through their distinct set of theoretical and philosophical lenses. 
Interdisciplinary Method: Overview 
 The relationship between white resistance, white normativity, and racial inequity 
constitutes a social system so comprehensive and multifaceted that efforts to analyze it 
necessarily demand a commitment to interdisciplinary inquiry. Joyce Mercer calls 
interdisciplinarity “constitutive of practical theology,”  a necessary element in 25
researching complex phenomena (such as white normativity) “because they all involve 
 Sally Haslanger, “Racism, Ideology, and Social Movements,” Res Philosophica  94, no. 4 24
(January 2017): 13.
 Mercer, “Interdisciplinarity,” 163.25
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the interplay between lived experience theorized by many diverse fields and theological 
inquiry.”  Interdisciplinarity analysis reflects the methodological assumption of mutually 26
critical correlation central to most contemporary practical theology—namely, that “the 
Christian tradition should be prepared to engage in an open exchange of ideas and debate 
with different cultural disciplines, values, images and world-views.”  The goals and 27
guiding questions for this exchange vary depending on the aims of the practical 
theological project, with researchers generally “selecting those areas most strongly 
arising out of the research situation itself.”  Interdisciplinary study requires practical 28
theologians to make crucial methodological decisions such as whether to grant epistemic 
priority to traditional Christian concepts or to insights from the human sciences; and 
whether to direct their analysis toward cultivating the church or transforming the wider 
society.  
29
 My choice of disciplinary partners aligns with the interests of liberationist 
trajectories of practical theology focused on social transformation, and I rely on the 
conceptual frameworks developed in critical whiteness studies and developmental 
psychology. Because I lead with these disciplinary frameworks rather than traditional 
 Mercer, “Interdisciplinarity,” 168.26
 Elaine L. Graham, Heather Walton, and Frances Ward, Theological Reflection: Methods 27
(London: SCM Press, 2005), 138. For a summary of the revised critical correlational method and 
its trajectories and modifications, see Browning, Fundamental Practical Theology.
 Mercer, “Interdisciplinarity,” 176.28
 See James Poling and Donald E. Miller, Foundations for a Practical Theology of Ministry 29
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000), 29-61.
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Christian theological categories, my method could plausibly be categorized as what 
Poling and Miller call the critical science approach, which “obtains its norms and 
strategies from science, perceiving the role of the Christian tradition as secondary.”  This 30
has the potential to relegate theology to a subordinate role or afterthought, or as Bonnie 
Miller-McLemore suggests, “we tack theology on at the end.”  Indeed, it is important to 31
keep in mind Browning’s warning that practical theology’s appropriation of the human 
sciences “has been uncritical about the sense in which these disciplines are scientific, 
about their implicit values, and about how they may overlap or contradict the values of 
theology.”  Incorporating the disciplines of critical theory and psychology, therefore, 32
requires acknowledging the embedded values operant in those disciplines. 
 However, as mentioned in the Introduction, the worldview and core convictions of 
liberation theology draw from the same ideological and theoretical well as critical race 
theory and whiteness studies, as both fields emphasize the socially constructed nature of 
racial hierarchies and a driving concern for social justice.  These concerns share the 33
liberationist practical theological commitment to “reflecting on action for the sake of 
transformed action.”  The reflection upon action performed by liberationist practical 34
 Poling and Miller, Foundations for a Practical Theology of Ministry, 37-38.30
 Miller-McLemore, “Five Misunderstandings,” 24.31
 Browning, Fundamental Practical Theology, 81.32
 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory an Introduction, 2nd ed. Critical 33
America (New York: New York University Press, 2012); Daniel Solorzano and Tara Yosso, 
“Critical Race Methodology: Counter-storytelling as an Analytical Framework for Education 
Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 8, no. 1 (2002): 23-44.
 Moore, “Purposes of Practical Theology,” 182.34
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theologians follows a rich tradition that draws from neo-Marxian social analysis and 
postcolonial theory, and is based in a particular understanding of human social reality.  35
This understanding, as articulated by Rubem Alves in A Theology of Human Hope, is that 
“Man [sic] is a historical being…. He becomes what he is through the history of his 
relations with his environment. He is not, therefore, simply a being in the world; he 
comes into being with the world.”  This premise provides the rationale for integrating 36
critical theory and social science with theological reflection, performed with the purpose 
of constructing “politically engaged understandings of salvation that envisioned 
humanizing institutions that allowed for the expression of agency and liberation of those 
cast aside by persons in power.”  37
 Liberationist practical theology manifests its capacity to address significant social 
issues in a holistic manner, taking seriously the inherently imbricated relationship 
between the personal and the social, the psychological and the systemic. It grounds itself 
in the presupposition, expressed by Chopp, that “human activity and social systems are 
co-constituted by producing and reproducing each other.”  This is the rationale for 38
paying attention to psychological mechanisms in the analysis of social structures, much 
as Bourdieu insists upon. Alves articulates the multidimensional nature of social 
structures in this way: “Structures have a built-in teleology…. They function to survive. 
 Turpin, “Liberationist Practical Theology,” 154.35
 Alves, A Theology of Human Hope, 3.36
 Turpin, “Liberationist Practical Theology,” 154.37
 Chopp, "Practical Theology and Liberation,” 133.38
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They develop efficient means to preserve themselves. This is true of organisms, of 
cultures, of institutions, of our psychic structure.”  My practical theological approach to 39
white emotioned resistance views it as both a self-preserving psychological dynamic and 
also a means by which the socio-political system of white normativity preserves itself. 
Theological reflection on this phenomenon, then, requires social and psychological 
analysis which can inform theological reflection on the meaning of white resistance and 
how best to facilitate transformation. I proceed with an overview of the major literature in 
critical whiteness studies, organized according to the primary disciplinary approaches in 
the field, and then offer a brief literature review of psychoanalytic analyses of racism. I 
conclude the chapter with a description of my own contribution to the field. 
Interdisciplinary Method: Critical Whiteness Studies 
 Critical whiteness research, in all of its disciplinary influences and permutations, 
begins with the premise of white complicity in an unjust system and the need to discern 
strategies to dismantle that system. It is a wide-ranging interdisciplinary area of study that 
integrates history, sociology, psychology, cultural studies, and education studies, and 
utilizes philosophical approaches such as post-structuralism, pragmatism, epistemology, 
and phenomenology.  The discipline in its current manifestation emerged in the late 40
 Rubem Alves, Tomorrow's Child: Imagination, Creativity, and the Rebirth of Culture. 1st ed. 39
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 10.
 For a thorough review of “materialist, deconstructionist, and psychoanalytic frameworks” in 40
critical whiteness studies see Anoop Nayak, "Critical Whiteness Studies,” Sociology Compass 1, 
no. 2 (2007): 737-55.
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1980s and early 1990s largely in response to sociology and critical theory that sought to 
understand causes of persistent racial inequality through research focused exclusively on 
marginalized populations. Whiteness studies intentionally shifted the focus to white 
identity and group status, rather than treating it as a default or normative category as had 
generally been done. “What is new and unique about ‘whiteness studies,’” explains 
Woody Doane, “is that it reverses the traditional focus of research on race relations by 
concentrating attention upon the socially constructed nature of white identity and the 
impact of whiteness on intergroup relations.”  What the diverse approaches to whiteness 41
studies share is an analytical emphasis on how white identity is intertwined with political, 
economic, and cultural power. 
Critical Whiteness Studies: Sociological and Cultural Analysis 
  While relatively young as an academic field, critical whiteness scholars often 
name W.E.B. DuBois and James Baldwin as theoretical antecedents, as their writing 
integrated deep insights into white habits of mind and behavior.  Early critical whiteness 42
literature includes David Roediger’s historical analysis of whiteness in labor movements, 
The Wages of Whiteness,  Ruth Frankenberg’s qualitative study based on in-depth 43
 Woody Doane, “Rethinking Whiteness Studies,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of 41
Racism, ed. Ashley W. Doane and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (New York: Routledge, 2003), 3.
 See in particular W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Souls of White Folk,” in Darkwater, Voices from 42
Within the Veil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time 
(New York: Dial Press, 1963).
 David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working 43
Class, Rev. ed., Haymarket Series (London: Verso, 2007).
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interviews with white women, White Women, Race Matters,  and Toni Morrison’s 44
literary criticism on race in American literature, Playing in the Dark.  The range of 45
subjects and research methods represented by these works reflects the extent to which 
whiteness orders social relations and shapes identity in all areas of life, from economics 
to art to everyday interactions. 
 Concepts such as white normativity and white invisibility emerge primarily from 
sociological research on whiteness—how it shapes white people’s perception of 
themselves and of society. As Woody Doane explains, “to the extent that white racial 
unconsciousness persists, whites are less likely to perceive the degree to which whiteness 
permeates cultural understandings and institutional practices—and are thereby more 
likely to resist attempts to redefine the white ‘center’ of American society.”  For Doane 46
and other sociologists such as Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Joe Feagin, white normativity 
persists through the medium of ideological frameworks. What Feagin calls the white 
racial frame and what Bonilla-Silva describes as color-blind racism involve an 
aggregation of habitual practices (such as residential segregation), attitudes (such as 
 Ruth Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness 44
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
 Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge, MA: 45
Harvard University Press, 1992).
 Doane, “Rethinking Whiteness Studies,” 8. Doane proceeds with a caveat that “it is essential 46
not to overstate the case for white racial unconsciousness,” for “white racial identity has been 
asserted and group mobilization has occurred when whites felt threatened by social changes, 
immigration, and challenges from subordinate groups.” The research of Kaufmann, Whiteshift, 
and Ashely Jardina, White Identity Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 
provide compelling evidence that white racial consciousness has re-emerged in recent years under 
just such conditions.
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stereotypes of underachievement among black people), and cultural narratives (such as 
the superiority of European cultures) that both presume and rationalize white dominant 
status.  47
 This emphasis on the relationship between material resources, social structures, 
and attitudes and beliefs draws upon Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Bonilla-Silva posits a 
“white habitus” in which “whites’ high levels of social and spatial segregation and 
isolation from minorities creates … a racialized, uninterrupted socialization process that 
conditions and creates whites’ racial taste, perceptions, feelings, and their views on racial 
matters.”  DiAngelo uses this understanding of white habitus in her analysis of white 48
fragility, and interprets moves of white resistance as  “[s]trategies of response to 
‘disequilibrium’” when that familiar habitus comes under critique.  Sociological analysis 49
of whiteness emphasizes the connection between ideology and material interest, 
identifying the behavioral and attitudinal patterns which function to preserve dominant 
status for whites. 
Critical Whiteness Philosophy: Poststructuralism, Epistemology, and Phenomenology 
 Many critical whiteness scholars work within philosophical traditions including 
poststructural discourse analysis, epistemologies of ignorance, and phenomenology. The 
 See Doane, “Rethinking Whiteness Studies”; Feagin, The White Racial Frame; Bonilla-Silva, 47
Racism without Racists.
 Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists, 104.48
 DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” 58.49
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poststructuralist approach, such as that taken by Thomas K. Nakayama and Robert L. 
Krizek, grounds its analysis of everyday social norms and discourse in Michel Foucault’s 
view that “power operates in … complex, relationally situated ways.”  Their aim is to 50
“expose whiteness as a cultural construction as well as the strategies that embed its 
centrality,”  with a focus on identifying the power interests undergirding social norms 51
and cultural productions. Foucault’s understanding of power informs a good deal of 
poststructural critical whiteness theory, including his concept of the biopolitical society, 
in which power is exercised in large part through social norms.  Applebaum’s study of 52
white complicity, Being White, Being Good, integrates Foucault’s analysis of discourse 
with Judith Butler’s account of the role of norms in subject formation. For Applebaum, 
Butler’s account helps explicate how “race is constituted through the repetition of 
discursive regimes of truth. Thus race, and whiteness in particular, always invoke a 
reiteration of norms.”  These norms enact power interests, whether we are conscious of 53
them or not.  54
 Other critical whiteness studies focuses on social epistemology—how society 
engineers perceptions, beliefs, and narratives about itself, through erasing essential 
 Thomas K. Nakayama and Robert L. Krizek, “Whiteness as a Strategic Rhetoric,” in 50
Whiteness: The Communication of Social Identity, ed. Thomas K. Nakayama and Judith N. 
Martin (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999), 94. See also Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, 1st American Ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).
 Nakayama and Krizek, 95.51
 See Bhandaru, “Is White Normativity Racist?”52
 Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 84.53
 Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 99-100.54
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historical and social realities. For Charles Mills and those who follow in this trajectory, 
“white ignorance” does not merely entail a lack of information, but is rather a process of 
selective memory and, in many cases, an act to intentionally suppress that which white 
individuals and society do not wish to know. The way this manifests in a society shaped 
by white supremacy is through “a white refusal to recognize the long history of structural 
discrimination that has left whites with the differential resources they have today.”  55
Jennifer Mueller argues that white ignorance should be conceptualized as “a cognitive 
accomplishment grounded in explicit and tacit practices of knowing and non-knowing,”  56
and emphasizes that white resistant discourse represents a creative attempts to preserve 
ignorance of knowledge that uncomfortably implicates them. 
 Another influential philosophical approach in critical whiteness studies is 
phenomenology, particularly the tradition initiated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
applied by Frantz Fanon to the experience of colonial racism. This philosophical 
trajectory affirms the importance of repetition of norms in upholding white normativity, 
but directs particular attention to the role of the body in performing those repetitions. 
Linda Martín-Alcoff argues that “race and gender consciousness produces habitual bodily 
mannerisms that feel natural and become unconscious after long use; they are thus very 
 Charles Mills, “White Ignorance,” in Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, ed. Shannon 55
Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, SUNY Series, Philosophy and Race (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2007), 28.
 Jennifer Mueller, “Racial Ideology or Racial Ignorance? An Alternative Theory of Racial 56
Cognition,” Sociological Theory 38, no. 2 (May 2020): 146.
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difficult to change.”  The racist social environment shapes the bodily comportment of 57
white people, and of people of color, but in very different ways that reflect the direction 
of systemic oppression. The title of George Yancy’s volume on whiteness, “Look, A 
White!” intentionally inverts Fanon’s experience of being singled out and demeaned by a 
white boy (“Look, a Negro!”).  For Yancy, this episode is both a matter of the boy 58
“undergoing white subject formation … learning how to think about and feel toward the 
so-called dark Other,” and an act in which the boy has “actually distorted his (Fanon’s) 
body.”  While the social structures of racism are not reducible to everyday perceptions, 59
habits, and practices, critical whiteness phenomenology shows how the “quotidian reality 
of race,” as Yancy puts it,  constitutes a significant mode in which racial inequity is 60
experienced and perpetuated. 
Critical Whiteness Studies: Resistant Emotionality in Qualitative Education Research 
 As mentioned previously, a significant amount of critical whiteness research is 
conducted in education departments, in which group interactions in anti-racist 
pedagogical settings are the material for analysis. Educators like Beverly Daniel Tatum, 
 Linda Martín-Alcoff, Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Studies in Feminist 57
Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 108.
 George Yancy, Look, a White!: Philosophical Essays on Whiteness (Philadelphia: Temple 58
University Press, 2012), 1-4. See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, New ed. (London: 
Pluto, 2008), 82.
 Yancy, Look, a White! 3.59
 Yancy, Look, a White! 18.60
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Barbara Applebaum, Robin DiAngelo, Cheryl Matias, and Michalinos Zembylas draw 
from their classroom experiences to identify common white defensive emotional 
responses, develop theoretical frameworks for critiquing white normativity, and strategize 
ways to navigate uncomfortable group dynamics.  The classrooms being researched are 61
generally at the university level, and therefore represent contexts that are higher in socio-
economic status and culturally on the progressive end of the spectrum. While these 
classrooms therefore represent a limited sample for analyzing white emotioned 
resistance, they nevertheless function as a kind of laboratory in which white people who 
identify as opposed to racism exhibit resistant practices in an interactive, structured 
environment. 
 One recurring emphasis in the education research is the way affect and emotions 
infuse this white resistance. DiAngelo’s description of white fragility includes an array of 
emotional reactions which she calls “defensive moves,” which include “the outward 
display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and behaviors such as argumentation, 
silence, and leaving the stress-inducing situation.”   Zembylas examines “Whites’ 62
affective strategies, and their emotional investment in maintaining current race structures 
 See DiAngelo, White Fragility; Beverly Daniel Tatum, “Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting 61
Together in the Cafeteria?" And Other Conversations about Race, Revised Edition (New York: 
Basic Books, 2003); Cheryl E. Matias, Feeling White: Whiteness, Emotionality, and Education, 
Cultural Pluralism Democracy, Socio-environmental Justice & Education (Rotterdam: 
SensePublishers, 2016); Applebaum, “Comforting Discomfort”; Michalinos Zembylas, “Affect, 
Race, and White Discomfort in Schooling: Decolonial Strategies for ‘Pedagogies of 
Discomfort,’” Ethics and Education 13, no. 1 (2018): 86-104.
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even as they educate against them.”  Matias argues that any process of coming to 63
recognize one’s own complicity in white supremacy and committing to anti-racist work 
“must therapeutically consider the deeply-embedded ways which whiteness emotionally 
informs identities and people’s sense of core values.”  These accounts suggest that even 64
sincere commitments on the part of white people to pursue racial equity are inevitably 
subverted by deeper affective commitments to preserving white normativity at the 
expense of the flourishing of people of color. 
 The majority of critical whiteness scholars emphasize that emotions should not be 
analyzed independently of the socio-political factors that form them. Zembylas is careful 
to maintain that “white emotionality needs to be also understood as socially and 
politically produced within the material, affective, and discursive assemblages of 
whiteness and white supremacy.”  However, if emotions play a constituent role in white 65
resistance to critical anti-racist analysis and to structural change, then investigation into 
the social and psychodynamic processes by which those emotions are generated has the 
potential to help educators develop effective pedagogical responses. 
Interdisciplinary Method: Psychoanalytic Analyses of Whiteness and Racism 
 Zeus Leonardo and Michalinos Zembylas, “Whiteness as Technology of Affect: Implications 63
for Educational Praxis.” Equity & Excellence in Education, 46, no. 1 (2013): 151.
 Matias, Feeling White, 99.64
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 Another significant body of research relevant to whiteness studies (even as it does 
not identify specifically as critical whiteness scholarship) is the application of 
psychoanalytic theory to racial animus and racialized identity. Fanon employs 
psychoanalytic insights in addition to his phenomenological approach, as he interprets his 
own experience interiorizing white colonial images of black inferiority.  According to 66
critical psychologist Derek Hook, one of Fanon’s primary contributions was “to approach 
the problems of national liberation and social revolution from the perspective of 
psychopathology, and the problems of personal identity through a sustained focus on the 
violence of the colonial encounter.”  Hook’s own research is grounded in the premise, 67
somewhat analogous to Bourdieu’s, that understanding the structural and political 
requires understanding the psychological, and vice-versa. Thus he examines how “racist 
sentiments may be said to persist in subliminal (pre-symbolic, bodily, affective) forms 
even after they have been confronted at the level of explicit discursive consciousness.”  68
Hook’s emphasis on the persistence of racist sentiments even after conscious intervention 
serves as an inspiration for my own emphasis on psychic attachment to familiar social 
environments and power relations. 
 Psychoanalytic approaches to white racism draw upon a range of theoretical 
trajectories. Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks takes a Lacanian approach, describing whiteness as 
 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 1-7.66
 Derek Hook, “A Critical Psychology of the Postcolonial,” Theory & Psychology 15, no. 4 67
(2005): 480.
 Derek Hook, “‘Pre-discursive’ Racism,” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 68
16 (2006): 225.
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a master signifier that “represents complete mastery, self-sufficiency, and the jouissance 
of Oneness.”  She and fellow Lacanian race theorist Sheldon George maintain that as a 69
socially constructed category, “race is inherently a discourse of supremacy,” and therefore 
dismantling racism requires abandoning the category as a signifier altogether, in “an 
attempt to confound race itself as bodily reference.”  Other approaches are grounded in 70
Freudian psychoanalysis, such as the argument of Arianne Miller and Lawrence Josephs 
that whiteness is pathological narcissism resulting from “a racialized form of oedipal 
splitting” in which “blacks come to represent symbolically the devalued/socially 
unacceptable sides” of the split.  Simon Clarke takes a similar approach to splitting 71
based on the theory of Melanie Klein, in which the bad is “denigrated, made larger than 
life, and projected out into someone or something else,” which includes the racial 
“other.”   72
 Other psychoanalytic accounts of the mechanisms of racial animus include M. 
Fakhry Davids’s theory of intrinsic psychic structures designed to generate anti-outgroup 
prejudice, which he goes as far as to describe as “an internal racist organization in the 
 Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race (London: Taylor 69
and Francis, 2000), 7.
 Seshadri-Crooks, Desiring Whiteness, 8-9. See also Sheldon George, Trauma and Race: A 70
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12, who argues that “by embracing the concept of race contemporary African Americans become 
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mind.”  Farhad Dalal’s model, by contrast, emphasizes the socially constructed nature of 73
race, and its external influence on the psychological development of racist prejudices.  74
Shannon Sullivan integrates psychoanalytic thought with her phenomenological analysis 
of whiteness, drawing upon Jean Laplanche’s theory of how infants develop unconscious 
emotional associations to sense-data. She uses Laplanche’s concepts to develop an 
account of how aversions toward racial groups are formed subconsciously from infancy, 
picking up nonverbal cues from caregivers.  Sullivan's theory, like most psychoanalytic 75
accounts of racism, focuses on the generation of hostile attitudes and associations toward 
members of racialized out-groups. This emphasis on theorizing the psychological roots of 
racial animus generates many valuable insights, but also leaves an open space to theorize 
how attachments to the white normative social milieu might play their own role in 
animating white resistance to critical antiracism. My theoretical contribution is an attempt 
to explore that possibility. 
Argument and Contribution: Psychic Attachment to the Social Order as a 
Mechanism of White Normativity 
 M. Fakhry Davids, Internal Racism: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Race and Difference 73
(Basingstoke, England: Palgrave, 2011), 13.
 Farhad Dalal, Race, Colour and the Processes of Racialization: New Perspectives from Group 74
Analysis, Psychoanalysis and Sociology (New York: Routledge, 2002).
 Shannon Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege 75
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 In the Introduction I described how a liberationist practical theology of white 
resistance involves both descriptive and ethical tasks. It is the descriptive task which 
comprises my interdisciplinary work in chapters 2-4. In these chapters I integrate 
qualitative education research, philosophical approaches in critical whiteness studies, and 
psychodynamic theory to conduct an in-depth analysis of the social and psychological 
mechanisms underlying white resistance. The need for this task has been highlighted in 
recent years by sociologists calling for more detailed analysis of the mechanisms of 
systemic racism. Meghan Burke, for example, affirms the value of Bonilla-Silva’s model 
of ‘color-blind racism’ as an ideology, but asks how we might more thoroughly 
understand the “processes that link to the material conditions of the social world while 
also allowing our subjectivities to navigate it as such.”  My interest in the psychological 76
dynamics of white resistance focuses on one way that material conditions shape 
subjectivities, and how subjective experiences and actions in turn influence social 
structures. My approach addresses the central concern, articulated by Sullivan, that we 
“never lose sight of the significant role that the social environment plays in the 
constitution of the individual,”  enriching current sociological and phenomenological 77
accounts by highlighting the role of psychological attachments in racialized habit 
formation. 
 Meghan A. Burke, “Colorblind Racism: Identities, Ideologies, and Shifting Subjectivities,” 76
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 Focusing attention on affective attachments to the social milieu itself has the 
potential to integrate a certain binary tendency in critical whiteness studies in which 
sociological and philosophical analyses focus on white self and group interest, while 
psychoanalytic theory focuses on the generation of out-group animus. At the socio-
political level of analysis, the characteristic of white hegemony most often stressed is the 
incentive of material in-group advantage regardless of the presence or absence of animus 
against racial out-groups. Bonilla-Silva explains that his model of colorblind racism “is 
based on a materialist interpretation of racial matters and thus sees the views of actors as 
corresponding to their systemic location…. Whether actors express ‘resentment' or 
‘hostility’ toward minorities is largely irrelevant for the maintenance of white 
privilege.”  Here Bonilla-Silva emphasizes that the salient factor in analyzing white 78
behavior is white interest in preserving privilege, resources, and status, in contrast with 
psychological phenomena such as negative feelings toward people of color. 
 Critical whiteness scholars also frequently interpret white hegemony-reproducing 
behaviors in terms of group interest, power, and status. In Shannon Sullivan’s discussion 
of whiteness as habit, she uses the term ontological expansiveness to describe an array of 
ways in which we assume an entitlement to the priority of our own needs and 
preferences. “As ontologically expansive,” Sullivan explains, “white people tend to act 
and think as if all spaces—whether geographical, physical, linguistic, economic, spiritual, 
bodily, or otherwise—are or should be available for them to move in and out of as they 
 Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists, 7-8.78
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wish.”  This tendency, however, often happens reflexively rather than as a result of 79
conscious calculation because very little in our social formation calls that entitlement into 
question. Deepa Bhandaru describes white social norms and behavior patterns in terms of 
Foucauldian power analysis that overlap with Sullivan’s concept of ontological 
expansiveness, arguing that the assertion of white group interests is more central to 
oppression than hostility toward people of color. “[Foucault] argues that power is 
responsible for producing subjects, but in expanding the space for certain subjects, power 
necessarily abandons others.”  In this account, racism is framed as the willingness on the 80
part of whites to abandon those considered ‘other’ to suffer the consequences of our own 
resource acquisition and self-actualization. 
 As socio-critical analyses focus on white self-assertion as manifest through 
material advantage and social location, psychoanalytic analyses of whiteness largely 
remain focused on the “out-group animosity” side of the equation. Shannon Sullivan, in 
the same work in which she develops the idea of white ontological expansiveness, 
focuses her discussion of infant psychological development on how it generates negative 
affect toward out-groups. She argues that “given that the adult world historically has been 
and continues to be both structured by categories of race and riddled with white privilege, 
then an infant’s unconscious habits inevitably will be formed by race and racism.”  The 81
 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 10.79
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unconscious habits that Sullivan focuses on here are negative impulses and associations 
toward particular racial groups, such as a negative association she experiences between 
smells characteristic of Mexican food and dehumanizing stereotypes of Latinx peoples.  82
 The emphasis that Sullivan, Hook, and other psychoanalytic theorists of racism 
place on negative out-group animus is important. I suggest, however, that mechanisms of 
psychological development of affect that psychoanalytic researchers apply to out-group 
animosity might plausibly also generate affective attachments to one’s in-group, but also, 
crucially, to the social milieu itself. I suggest that white people are habituated from our 
formative years into racialized social norms, but also socialized into an assumed 
prerogative to set our norms as the parameters for acceptable sociability in a plural 
society. 
 I propose this model in conversation with critical whiteness education research as 
an additional interpretive framework for analyzing emotioned white resistance. Focusing 
on comfortable affective attachments to the social milieu emphasizes what white people 
are trying on an intuitive level to preserve when the damaging and oppressive effects of 
our habitual behaviors are exposed. Not only are we defending an empowered social 
status and position, we are defending a moral formation that has trained us on the 
intuitive level to experience that position as either good or at least acceptable. The 
experience of normality generates a psychic power that resists the demand that white 
people transform our moral intuition regarding the legitimacy of our place within society. 
 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 68.82
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 My contribution to critical whiteness studies lies in synthesizing emphases from 
primary trajectories in the field. From sociological approaches I emphasize that white 
behavior runs on interest in social advantage, either in complement with out-group 
animus or in spite of its absence. From the phenomenologists I focus on how social 
norms reproduce structural oppression in part through everyday, habituated actions. From 
psychoanalytic and critical emotion approaches I incorporate an interest in affect, but turn 
the focus from the activation of out-group animus toward the role of comfortable 
attachments to the racialized status quo. I posit that one catalyst of emotioned resistance 
among whites is the disruption of affective attachments to a particular social environment 
characterized by norms that presume and uphold white supremacy, and also attachments 
to a moral identity which is formed presuming the moral acceptability of those norms. 
This contribution to critical whiteness studies does not preclude the presence of racial 
animus among many white people, but supplements that analysis to better account for 
emotioned resistance among white people sympathetic to ideals of racial justice. My 
descriptive analysis then serves as the basis for theological reflection in the final chapters
—on how to understand the moral culpability of white comfort-preserving behaviors, and 
the real cost such behaviors inflict upon the well-being and humanity of all involved. 
67
CHAPTER TWO: WHITE RESISTANCE IN CRITICAL WHITENESS 
EDUCATION RESEARCH 
 The gap between white practice and white consciousness of our own practice is 
one of the primary conundrums investigated by critical whiteness scholars. One of the 
most common research settings used for analyzing the habitual practices and underlying 
psychological dynamics of white normativity is the anti-racist pedagogical setting, where 
white people are encouraged to develop consciousness of structural racial injustice and 
white complicity in that injustice. This chapter consists of a literature review of 
qualitative education research conducted in anti-racist pedagogical contexts, structured as 
a taxonomy of common modes of emotioned white resistant behavior and discourse. 
While my liberationist practical theology of white emotioned resistance is developed with 
the aim of aiding both the church and society work toward racial justice, the body of 
qualitative research conducted in classrooms is significantly larger than that of 
comparable research conducted in churches, and therefore constitutes a richer data pool 
from which to analyze white resistant patterns. After reviewing the research, I offer some 
initial hypotheses of the underlying self-protective goals of white resistance, which leads 
into a dialogue in the following chapter with prominent critical whiteness scholars and 
their interpretations of the phenomena. 
 My method rests on the premise that observing how white individuals react when 
white normativity is identified and confronted can help clarify how white normativity 
works as a hegemonic order. I examine white resistant behaviors and discourse in terms 
68
of Courtney Goto’s conceptualization of enactments, and the relation of enactments to the 
“master narrative” of white normativity.  According to Goto, white normativity functions 1
as a master narrative “in the sense of dominating how both whites and non-whites 
perceive and relate to themselves and to one another according to the culture’s racial 
hierarchy.”  Enactments, then, are defined as “individual or collective behavior that 2
reveals the complex master narrative and its subnarratives at play, expressing as well as 
shaping often tacit assumptions about reality, for example, race, class, gender, sexuality, 
or religion.”  White resistant behaviors in antiracist pedagogical settings function as 3
enactments in that they reveal tacit assumptions among white people about race and 
social power, but also in how they reinforce power and hierarchy in the settings in which 
they occur. 
 This first part of this chapter reviews the qualitative education research on 
recurring white resistant behaviors and discourses in anti-racist pedagogical contexts. My 
taxonomy of common white reactions to antiracism teaching as depicted in the literature 
draws upon categories found in the literature and selects representative examples for 
analysis. In my survey of the research, I begin with nonverbal behavioral responses (such 
as remaining silent, agitation, crying, and leaving the classroom), and then delineate four 
 Courtney T. Goto, “On Being Caught Enacting White Normativity,” Religious Education 114, 1
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types of discursive moves. These include 1) Minimizing systemic racism, which includes 
invoking the “colorblind” ideal, accusing those who identify racism of being “divisive,” 
and reducing systemic racism to the universal phenomenon of racial prejudice; 2) 
Dissociation of self from “real racism,” whether relegating racism to a thing of the past, 
or limiting it to the most blatant expressions of racial animus; and 3) Appealing to 
ignorance and inability to recognize systemic racism as occurring in contemporary 
society. 
 I conclude the chapter by offering an analytical frame for these behavioral and 
discursive moves in terms of possible underlying strategies and motivations. My 
framework for describing these strategies emphasizes what white people might be hoping 
to preserve. These include 1) Preservation of moral identity, which involves experiencing 
our selves and communities as essentially good in accord with our positive intentions and 
aspirations; 2) Preserving the legitimacy of the social order, characterized by a belief that 
social systems are fundamentally just despite discrete instances of racism, and usually 
informed by an individualist sense of moral responsibility; and 3) Preserving racial 
hierarchy itself, including the preservation of white status privilege over people of color. 
Qualitative Education Research on White Resistance: Overview 
70
 In the decades since critical race theory began as a legal theory  and its analyses 4
were disseminated throughout the humanities and social sciences, one field which has 
been greatly influenced by its insights is education research. Critical race theory has been 
employed to analyze racial disparities in education in recent decades, challenging white 
hegemonic practices in curriculum development, assessment, and school funding.  It has 5
significantly informed the paradigm for contemporary teacher training courses, 
emphasizing approaches to multicultural education that are antiracist in character. Such 
educational initiatives arose largely in response to the need for “teachers developing 
multicultural skills in order to effectively educate immigrant, non-English-speaking 
students, and children from diverse racial and ethnic groups.”  However, while 6
multicultural antiracist education has endeavored to offer “an orientation toward social 
justice and preparation for culturally responsive teaching,”  numerous recent studies have 7
observed forms of resistance among white student teachers, who are then “not equipped 
to offer the racially/ethnically diverse students in schools a strong and culturally 
 See Crenshaw, et al., Critical Race Theory; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race 4
Theory: an Introduction, 2nd ed (New York: New York University Press, 2012).
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Field Like Education?” in Race Is … Race Isn’t: Critical Race Theory and Qualitative Studies in 
Education, ed. Laurence Parker, Donna Deyhle, and Sofia Villenas (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999), 20-30.
 McIntyre, Making Meaning of Whiteness, 11.6
 Christine E. Sleeter, “Critical Race Theory and the Whiteness of Teacher Education,” Urban 7
Education 52, no. 2 (2017): 155.
71
responsive education.”  Education research has thus begun to integrate analysis of that 8
resistance in the hopes of designing more effective programs and structures. 
 Another reason that anti-racist education and social justice pedagogy have been 
prominent themes in education departments is a recognition of the importance of 
education in distributing economic resources, enforcing socio-cultural norms, and 
defining what narratives and frameworks are considered “knowledge” by society. As 
Daria Roithmayr explains, “the classroom—where knowledge is constructed, organized, 
produced, and distributed—is a central site for the construction of racial power.”  9
Furthermore, the racial power dynamics which education helps to construct frequently 
play out in the classroom environment itself. George Yancy posits that classrooms “are 
microcosms of the larger social order and reflective of problematic racist stereotypes and 
assumptions.”  So critical whiteness scholars have often used the classroom as a 10
research site because of the social influence of education and also because many of the 
attitudes and conflicts experienced in their classrooms reflect, with some inherent 
limitations, prevalent attitudes and conflicts outside the classroom. These projects allow 
 Sleeter, “Critical Race Theory,” 157. See also Marilyn Cochran-Smith, “Uncertain Allies: 8
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for observation in relatively controlled social environments structured with the purpose of 
unearthing and challenging white normative beliefs and assumptions. 
 The critical whiteness studies on pedagogical settings utilize a range of qualitative 
methods, and the researchers represent a range of positionalities relative to research 
participants. Many critical whiteness education scholars such as Barbara Applebaum, 
Alison Jones, Cheryl Matias, and Michalinos Zembylas use anecdotes of white resistant 
discourse drawn from their own teaching experiences to inform their critical theoretical 
work.  Other education scholars draw from their work as educators outside of the 11
university: Robin DiAngelo analyzes white discourse heard in her antiracism workshops 
offered to private and nonprofit organizations.  Another significant body of education 12
literature consists of in-depth qualitative research projects which use white students as 
research participants. Some of the studies, such as those by Alice McIntyre and Kim Case 
and Annette Hemmings, research teacher training courses at the graduate level,  while 13
others projects like those of Marianne Modica, Jennifer Trainor, and Jennifer Mueller are 
conducted at the undergraduate level or in high schools.  The qualitative studies 14
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generally involve classroom participant observation, supplementing it with in-depth 
interviews with students and teachers. Other projects such as the study of white HBCU 
students by Uma M. Jayakumar and Annie S. Adamian exclusively use in-depth 
interviews with white university students.  While some of the projects are conducted in 15
mixed-race settings and others are conducted in either predominantly or exclusively 
white contexts, all focus on gathering and analyzing white responses to critical 
antiracism, whether presented in the class as the topic of study or raised as the subject of 
interview questions. 
Qualitative Methodological Issues in Whiteness Education Research 
 While the preponderance of the studies surveyed utilize participant observation in 
the classroom, education researchers employ and often combine several qualitative 
research methods including in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Most 
employ forms of discourse analysis to ascertain patterns in white writing and speech.  16
Researchers engage in different degrees of participatory involvement with their research 
 Uma M. Jayakumar and Annie S. Adamian, “The Fifth Frame of Colorblind Ideology: 15
Maintaining the Comforts of Colorblindness in the Context of White Fragility,” Sociological 
Perspectives 60, no. 5 (2017): 921.
 See in particular Trainor, Rethinking Racism; Kathy Hytten and John Warren, “Engaging 16
Whiteness: How Racial Power Gets Reified in Education,” International Journal of Qualitative 
Studies in Education 16, no. 1 (2003): 65-89; Sabina E Vaught and Angelina E. Castagno, “‘I 
don't think I'm a racist’: Critical Race Theory, Teacher Attitudes, and Structural Racism,” Race 
Ethnicity and Education 11, no. 2 (2008): 95-113. For a description of discourse analysis see 
Linda A. Wood and Rolf O. Kroger, Doing Discourse Analysis: Methods for Studying Action in 
Talk and Text (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000). For a discourse analysis of white 
student speech, see Nakayama and Krizek, “Whiteness as a Strategic Rhetoric.”
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subjects (students and teachers)—some projects are based on analysis of survey results  17
or restrict themselves to an observational role in the classroom, while a majority of the 
researchers engaged more directly with students and teachers, both in the classroom 
setting and outside of it.  Additionally, several report significant self-reflection about 18
their own positionality as a white researcher as part of the fieldwork process. McIntyre 
describes using her field notes as “data for engaging in my own ‘autocritique’ describing 
how I made meaning of my own whiteness and how it constrained and facilitated the 
ways in which I engaged the multiplicity of my roles within this experience.”  What 19
each of these methodologies have in common is a commitment to explore the nuances of 
how particular white people respond to antiracism teaching, analyzing both their 
subjective experience and behavioral patterns to better understand how white normativity 
operates. 
 This common critical whiteness education methodology operates on the premise 
that, in the words of Susan Morrow, “the very nature of the data we gather and the 
analytic process in which we engage are grounded in subjectivity.”  In this way the 20
research falls within what Morrow calls a “postmodern/ideological/critical” paradigm,  21
 Hytten and Warren, "Engaging Whiteness.”17
 See Modica, “Unpacking the "Colorblind Approach.’”18
 McIntyre, Making Meaning of Whiteness, 6. See also Trainor, Rethinking Racism, 30-33, for an 19
example of self-assessment emerging from the research process.
 Susan L. Morrow, “Quality and Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research in Counseling 20
Psychology." Journal of Counseling Psychology 52, no. 2 (2005): 251.
 Morrow, “Quality and Trustworthiness,” 254.21
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with a commitment to “focus on the historical situatedness of the research, the 
importance of the research in increasing consciousness about issues of power and 
oppression and—for the ideological and critical perspectives in particular—the potential 
of the research to create change.”  Specifically, this involves a commitment to critical 22
race theory as an interpretive paradigm, which several studies name specifically as their 
basis for interpreting white discourse patterns through the lens of wider social 
structures.  While some studies like that of Case and Hemmings utilize a grounded 23
theory approach to coding their data, critical race theory still informs the way they 
develop their categories.  Sabina Vaught and Angelina Castagno, for example, thematize 24
the responses of white teachers to antiracist training programs and “argue that these 
thematically-grouped racial attitudes expressed by teachers in this study are illustrative of 
larger structural racism that both informs and is reinforced by these attitudes and these 
manifestations in practice.”  The theoretical aim of education research on whiteness, 25
generally speaking, is to draw connections between broader structures of racial injustice 
and white reactions observed on the individual and group level, to the end of creating 
more just education systems. 
 Morrow, “Quality and Trustworthiness,” 253. See also Sarah J. Tracy, Qualitative Research 22
Methods: Collecting Evidence, Crafting Analysis, Communicating Impact (Chichester, UK: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 37-63.
 Modica, “Unpacking the ‘Colorblind Approach’”; Sleeter, #Critical Race Theory and the 23
Whiteness of Teacher Education”; Vaught and Castagno, “I Don’t Think I’m a Racist.”
 Case and Hemmings, “Distancing Strategies,” 610.24
 Vaught and Castagno, “‘I Don’t Think I’m a Racist,’” 95.25
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 One limitation inherent in this approach is that the samples are relatively small—
generally limited to the particular classroom being researched or a selection from 
classroom or workshop experiences conducted by the researcher. The research 
participants are also generally comprised of white students of high socio-economic status, 
although Trainor’s study stands out in that the high school where she conducted her 
research enrolled working class and middle class white students. While some studies like 
Trainor’s methodically observe a classroom over the course of a year and interview 
selected students, other scholars such as DiAngelo gather anecdotes over years of 
conducting workshops to illustrate their theoretical points. This means that in many cases 
data is invariably selected in the interest of supporting theoretical positions rather than 
providing a comprehensive picture of classroom dynamics. 
 Because critical whiteness research operates with clearly expressed ideological 
aims and endeavors to analyze the relationship between social structures and individual 
behaviors, it inevitably faces questions of validity and generalizability inherent to all 
qualitative research. Critics of qualitative studies allege that those conducting the 
research “have no way of verifying their truth statements,”  and the critique is all the 26
more pointed when the study of subjects like racial identity and oppression raise the 
political and ideological stakes. Qualitative researchers operating in the critical paradigm, 
grounded in a social constructivist understanding of reality, respond that such critiques 
 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonne S. Lincoln, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of 26
Qualitative Research,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd Edition, ed. Norman K. Denzin 
and Yvonne S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000), 8.
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rely upon a conception of objectivity that denies the subjectivity inherent to the enterprise 
and is inadequate to the complexity of the phenomena being studied.  They reject 27
empiricist claims that “the foundations of reality reside in rigorous application of testing 
phenomena against a template as much devoid of human bias … as instrumentally 
possible,” and affirm that all knowledge, including knowledge of social reality, is 
inherently perspectival and co-created through human interpretation.  28
 Still, Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba remind us that the issue of validity is to a 
certain extent unavoidable. As they affirm, any qualitative study must address the 
question: “Are these findings sufficiently authentic (isomorphic to some reality, 
trustworthy, related to the way others construct their social worlds) that I may trust 
myself in acting on their implications?”  Even this question, however, is not one of 29
establishing universally accepted criteria, as qualitative research will likely continue on a 
trajectory of “multivocality, contested meanings, paradigmatic controversies, and new 
textual forms.”  Rather, establishing authenticity involves developing practices and 30
paradigms that encourage transparency and self-reflexivity, such as “making one’s 
implicit biases and assumptions overt to self and others,” meeting with peer researchers, 
and soliciting feedback from participants to minimize any serious misrepresentation.  31
 Yvonne S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, “Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and 27
Emerging Confluences,” in Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 178.
 Lincoln and Guba, “Paradigmatic Controversies,” 176-77.28
 Lincoln and Guba, “Paradigmatic Controversies,” 178.29
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 While the research I engage with for this project is conducted with distinct 
ideological aims and interests—to dismantle white normativity in education—I proceed 
on the premise that these peer-reviewed studies present their data in way that is 
adequately fair and authentic, at least for the purpose of examining white resistance as a 
distinct phenomena. The organization and interpretation of data reflects the researchers’ 
explicitly stated motivations and theoretical commitments; much of it is not designed to 
provide a multifaceted description of the anti-racist classroom experience. Moreover, the 
anti-racist pedagogical setting represents a distinct social environment—most everyday 
practices of white normativity do not meet with analysis or challenge from a teacher, and 
interactions between racial groups are not usually moderated by a trained facilitator. As a 
result, my analysis and conclusions are limited in generalizability, to the extent that I am 
examining white resistance in predominantly educated spaces where a generally 
progressive ethos guides the pedagogy. While this is an important limitation, it reflects 
the aim of the dissertation to examine how particular psychological mechanisms of white 
resistance operate to sustain white hegemony in contexts where opposition to racism is 
professed as an institutional value. 
White Resistant Behavior and Discourse Depicted in Education Research 
 White resistance, disavowal, and distancing in response to teaching on systemic 
racism are among the most prominent and recurring themes in the critical whiteness 
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education literature. Robin DiAngelo’s influential initial article on white fragility 
describes the phenomena in this way: 
White fragility is a state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress 
becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves. These moves include 
the outward display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and behaviors such 
as argumentation, silence, and leaving the stress-inducing situation. These 
behaviors, in turn, function to reinstate white racial equilibrium.  32
While DiAngelo does not define “racial stress” and “racial equilibrium” up front, her 
meaning becomes clearer as she describes the experience of privilege resulting from 
structural racism, in which “the insulated environment of racial privilege builds white 
expectations for racial comfort.”  “Racial stress,” then, refers specifically to the 33
discomfort produced when educators “directly name the dynamics and beneficiaries of 
racism,” and the “defensive moves” named in the introduction constitute “forms of 
resistance to the challenge of internalized dominance.”  34
 DiAngelo then provides examples of racial stress: 
• Suggesting that a white person’s viewpoint comes from a racialized frame of 
reference (challenge to objectivity);  
• People of color talking directly about their racial perspectives (challenge to 
white racial codes);  
• People of color choosing not to protect the racial feelings of white people in 
regards to race (challenge to white racial expectations and need/entitlement to 
racial comfort);  
• People of color not being willing to tell their stories or answer questions about 
their racial experiences (challenge to colonialist relations); 
 DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” 54.32
 DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” 55.33
 DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” 55-56.34
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• Receiving feedback that one’s behavior had a racist impact (challenge to white 
liberalism); 
• Suggesting that group membership is significant (challenge to individualism);  
• An acknowledgment that access is unequal between racial groups (challenge to 
meritocracy);  
• Being presented with a person of color in a position of leadership (challenge to 
white authority).  35
The resistance to which critical whiteness scholars refer is specifically resistance to the 
pedagogy and group interactions that confront white people with the systemic nature of 
racism and our complicity within it. The “racial equilibrium” which these challenges 
disturb, then, is the state in which the privileges and social patterns of white normativity 
are taken for granted and the uncomfortable implications of white complicity are either 
repudiated or minimized. 
 While the critical whiteness education studies surveyed here use a wide array of 
definitions to categorize these phenomena, they do find consistent patterns of pedagogical 
practice and white resistance that map generally on to DiAngelo’s categories of ‘racial 
stress,’ ‘defensive moves,’ and ‘racial equilibrium.’ Case and Hemmings describe their 
white women student participants in this way: “Rather than confront issues of race and 
racism, these students tend to distance themselves from the curriculum in acts of 
resistance.”  Nado Aveling recounts that resistant students in her courses “refused to 36
‘see’ colour as a means of establishing their non-racist credentials and became defensive 
 DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” 57.35
 Case and Hemmings, “Distancing Strategies,” 607.36
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when their assumptions were challenged.”  McIntyre’s study of white women teacher 37
candidates uses the term “white talk” to describe resistant discourses, which “insulate 
white people from examining their / our individual and collective role(s) in the 
perpetuation of racism.”  Hytten and Warren’s study explores how students exposed to 38
critical whiteness literature “might resist or struggle with the material in such a way as to 
protect and secure whiteness’s dominant position.”  The descriptions of white resistant 39
behavior and discourse outlined in this chapter are composed within this broader 
interpretive framework—a narrative of the underlying motivations behind white resistant 
behavior, and how those motives align with interests in preserving white social and 
material power. My theoretical contribution to the discussion involves interacting with 
and supplementing the interpretive frameworks found in the literature. Undertaking that 
task requires that we first examine the behaviors themselves as depicted in the literature, 
as well as how they impact learning and social dynamics in the classroom. 
Emotioned Behavioral Patterns 
 Some modes of white resistance do not involve specific discourse strategies, or 
require spoken words at all, but consist of emotive and embodied responses. These 
responses are no less influential on classroom dynamics for being nonverbal—they can 
 Nado Aveling, “Student Teachers' Resistance to Exploring Racism: Reflections on 'Doing' 37
Border Pedagogy,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education 30, no. 2 (2002): 119-30.
 McIntyre, Making Meaning of Whiteness, 45.38
 Hytten and Warren, “Engaging Whiteness,” 67.39
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communicate discontentment with the content by lack of participation, or they can 
interrupt the flow of learning and redirect attention and sympathy toward white 
experiences of discomfort. In this way white resistant responses constitute enactments in 
Goto’s formulation because they reveal how white normativity is being disturbed, and 
function as attempts to restore racial equilibrium. 
Silence 
 One of the most common responses described in the literature is silence. 
DiAngelo, Case and Hemmings, Hytten and Warren, and McIntyre each specifically point 
out the practice of silence or non-participation as a common white resistant behavior.  40
Case and Hemmings name silence as “the most common distancing strategy” employed 
by their white women participants, with less than 39% participating in discussion and of 
that number, less than 15% “spoke more than once and most of them made short, highly 
cautious remarks.”  This dynamic often contrasts noticeably with the willingness of 41
students of color to participate, in racially diverse settings. Christine Sleeter recounts a 
time when a group of students of color joined her all-white class on Cultural Diversity, in 
which “the students of color tried to engage the white students in talking about race, an 
experience everyone found frustrating because most of the white students were silent.”  42
 DiAngelo, “White Fragility”; Case and Hemmings, “Distancing Strategies”; Crowley and 40
Smith, “Whiteness and Social Studies Teacher Education”; Hytten and Warren, “Engaging 
Whiteness”; McIntyre, Making Meaning of Whiteness.
 Case and Hemmings, “Distancing Strategies,” 610, 614.41
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Case and Hemmings note that in contrast to the white students “the 5 Black women 
students had a participation rate of more than 83% and spoke an average of three times 
per class meeting.”  While most classrooms include a percentage of students who prefer 43
not to engage, the consistency of white silence points to a broader phenomenon. 
 The most commonly cited reason for silence among white students is that they 
feel afraid to offend students of color in the same classroom, or say something that will 
bring criticism or judgment upon themselves. The white women in Case and Hemmings’s 
study reported that “they kept silent because they did not want to incur the social 
disapproval of Black people in the room.”  Other survey comments include: 44
I kinda feel ignorant to like how to approach things. Plus, it’s hard to ask 
questions about it because I want to know more about them and what they do, but 
it’s hard ‘cause you don’t want to offend anybody. 
I would be a little worried, I don’t know. I guess I would have to think exactly 
what I was gonna say. I don’t want to offend anyone. I don’t want anyone to 
offend me. 
I would rather shut my mouth than offend someone.  45
A white student in one of Tatum’s classes expresses that in speaking about racism, “this 
much honesty is difficult for many of us, for it would permit our insecurities and 
 Case and Hemmings, “Distancing Strategies,” 614.43
 Case and Hemmings, “Distancing Strategies,” 614. See also Applebaum, Being White, Being 44
Good, 186; Modica, “Unpacking the ‘Colorblind Approach,’” 407; Tatum, Why are All the Black 
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ignorances to surface, thus opening the floodgate to our vulnerabilities.”  The potency 46
which the charge of racism still carries in contemporary society owes to how it is often 
framed as a core identity characteristic rather than a descriptor of behaviors or policies. 
Therefore, the fear of offending which drives silence is associated with a fear of exposing 
one’s ignorance and leaving oneself vulnerable to an accusation which feels like an 
existential threat to one’s moral identity. 
 Silence can be used to protect white people from fully engaging with the content 
of critical antiracist teaching, but it can also have an adverse effect on people of color in 
the same classroom. Robin DiAngelo and Özelm Sensoy point out that white people’s 
silence can often be interpreted as implicit agreement and solidarity with other white 
people who are more actively opposed to the course material. “White silence,” they write, 
“served to embolden the actively resistant participants because it implied agreement. 
Even if Whites who were silent found the behavior of their cohorts problematic, their 
silence allowed these vocal participants to dictate the agenda of virtually every 
discussion.”  DiAngelo and Sensoy acknowledge that the underlying reasons for silence 47
may be quite different from its impact, but they emphasize that failure to engage or 
challenge the racist discourse of white peers nevertheless shapes group dynamics. 
Conversely, silence in response to a white student taking an antiracist stand “serves to 
 Tatum, Why are All the Black Kids, 194-95.46
 Robin DiAngelo and Özlem Sensoy, “Getting Slammed: White Depictions of Race Discussions 47
as Arenas of Violence,” Race Ethnicity and Education 17, no 1 (2012): 116.
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isolate the person who took that stand.”  Silence therefore often functions to empower 48
those most willing to vocalize their resistance to teaching on structural racism, while 
disempowering students of color by delegitimizing their experiences.  49
Emotional Agitation and “Acting Out” 
 Another category of white embodied responses are behaviors of emotional 
agitation and disruption. As DiAngelo outlines, white defensive behaviors include “the 
outward display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and behaviors such as 
argumentation, silence, and leaving the stress-inducing situation.”  The prevalence of 50
white students demonstrating high levels of agitation, to the extent of crying or physically 
leaving the room, is well-documented in the whiteness education literature. Modica 
describes an incident from her own teaching experience: 
During one of my own college classes, a white female student had suggested her 
mother as an example of someone who holds narrow views of race because of her 
age. When noted kindly, but firmly, that the student’s mother was likely younger 
than I am, and that age is not an excuse for intolerance, the student’s eyes welled 
with tears and she fled into the hallway.  51
Applebaum relates similar teaching anecdotes, including the actions of fellow white 
students to comfort those expressing greater agitation. A white male student who began 
 Robin DiAngelo, “Nothing to Add: The Role of White Silence in Racial Discussions,” 48
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by charging that students of color “seemed to be over-sensitive and offended by practices 
that were not ill-intended” proceeded, upon being challenged, to protest “with both anger 
and tears insisting that he was not racist.”  Depictions in the education literature of white 52
people driven to tears upon having their perspective on racism challenged indicates the 
intensity of emotion which the subject matter invariably elicits.  53
 In the general classroom setting, conversely, white resistance can take on a tone of 
hostile belligerence, often directed toward the instructor. Matias describes an incident in 
which a white student objects to her systemic framing of race: “While gripping his table 
and fervently pointing his finger at me, he strongly and loudly asserted, ‘The fact is YOU 
telling me to see race and gender IS racist and sexist!’”  I will discuss in a subsequent 54
section the discursive move used here to insist on a ‘colorblind’ framework; what I 
highlight here is the performance of anger and the willingness to confront an instructor in 
such an emotionally charged way.  The level of emotional activation displayed by these 55
white students, and their willingness to diverge from classroom norms of comportment, 
suggest that they perceive in the anti-racist teaching a form of threat to something 
essential to their sense of self or sense of well-being. 
 Applebaum, “Comforting Discomfort,” 863.52
 See also Matias, Feeling White, 1-6.53
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 Another mode of emotioned discourse which diverges significantly in tone from 
belligerence but can still divert classroom energies toward white interests is a focus on 
personal shame and discomfort. White students who experience emotions associated with 
shame or disorientation often attempt to process those emotions in the classroom in a way 
that makes the feelings themselves the center of discussion. Hytten and Warren quote one 
white student who frequently comments on her own sense of shame, and halfway through 
the semester says, “this is a new topic for me and it’s hard to understand sometimes. 
Sometimes it’s hard because it takes effort to figure it out and sometimes it’s hard from 
last week and because it is emotionally stressful.”  DiAngelo and Sensoy provide a more 56
contentious example in which one student in discussion complains that “every single day 
this whole week since this past experience, I felt the same degree of anger that I had last 
week from the experience of being here. And so, you know—I’m not talking to this 
because I feel angry from last week and because I don’t want to say a bunch of shit and 
have it all slammed back in my face.”  What both of these comments reveal is a concern 57
to express the difficulty of their emotional experience. I would further argue that they 
demonstrate a degree of emotional dysregulation that suggests a perceived threat to 
something important, as I will explore in subsequent sections. 
Modes of Resistant White Discourse 
 Hytten and Warren, “Engaging Whiteness,” 72.56
 DiAngelo and Sensoy, “Getting Slammed,” 104.57
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 While the previous examples focused on distinct modes of emotioned behavior, 
both verbal and non-verbal, I now turn to delineate recurring patterns of discourse that 
represent forms of resistance against anti-racist frameworks taught in classrooms. In 
doing so I follow a widely established method in whiteness studies, categorizing common 
arguments and statements which function to minimize the extent of racism and attempt to 
exonerate the speaker or U.S. society, in general. 
 The literature reflects different approaches to framing the phenomena. What 
McIntyre simply calls “white talk”  is referred to by DiAngelo as “defensive moves”  58 59
and by Case and Hemmings as “distancing strategies,”  terms which emphasize the self-60
protection function of discourse on an individual level. Sandra Lee Bartky calls these 
discourses “phenomenologies of denial,” emphasizing the experience of “nice” white 
people who “believe they have no race prejudice.”  Bonilla-Silva and Feagin use the 61
language of “frames,” or discourses which reinforce ideology at the societal level—they 
are, as Bonilla-Silva describes, “set paths for interpreting information,”  in ways that 62
preserve the legitimacy of white hegemony. Hytten and Warren using the language of 
“rhetorics” rather than “strategies” and warn against racial essentialism in how we 
interpret the motivations behind these discourses. Their research finds that several of 
 McIntyre, Making Meaning of Whiteness, 45.58
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these discourses were also utilized by students of color in a way that complicated their 
theorizing of how hegemonic power flows between groups.  While the question of what 63
incentives people of color have for using these discourses is an important one, my own 
analysis of these discourse patterns focuses on how they are employed by white people. 
“I Barely Even Notice It”: Discourses Minimizing Systemic Racism 
 One commonly employed category of resistant discourses is grounded in the 
assumption that racism is neither prevalent nor particularly malevolent in contemporary 
U.S. society. This premise is sometimes expressed directly in the course of group 
discussions or interviews, as in Jayakumar and Adamian’s study on white HBCU 
students, in which several of their interviewees “made statements about race not 
mattering, not seeing racial difference, or identifying themselves as race-less.”  Even 64
when not stated directly, the premise that racism is relatively insignificant to social life 
reveals itself in reaction and protest when structural racism is identified as a causal factor 
of inequality, or when it is brought up at all. The common accusation of “playing the race 
card,” for example, implies that a person of color who claims that racism is a factor in 
their mistreatment is cynically wielding the social opprobrium against racism to their 
advantage, in effect making a false accusation. The charge itself rests on a baseline 
assumption of how much racism ‘actually’ exists, how plausible it is that racism played a 
 Hytten and Warren, “Engaging Whiteness,” 67.63
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role in the disparity, and who gets to decide. Minimizing discourses often reflect an 
intuition, a reflexive belief among many white people that the society they inhabit is not 
characterized by racism or racial inequality to any significant degree. 
 One set of minimizing discourses reflect the cultural prevalence of the ideology of 
colorblindness in the U.S. since the 1960s. As described earlier, sociological approaches 
to whiteness analyze the function of colorblindness as a rationalizing ideology, which 
“explains contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics.”  This 65
often involves accounting for racial disparities as “the product of market dynamics, 
naturally occurring phenomena, and blacks’ imputed cultural limitations.”  But 66
colorblindness also functions as a belief that the best way to reduce racism in society is to 
refuse on principle to take race into account when developing policies, selecting 
candidates for positions of prominence, or even identifying oneself or others. 
 Many initial white reactions to being instructed or questioned on systemic racism 
are simply variations of surprise that the topic is considered salient. In Natasha K. 
Warikoo and Janine de Novais's series of in-depth interviews with white elite university 
students, colorblind survey responses characterize just over half of their data set.  In 67
response to questions on the influence of university initiatives and campus life on their 
understanding of race and diversity, one student responded: 
 Bonilla-Silva, Racism without Racists, 2.65
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A lot of the students here are pretty race-blind, in the sense that I attend a lot of 
events that are filled with people of every color, of every race…. And I barely 
even notice it until I consciously try and think about it. And it’s not pointed out.  68
Another student responds, “No one looks at you and thinks, ‘Oh, this is a white person.’ 
… That’s definitely not the first thing that I see. And I don’t think a large amount of the 
people here see it at all.”  Both of these responses describe a subjective experience in 69
which race is either absent from perception or significantly suppressed (with the bulk of 
theorists leaning heavily toward the latter option, as will be explained in subsequent 
chapters). The second response, interestingly, projects the white student’s own experience 
onto the majority of other students (“I don’t think a large amount of the people here see it 
at all”), a naturalization of one’s intuition and perspective which is one common 
characteristic of white normativity. 
 Some white reactions characterized by the colorblind frame focus on self-
identification—whether the white respondent perceives their own identity in terms of 
race. Some of these responses indicate that other aspects of identity (such as cultural 
background or national ancestry) can be experienced as salient even if race is not, as with 
this respondent in Jayakumar and Adamian’s study: 
My ethnicity holds absolutely no importance in my personal daily life. I do not 
look upon my ethnicity in anything that I do outside of my request that the 
children study German in school. My mother is from Germany. Often I will not 
answer race questions on forms.  70
 Warikoo and de Novais, “Colour-blindness and Diversity,” 865.68
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This student’s claim to “not answer race questions on forms” could reflect a general 
conviction on the validity of racial categories, but it also suggests a specific discomfort 
with being identified as white. Jo-Anne Lee reports that in her women’s studies classes 
on racialization, many “White majority students tend to bristle at the idea of being named 
as White and at being asked to take action on the basis of their White identity.”  Or as a 71
white student in one of Beverly Daniel Tatum’s classes protests, “I’m just normal!”  This 72
simple objection encapsulates the wider phenomena of white normativity—a belief, as 
well as an instinct, that racial and cultural specificity is recognizable only in those 
different from yourself, in contrast to your own ‘normality.’ 
 Other responses from white students demonstrate how a colorblind orientation is 
culturally pervasive largely because it is actively taught by many social institutions 
including families, schools, and popular media. One white student explains the way 
colorblindness was taught specifically as an aspect of her Roman Catholic faith and 
upbringing: 
Growing up, I attended a Catholic school and was taught that we were all created 
equal and are created in the image and likeness of God. For this reason, each and 
every one of us was made especially by God and therefore demanded a certain 
kind of respect. No matter what a person’s skin color, sex, or sexual orientation, 
we are all the same. Ultimately, we were taught to be colorblind, or to be able to 
 Jo-Anne Lee, “Teaching White Settler Subjects Antiracist Feminisms,” in Exploring Race in 71
Predominantly White Classrooms: Scholars of Color Reflect, ed. George Yancy and Maria del 
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look beyond a person’s physical appearance, so as to get a better understanding of 
who the person actually is.  73
In this case, the student’s understanding of church teaching about the inherent worth of 
each individual regardless of their identity entails an inherent claim to respect, but she 
also defines that equality as being “all the same,” and assumes that disregarding one’s 
appearance is essential to knowing “who the person actually is.” This respondent further 
claims that “If people practiced colorblindness, racial discrimination would not be a 
factor … The fact that I am able to look past race tells me that the lesson I have learned, 
to treat others as we would like to be treated and to look inside of a person rather than [at] 
the outside, is indeed working.”  This comment exemplifies how colorblind ideology is 74
imparted and internalized, not only in Christian settings but in the broader culture. 
Colorblindness is presented as the solution to systemic racism, and the capacity to “look 
past race” is taken as a measure of success. 
 The pervasive commitment to the value of colorblindness can often result in 
another common white reaction—an anxiety or hostility toward people of color 
identifying racism. Mazzei provides one example of a white student’s reaction upon being 
asked to speak about specific experiences of race or racism: “Why do we need to talk 
about it? Isn’t it best if we don’t notice it? Isn’t it an issue because we [You] keep making 
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it an issue?”  The episode of hostility referenced earlier by Matias (“The fact is YOU 75
telling me to see race and gender IS racist and sexist!”)  is an even stronger expression 76
of this conviction, that racism (as understood by the participant) is more or less a non-
factor until it is named or described. Drawing upon her interviews with diversity 
practitioners, Sara Ahmed affirms, “Describing the problem of racism can mean being 
treated as if you have created the problem, as if the very talk of divisions is what is 
divisive.”  She reports similar comments frequently made to her following her own 77
presentations on race and inclusion: “Why are you always bringing up racism? Is that all 
you can see? Are you obsessed?”  Applebaum summarizes some of the most common 78
responses in her classroom, “when privileged students describe marginalized students as 
‘just too sensitive’ or that ‘they complain too much’ or ‘they are playing the race card.’”  79
Such responses are only intelligible in the context of a prior understanding that racism is 
not widespread nor a significant determinant of social and economic opportunity. 
 Another mode of white resistance which minimizes the reality of systemic racism 
is characterized by appeals to universality and equivalence of racial experience. What 
these responses have in common is how they interpret personal experiences and 
understandings of race without accounting for the particular power differentials of 
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systemic racism. A relative parity of social experience across racial groups is assumed, 
resulting in discourse that can inhibit progress in understanding the nature of inequitable 
structures. One response that reflects this orientation is what Hytten and Warren call the 
“discourse of connections,” which is “premised on the belief that at the most fundamental 
level, we all share some core human experience.”  George Yancy describes a classroom 80
interaction in which a black woman shared about the emotional difficulties of being 
called “the black girl” as the only black student in an all-white school, upon which a 
white female student responds, “I know exactly what she means! I lived in a black 
neighborhood and they referred to me as ‘the white girl.’”  While Yancy acknowledges 81
the white student’s experience, he maintains that this response in this context “obfuscated 
the specific power and privilege of the historical uniqueness of white racism.”  The 82
move to draw similarities can itself be a mode of minimizing entrenched power 
differentials. 
 The desire to emphasize equivalent experiences between racial groups can also 
manifest itself in efforts to minimize different experiences and agendas within the 
classroom environment itself. One commonly heard white reaction is an objection to 
framing racism in terms of power differentials because it is “divisive.” According to 
DiAngelo and Sensoy, this response presumes the existence of an “ideal imagined 
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community” in which white people operate in partnership with people of color to become 
increasingly inclusive.  This can lead to frustration among white students when racism is 83
defined in terms of social power distributed by race, as in these comments by a while 
male student: 
I found it—I found the idea of [racism as systemic power] to be divisive to us as a 
group…. That it was dividing us. That it would divide us into those with power 
and those without. And I would prefer not to go—you know, I would prefer to 
remain as a whole group. 
Here the student objects that defining racism in terms of power structures divides the 
class by race, in a way that he presumed was not the case before the teaching framework 
was given. The fact that the division is experienced as novel indicates how thoroughly he 
had presumed colorblind premises before taking the class. 
 Assumptions of universal experience also undergird a common defensive 
maneuver among white people: the claim of “reverse racism.” This charge can be leveled 
in the context of interpersonal interactions or at broader attempts at systemic change such 
as affirmative action.  As this example from R. Patrick Solomon’s research 84
demonstrates, response to teaching about white privileged status in society often elicits 
claims that white people can be the victims of racism just as assuredly as people of color: 
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Whites may well be over-privileged in some settings, but the author fails to point 
out any negative aspects of being white. To highlight some negative aspects, 
minorities have affirmative action for attaining certain jobs, and can use 
discrimination as an advantage against whites.  85
These expressions of felt injustice against white people reveal a worldview in which 
systemic disadvantage and oppression of people of color is not significant enough to 
merit measures designed to increase greater parity. Anti-racist policy measures are framed 
as an injustice to the white majority. In particular, the belief that affirmative action is only 
meant to address “a bad life in the past” is only intelligible in light of a belief that 
disadvantage based upon race is no longer persistent. 
“I Don’t Feel Like a Racist”: Discourses Dissociating from ‘Bad Whites’ 
 Another category of resistant responses reflects even more directly the self-
exoneration drive of many white students—an effort to differentiate themselves from 
more overt forms of racism or racist people, either present or past. Teaching about white 
complicity and responsibility in systemic racism invariable elicits emotions attached to 
the strong moral stigma and censure associate with the term racist. One white respondent 
in Hytten and Warren’s study summarizes this genre of response: 
Does feeling that my whiteness is a normal condition condemn me to the ranks of 
racist? Am I one of the automatically privileged, waving a flag of racist power, 
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because of my color? I don’t feel like a racist, yet certain writers and our own 
country’s history tell me I must be (emphasis added).  86
In the context of their study, Case and Hemmings describe this narrative as a “tactic” 
through which the white women in their classrooms “attempted to dissociate themselves 
from the socially unacceptable label of racist although assigning themselves the label of 
good White, tolerant of cultural differences and color-blind in their social interactions.”  87
Sara Ahmed argues that the act of distancing can actually occur through attempts to 
identify racism in the discourse or institutional practices of other white people—even 
identifying racism in oneself can function implicitly as a “claim not to be racist in the 
same way” as those who fail to recognize their own racism.  The move to differentiate 88
from other, ‘worse’ white people functions as a way of self-assuring oneself of an 
acceptable moral identity. 
 The most common mode of distancing is temporal—favorably contrasting racial 
justice in contemporary times with chattel slavery or Jim Crow segregation in previous 
eras. The sentiments that “We have come a long way. It is better,”  or that talk of racism 89
is of little relevance because “there’s no more slavery,”  are commonplace among white 90
people as well as many people of color in society at large, and they frequently arise in 
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response to claims that racial inequality is pervasive. Winans reports that most of her 
white students “assert that racism is a relic of the past, that they themselves see beyond 
race, that they try to live by the Golden Rule, that they are not racist.”  In analyzing the 91
reasons for racial inequality, responses insisting “white privilege is something of the 
past”  might refrain from blaming the culture of black or Latino groups, but place the 92
focus on past injustices at the expense of present ones. One white student in Warikoo and 
de Novais’s study claimed, “What’s keeping minorities down now is not so much racism 
as the fact that they are at the bottom of the socio-economic status hierarchy because of 
centuries of racism.”  The idea that racism is a phenomenon largely relegated to the past 93
drives a significant degree of white resistant responses. 
 The perceived degree of difference between past and present is generally 
presented as a rebuttal to the idea that contemporary racial inequalities reflect persistent 
racism in contemporary systems and cultural assumptions. This is summarized in the 
general sentiment that “things are getting better,” and that racism is no longer a 
significant factor in social life. “I don’t think skin color matters much anymore,” says one 
white student, adding that “It’s getting better…. as this generation below me comes up, I 
think that they’re going to start dying off those racist old people.”  Hytten and Warren 94
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call this propensity the discourse of mark-it, meaning the “marking” of racial progress, 
which can become “disabling when it leads to complacency, or when it gets called upon 
as a way of resisting the fact that racism is still a significant social problem.”  Such 95
discourse can often take an impressionistic form, as with two white respondents who 
said, “In the past definitely whites were privileged, but things have evened out greatly 
over time. I don’t think it’s 100 percent yet, but it’s very close, if anything, 51 or 49 
percent even.”  The fact that “51 or 49 percent” is perceived as significant progress 96
reveals intuitions concerning how much social change has taken place, but also intuitions 
concerning how much social change should be perceived as adequate or reasonable. 
 When not contrasting themselves with previous generations in U.S. history, white 
students also contrast themselves with contemporaries, including family members, 
perceived as more racist than themselves. Similarly to the previous discursive moves, the 
objection can be as simple as “I’ve never abused or insulted a black person,”  or 97
emphasizing the difference between commonplace white social behavior and the culture 
of the Ku Klux Klan. However, whiteness education researchers also frequently report 
white student comments about family members and other peers, again emphasizing the 
contrast between their loved ones and themselves. One student who frequently described 
her structural understanding of racism made the following comments: 
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And I just, like, know in the same way, I think that people have this sort of veil 
over their eyes. I think that I have this magnifying glass on, where I am 
hypersensitive almost, maybe not hypersensitive, but hyper aware, not sensitive—
aware of all of those things being um perpetrated . . . I recognize that ignorance 
now in my friends and family—the things that they say I just, like, can’t believe, 
just sort of this, it’s just like over the head, you know, so, one of that.  98
Alice McIntyre also describes white teacher candidates in her research as referring to 
parents and grandparents as “very racist and very vocal about it.”  What these comments 99
have in common is a certain performance of antiracism—their condemnation of other 
people’s racism is meant to be a sign of their recognition of the problem while distancing 
themselves from it. 
 For McIntyre, these responses are significant in that they rest on the premise that  
racism is “located within the individual and that it can be defined on a continuum from 
good to bad,” from “good whites” to “bad whites.”  But she goes on to explain that this 100
framework can be quite counterproductive when trying to address racism on a systemic 
level. “This limited definition of racism lets the ‘good whites’ off the hook at the same 
time that it dilutes a critique of the multiple ways that white people perpetuate, and 
benefit from, white racism.”  Whiteness scholars frequently make this claim, that the 101
underlying purpose of white resistant moves is personal absolution, getting oneself “off 
the hook” from what is recognized to be a serious social injustice, even a social evil. 
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 The claim is supported by direct statements from white students in antiracist 
training settings. Matias quotes a white student in one of her classes: 
I felt like I was being called evil. I was so ashamed of who I was in that moment 
that I dropped the class; I probably should have stayed in it to get a genuine 
understanding to feel stereotyped and uncomfortable, but I didn’t because I was 
so ashamed of being White in that class.  102
Similar comments arise in Solomon’s study, such as the objection that describing white 
people as having systemic advantage in society “seem to blame a person for their 
ancestors.”  Another student remarks, “I feel that just because I am white I am ‘labeled’ 103
as being a racist when in fact it could not be further from the truth. We need to remember 
that some people may take advantage of this ‘privilege’ but others may not want to be 
punished for being in that same category just because of color.  A participant in 104
Picower’s research puts it even more succinctly: “Being White is what I was born with. 
So you know, I’m not going to feel guilty about being White.”  The more direct refusals 105
to feel guilt indicate how teaching on systemic racism is being processed—the claims of 
shared responsibility for a wider system that produces inequality are consistently received 
as condemnations of one’s personal character, with objections functioning to deflect the 
force of blame. The cognitive processing of these social and ethical claims activates an 
emotional combination of guilt and resentment at being made to feel guilty. 
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“I Didn’t Know Any of This”: Discourses of Ignorance and Skepticism 
 A fourth category of emotioned resistant response which I draw from the critical 
whiteness literature consists of expressions of ignorance about systemic racial power 
disparities. Some expressions of ignorance take on the form of a confession and 
accompany a sincere desire to learn more, and therefore do not as easily fall into the 
category of “resistance,” as exemplified by the student in Hytten and Warren’s study who 
laments that “this is a new topic for me and it’s hard to understand sometimes.”  Other 106
declarations of ignorance are characterized by significant skepticism that systemic racism 
is actually integral to U.S. society. What many critical whiteness theorists maintain, 
however, is that even the most innocent expressions of ignorance emerge from a broader 
socially constructed ignorance that has its own resistant function. Applebaum calls white 
ignorance “a product of an epistemology of ignorance, a systematically supported, 
socially induced pattern of (mis)understanding that is connected to and works to sustain 
systemic oppression and privilege.”  The theoretical foundations of critical analysis of 107
white ignorance by Charles Mills and others will be explored in the following chapter; 
here I present a sample of how white students express it and interpret it when confronted 
with analysis of systemic racism. 
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 As mentioned above, many white students express their ignorance of systemic 
forces in earnest. As Melanie Bush reports from her research, many white people 
acknowledge the existence of racial disparities, but those who do not resort to cultural 
deficiency explanations often “reveal that they really don’t understand why there are such 
differences in standards of living, wealth, and resources between groups.”  Some white 108
people express authentic chagrin upon being faced with the persistence of systemic 
racism, as one white woman in Avelings’s class expressed that “I felt rather deflated, 
thinking ‘I didn’t even know I may be contributing to racism in schools. So how can I go 
about reducing its effects?’”  Another white student interviewed by Ryan Crowley 109
responds in a way that indicates a learning process, and also indirectly reveals the wider 
social milieu of ignorance that shaped his prior views: 
So I guess that sort of made me realize that even my academic outcomes aren’t 
solely based on how smart I am or how hard I worked in school, which carried 
over to just, you know, maybe my life outcomes aren’t solely based on how hard I 
work.  110
 Other claims of ignorance, while plausibly sincere, contain an element of 
defensiveness toward the implication that their lack of knowledge about racialized 
systems is subject to critique. DiAngelo and Sensoy provide a pair of examples from their 
classroom experiences: 
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Apparently I’m just pretty darned clueless here, because I haven’t – I mean, 
racism; I don’t know. I guess I’m just still out of touch. 
How could I possibly know? I don’t know; right – or know what the world would 
look like from another perspective.  111
These last examples are more obviously “resistant” than the previous ones, but they each 
manifest a form of dismissal rooted in an experience of feeling overwhelmed—that the 
picture of society drawn by critical theory is overly, unnecessarily complex. Expressed 
ignorance of systemic analysis, in this mode, is more an expression of direct resistance, 
as it begins with the premise that “common-sense” understandings of race and society 
deserve greater deference precisely because they do not require such detailed explanation. 
Summary: Implicit Goals of White Resistant Behavior and Discourse 
 The taxonomy of white resistant responses in this chapter represents an attempt to 
identify and thematize a diversity of behaviors, affective reactions, and discursive 
patterns. The critical whiteness education scholars who engage in this research observe 
enough consistent and common themes among these responses that it is possible to 
analyze them in terms of reflecting a generalizable social reality. As mentioned above,  
this range of behavior and discourse can be understood in terms of Goto’s concept of 
enactments—“individual or collective behavior that reveals the complex master narrative 
and its subnarratives at play, expressing as well as shaping often tacit assumptions about 
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reality, for example, race, class, gender, sexuality, or religion.”  As Goto explains, in 112
anti-racist pedagogical contexts, this range of reactions tends to “define the space as well 
as lend the contours of how others are expected to respond.”  The core assumptions 113
which underlie many of the white resistant responses in the research—racism is relatively 
rare and better than it used to be, U.S. society and economy are largely meritocratic, and 
moral responsibility for racism should be limited to conscious intent or animus—
represent “master narratives” of the sort that Feagin categorize as the white racial frame. 
While narratives of minimization represent only one manifestation of white hegemony—
others include overt, virulent white supremacism and pseudoscientific claims of 
differences in cognitive ability between racial groups—they are most common among 
whites who identify as liberal, and thus constitute a practice of resistance most common 
in institutions which purport to pursue equity. 
 White resistance, however, is consistently manifested not only in ideas and 
discourses but in a high degree of charged affect. The question then becomes whether the 
frequently emotional nature of these reactions provides insight into the nature of white 
normativity, in terms of the social and psychological mechanisms through which it 
reproduces itself. DiAngelo frames her observations of white fragility behaviors in terms 
of an effort to “reinstate white racial equilibrium.”  As I explain at the beginning of the 114
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chapter, my method presumes that observing the reactions of white individuals when 
white normativity is challenged can inform our analysis of how it operates. The affect 
that often accompanies defensive responses suggests that there is something about the 
status quo that is felt as sufficiently important to white people’s sense of well being that it 
requires defense. 
 Therefore I close this chapter by thematizing underlying goals of white resistant 
responses as theorized in the critical whiteness literature. I frame these underlying goals 
in terms of what white people are trying to protect, which include preserving moral 
identity, preserving the legitimacy of the social order, and preserving racial hierarchy. 
The following chapter will then analyze how different streams of critical whiteness 
scholarship theorize the relationship between these implicit agendas and the white 
behaviors and discourse that function to preserve them. That analysis, in turn, sets up in 
subsequent chapters my own hypothesis concerning the formation of intuitive affinities to 
the white normative social milieu itself through psychological development. Analyzing 
white resistance in terms of tacit goals of protection reflects common analytic categories 
in the critical whiteness literature, and also anticipates my argument that white 
normativity is as much about intuitive affinity toward the milieu of white hegemony as 
about biases against racialized out-groups. 
Preserving Moral Identity 
108
 The category of responses which directly assert white innocence and dissociate 
from ‘bad whites’ are the most obvious attempts at moral self-exoneration, but to varying 
degrees all resistant responses constitute attempts to preserve a sense of oneself and one’s 
community as essentially good. Barbara Applebaum has produced the most extensive 
body of work on the moral identity element latent within white resistant discourse. “Most 
white students see themselves as good people,” she explains, “and take the charge of 
complicity as a serious affront to their moral being.”  Denials of personal racial animus, 115
or emphasis on alternative reasons for racial disparities, or even protestations of 
ignorance, function in Applebaum’s view as “distancing strategies so that white people do 
not have to consider the subtle ways (subtle for white people) they are perpetuating a 
racist system.”  Throughout the literature, white resistance is consistently interpreted in 116
terms of preserving a sense of oneself as within acceptable bounds of morality. 
Preserving the Legitimacy of the Social Order 
 White discourses which minimize the extent of systemic racism tend to function 
similarly to discourses that explicitly uphold the ideal of meritocracy—they bolster 
legitimacy of the present socio-economic system, and by extension defend the moral 
identity of the society of which we are a part. In this way white resistance serves to 
defend a sense that one’s culture and society is basically just, and racism is merely an 
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anomaly or an incomplete fulfillment of the society’s ideals. White discourses of 
minimization also serve to preserve individualist ideologies concerning the nature of 
moral responsibility, and the value of colorblindness as an appropriate means toward 
racial justice. Regarding the former, Applebaum explains that Western philosophical 
ethics has long understood morality primarily in terms of individual intention and direct 
causal responsibility for harm. In this view, “If one is not the direct cause, then one is not 
at fault and bears no personal responsibility for the act.”  One function of moral social 117
formation is that it provides guideposts for determining whether we are fulfilling our own 
moral ideals. So when white students react to teaching on complicity in systemic racism, 
it is not only a defense against experiencing personal guilt, but also a defense of the 
cultural values, and by extension, the society itself, as an integral source of identity. 
Preserving Racial Hierarchy 
 Perhaps the most provocative theme in the critical whiteness research literature is 
the claim that white people employ resistant discourse to uphold racial hierarchy itself, 
even when either disavow or fail to consciously realize that is what they are doing. While 
most white discourse takes pains to denounce white supremacy, the discursive moves 
toward ignorance, rationalization, or self-exoneration constrain the challenge to white 
normativity within a sphere where white people’s status is not substantively threatened 
and in which they perceive that they receive positive benefits themselves. This reflects 
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the principle of interest convergence, as developed by the earliest critical race theorists 
such as Derek Bell.  According to H. Richard Milner, “interest convergence stresses that 118
racial equality and equity for people of color will be pursued and advanced when they 
converge with the interests, needs, expectations, and ideologies of Whites.”  119
Questioning or minimizing the impact of systemic racism, focusing on individual white 
innocence of racial animus, and appealing to ostensibly objective principles of 
meritocracy all operate to place limits on challenges to comfortable modes of social 
operation. 
 DiAngelo describes anti-racist pedagogy as a “challenge to internalized 
dominance,”  implying that preserving relative privilege over people of color is an 120
internal driving motivation whether white people are fully cognizant of this or not. The 
nature of white normativity means that these deeply rooted motivations may have less to 
do with racial animus than an intuitive comfort with racial social hierarchy, what 
DiAngelo calls “the insulated environment of racial privilege [that] builds white 
expectations for racial comfort.”  Matias expands on this notion in her claim that 121
“Whites have also developed a psychological condition toward their whiteness…. Whites 
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have developed a dependency on a white supremacist system because such a system 
constantly reinforces, uplifts, and purports their existence, identity, mentality, and 
behaviors above people of color.”  What these critical whiteness scholars propose is that 122
white people generally have psychological incentives to preserve racial hierarchy even as 
they consciously recognize its moral illegitimacy. 
 One inherent tension that results in common white resistant responses is how to 
preserve a sufficiently comfortable degree of white normativity while simultaneously 
preserving our individual and corporate moral identity. In Jennifer Mueller’s analysis of 
white ignorance, for example, 
people approach the maze of racial cognition with vested ends in mind, tacitly if 
not consciously. For white actors, #successful” cognition is commonly defined by 
being able to execute, or at least abide by, racial domination without being racist 
(i.e., without feeling bad or being regarded as deviant or immoral)—an objective 
that racial ignorance facilitates.  123
Mueller’s account reflects a premise central to most critical analysis of white resistance 
and white normativity—the assumption that white behaviors and discourse should not be 
taken at face value, but rather reflect deeply rooted incentives and motivations to preserve 
white hegemonic status. This dual incentive to preserve the social order while preserving 
one’s sense of self as moral is potentially one source of the charged affective and 
emotional responses observed in anti-racist pedagogical contexts. 
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 In the following chapter, I examine the question of the relationship between the 
function and subjective experience of white discourse in dialogue with three trajectories 
in critical whiteness scholarship, and their different approaches to theorizing these 
inherent tensions. I focus on the frameworks of Barbara Applebaum, Jennifer Mueller, 
and Linda Martín-Alcoff. Each of these prominent scholars is grounded in the premises 
of critical race theory and its understanding of systemic power, and each draws heavily 
from their experiences of teaching systemic racism as a basis for analysis. My 
engagement with their interpretations of the motivations and strategies undergirding 
white resistance lays the groundwork for my own theoretical contribution to the field, 
which can be summarized as a preservation of the affective attachment to the social 
milieu and cultural norms. I posit that the various forms of white resistance catalogued 
above can be understood in terms of a threat response to the challenge that critical 
antiracism poses to an embodied sense of security and comfort in the social and cultural 
norms that constitute white normativity. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CRITICAL WHITENESS ANALYSIS OF WHITE 
EPISTEMIC RESISTANCE 
 The critical whiteness research literature consistently frames white emotioned 
resistance, as catalogued in the previous chapter, as a set of strategies or tactics which 
white people employ in order to avoid feelings of complicity and to preserve white 
hegemony. The language of strategy connotes a process of deliberate calculation in which 
white people interpret our lived experience in terms of advantaged status and privilege, 
and understand on some level that our reactions and responses are designed to preserve 
that status. This framework sits in a degree of tension with the spontaneous expressions 
of guilt or confusion white people enact when our moral identity and worldview are 
challenged by critical antiracism. While there is evidence that many white U.S. citizens 
do explicitly understand their identity in terms of dominant status,  the whiteness 1
research literature depicts a sample of white people who generally do not demonstrate an 
awareness of how their beliefs and perceptions merit the description of ‘racist,’ nor do 
they think of themselves as intending to propagate racial hierarchy.  
 Critical whiteness theory, like most streams of sociology and psychology, takes 
for granted a significant gap between what people consciously believe we are doing and 
the underlying incentives that motivate our discourse and behaviors at the level of group 
interest. I affirm the central claims of critical whiteness theory concerning the self-
protective, power-reinforcing functions of emotioned white resistance, and its three 
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implicit goals that I enumerate at the end of the previous chapter: preserving moral 
identity, preserving a sense of society’s legitimacy, and preserving racial hierarchy. My 
central interest, however, is to explore in more detail the nature of the dissonance or 
cognitive gap between white people’s subjective experience of emotioned resistance—of 
ignorance, confusion, or disagreement with critical antiracism—and the way that our 
resistance works to reinforce racial hierarchy. 
 To this end I turn to three prominent scholars of critical whiteness theory, each 
representative of a different theoretical approach. I engage with Barbara Applebaum, 
Jennifer Mueller, and Linda Martín-Alcoff, who work primarily with postmodern power 
analysis, epistemologies of ignorance, and phenomenology, respectively. In Being White, 
Being Good, Applebaum draws upon critical theorists Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, 
applying their accounts of discourse, power, and the social formation of the subject in her 
interpretation of how white people process their culpability in systemic racism. Mueller 
works within the paradigm of white ignorance developed by Charles Mills, and traces 
“epistemic strategies” employed by her white students for sustaining ignorance of 
systemic racism even when it is the subject of analysis.  Martín-Alcoff employs a 2
phenomenological approach centered on embodiment, explaining in Visible Identities 
how “knowledge lodged in our bodies”  shapes mannerisms, habits, and all manner of 3
subtle interactions that contribute to a broader racial hierarchy in society. My engagement 
 Mueller, “Producing Colorblindness.”2
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with these three models, and my assessment of their strengths and weaknesses, lays the 
theoretical groundwork for my own contribution in the following chapter, focused on the 
psychological development of affective attachments to the social order. 
 Ultimately, I argue that a psychodynamic analysis of white emotioned resistance 
that takes seriously many white people’s subjective experiences of earnest intentions and 
disorientation, without centering them, has the potential to resolve some tensions in the 
various critical whiteness approaches. While the poststructural and epistemological 
approaches treat white resistant discourse largely as a series of strategies meant to 
obscure group interests, phenomenological approaches pay more attention to proximate 
motivations, and how white people default to habits and ideas that simply feel normal. I 
believe that addressing directly such proximate motivations to preserve a sense of 
normality, rather than attempting to move past them into critical analysis, has both 
pedagogical and pastoral value in helping white people move toward transformation. 
 It is important at this point to pause and acknowledge the role of my particular 
epistemic advantage in addressing this topic. As a white person who has attended several 
anti-racist classes and workshops and done extensive reading in anti-racist literature, I am 
well acquainted with the reluctance to perceive racism as something that permeates social 
norms, and the disorientation that arises when what I believe to be honest questions about 
white complicity are identified as bad-faith attempts to derail. For decades of my life I 
have believed that “being colorblind” was the best way to achieve racial equality, and I 
have claimed sincere ignorance about the way racial power dynamics shape who has 
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influence and who is deemed important in institutions. I have experienced confusion 
when friends of color express mistrust of white people, believing that my lack of animus 
ought to be sufficient to quell suspicions as to my good intentions. While my research on 
white resistance does not include therapeutic settings, I experience a feeling analogous to 
countertransference when reading about white people whose questions and skeptical  
responses are analyzed as “strategies” or “expressions of power.” 
 My exploration of the relationship between social structures and white individual 
subjective experience, then, is unavoidably a self-exploration, an attempt to examine how 
I may, in Haslanger’s language, be “confused or misled about the social practices that [I] 
enact.”  Critical whiteness scholars address the importance of interpreting white 4
emotioned resistance not primarily through the lens of conscious intention but in light of 
the work it does to preserve white hegemony, and that is the primary focus of the 
theorists here. My proposal to examine more closely the white subjective experience of 
emotioned resistance is intended to help white people recognize our own patterns and 
interrogate our own motivations with stricter scrutiny and deeper insight. 
“Power Works through Our Very Being”: Barbara Applebaum and Power Analysis 
of Discourse and Norms 
 As exemplified in the title of her book Being White, Being Good, Barbara 
Applebaum’s work concerns itself largely with the way conceptions of moral 
 Haslanger, “What is a Social Practice?” 236.4
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responsibility are integral to analysis of the nature of racism. Most of her theoretical work 
incorporates her pedagogical experience with white students, as in her article, “In the 
Name of Morality: Moral Responsibility, Whiteness and Social Justice Education.” Here 
Applebaum describes classroom experiences in which white students “were more 
concerned with proving how they were good antiracist whites than they were in trying to 
understand how systemic oppression works and the possibility that they might have a role 
in sustaining such systems.”  White people’s vested interests in appearing ‘good’ to 5
others and to ourselves inhibits our ability to engage in social analysis, and stymies 
honest evaluation of the progress institutions are making, or not making, in racial equity. 
 One of Applebaum$s central arguments is that white students act consistently to 
preserve their sense of moral identity, and making progress requires enacting a shift in 
how moral responsibility is conceived. “As long as individual intention, knowledge and/
or choice and control are the cornerstones for the only conception of moral responsibility 
one can appeal to, white complicity will be obstinately denied.”  One way of addressing 6
this phenomena is to look at moral reasoning as a largely intuitive process with cultural 
criteria that are both taught and absorbed through socialization. Many well-meaning 
white people understand ourselves as opposed to racism according to the terms on which 
society has trained us, which generally means not entertaining hateful thoughts toward 
people of color, and endeavoring to treat the people we come into contact with equally on 
 Applebaum, “In the Name of Morality,” 278.5
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an individual basis. Encountering critical antiracist pedagogy generates a moral crisis in 
many white people by upending not just the way we conceptualize racism, but also the 
very terms of moral reasoning about racism under which we have been formed, by 
presenting a model of group complicity regardless of individual intent and actions. 
 Where critical race theory and critical whiteness studies most directly challenge 
common Western understandings of moral responsibility, according to Applebaum, is in 
the disconnect between one’s conscious intentions and the broader impact of one’s 
structural position within society. She argues for an understanding of white complicity 
that “calls for a specific type of vigilance that recognizes the dangers of presuming that 
one can transcend racist systems when one attempts to work to challenge racist 
systems.”  Most relevant to the aims of my project, she proceeds to argue that efforts to 7
distance oneself from complicity (with statements like #I$ve never looked down on 
anyone because of their race”) or to position oneself as an opponent of racism, “function 
as distancing strategies so that white people do not have to consider the subtle ways 
(subtle for white people) they are perpetuating a racist system and shielding the system 
from challenge.”  Applebaum’s concept of distancing strategies is central to her 8
understanding of white resistance—which she sees as designed to help white people 
preserve a sense of moral identity. This section analyzing Applebaum will therefore focus 
on 1) her understanding of complicity as an embodiment of power within white 
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hegemonic systems, and 2) her understanding of white resistant discourse as distancing 
strategy. 
Intent vs. Impact: Subject Formation and Social Norms 
 One of Applebaum’s primary concerns is to develop pedagogical strategies based 
on the premise that conceptions of moral responsibility based on intention and individual 
control “cannot account for the ways in which white people perpetuate racism through 
unintentional habits of their everyday practices and that are more accurately intertwined 
with white ways of being.”  She explains that these ways of being include “traits of 9
character or a certain outlook about the world and how people move around in the world 
that is sanctioned by dominant norms and work to keep systemic injustice in place.”  10
Applebaum’s conception of “white ways of being” blurs sharp distinctions between 
intentional and unintentional behaviors in the interest of developing an account of 
complicity that incorporates both modes. 
 Applebaum’s theoretical grounding for how she conceptualizes “white ways of 
being” lies in her reading of Judith Butler’s account of subject formation and Michel 
Foucault’s theories of discourse and power. She finds that Butler “offers an explanation 
for how the subject is completely entrenched in the social without succumbing to a 
 Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 13.9
 Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 34.10
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determinism that precludes agency.”  The bridge between socialization and agency that 11
Applebaum finds in Butler’s work lies in her understanding of the reiteration of social 
norms with regard to sex and gender. On the one hand, every person is born into a society 
with particular norms of behavior and identity which “define the borders of what is 
thinkable, what is intelligible,” in terms of social relations.  However, such regulatory 12
norms “cannot reproduce or maintain themselves but instead require subjects whose 
existence depends on the reiteration of norms.”  Subjects reproduce norms through a 13
process in which the social order itself shapes the subject’s thinking and behavior within 
parameters of what is considered “normal” as the basis for being able to think, function, 
and have one’s humanity recognized: 
Since power is located in the norms and conventions that regulate discourse, this 
means that having subject status depends upon complying with and participating 
in dominant norms and conventions. One speaks and acts intelligibly (that is, one 
is a subject) only insofar as one is able to conform to the norms that regulate 
discourse. As such, social norms are both enabling and constraining, they enable a 
subject to speak insofar as they constrain the subject as subject.  14
In Butler’s account, social norms regarding identity both enable one to speak intelligibly, 
and also constrain the possibilities one has in how they understand and present 
themselves. 
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 Both constraint and possibility are necessary elements in Applebaum’s account of 
complicity in white supremacy, and her claim that white people share culpability for 
reproducing white normativity in our daily lives. For Applebaum, “what is distinct about 
Butler’s account is that the subject is not inert but actively complicit in these exclusionary 
tactics of power through its constitution as a subject and through the way it is compelled 
to performatively reiterate those norms to maintain subject status.”  There is an inherent 15
tension in being both active and compelled as applied to white complicity, for “Not only 
does the white subject cite white norms in order to maintain its status as a body that 
matters, in doing so the subject is implicated in perpetuating exclusions.”  Formulating 16
moral implication in this way includes behaviors that one is not conscious of being 
oppressive within the scope of the subject’s responsibility. Learning to operate within the 
social framework involves choices, however instinctual those choices may be, which 
invariably contribute to perpetuating exclusionary norms. 
Distancing Strategies: The Function of Power in Discourse 
 “White complicity,” Applebaum explains, “involves those practices that white 
people enact but are not perceived as morally wrong because they conform to societal 
norms and values.”  It is when such practices are challenged or named as oppressive in 17
 Applebaum, Being White, Being Good, 58.15
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the context of critical whiteness pedagogy that deflections, emotionally charged 
objections, and other forms of denial often result, as catalogued in the previous chapter. 
Drawing upon this same body of critical whiteness research, Applebaum calls these 
discourse patterns “distancing strategies,” drawing the language from Kim Case and 
Annette Hemmings’s paper of the same name. She describes the phenomena as 
“culturally sanctioned discursive practices that white students inadvertently use to evade 
consideration of their complicity.”  She further notes, however, that when she has 18
challenged white students with the idea that their responses (such as “As long as no one 
consciously intends to be racist, that’s what really matters!” or “To be fair, we should be 
talking about racism against whites, too”) are designed to distance, they frequently 
respond with skepticism. “What I asked my students to consider was how these 
comments were distancing strategies. In response, one of my white students exclaimed, 
‘How can you even think these were distancing strategies? Weren’t these just people 
sharing their opinion?’”  19
 In order to address the student’s question, and by extension the wider question of 
the dissonance between the subjective intention and the social function of discourse, 
Applebaum draws upon post structural scholarship on the nature and function of 
discourse and its relationship to power. Through her reading of Butler, Foucault, and 
other poststructural thinkers, she rejects the assumption that “words are transparent 
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instruments by which people transmit the ideas that they want to communicate to 
others.”  Rather, language is immersed in social assumptions that set the parameters for 20
what is intelligible and also reproduces those parameters, and is therefore unavoidably 
imbricated with power. Applebaum affirms that “focusing on the intention of the speaker 
can actually hide how power works through discourse.”  Regarding her student’s 21
question, it could be said that there is no such thing as “just people sharing their opinion,” 
with an emphasis on the word just. Language is always doing more than we intend, 
because our phrases, intonations, and timing are inherited from the wider society, and 
carry particular kinds of force due to cultural context and social convention. 
 Applebaum then takes an additional step, saying that “intentions too are 
discursively formed.”  While this language evokes a potential psychological analysis of 22
how intentions are shaped through psychological development, Applebaum does not go in 
this direction. Instead, her claim “is not to imply that we do not mean what we say or that 
we do not have intentions when we speak but rather the discourse might have effects that 
are not consonant with our intentions.”  Later in the same chapter, however, she applies 23
a Foucauldian analysis of discursive power in a way that strongly suggests that it is 
improper to conceive of individual intentions as something distinct or somehow 
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independent of the way discursive power works in and through subjects.  Foucault 24
“underscores that discourses transmit power because discourses limit who people can be 
and what can be thought…. discourses work through normalization to mask power 
relations operating in society.”  The way that discourse facilitates power is through 25
processes of normalization, as language reifies within a given social context what is 
intuitively experienced as legitimate, ordinary, and normal, and what is not. 
 This understanding of power and discourse has, for Applebaum, serious 
ramifications for the question of conscious intention and its relationship to white resistant 
discourse. The work of normalization in shaping discourse is so thorough that it “implies 
that the statements we make are not issued from an originating opinion, some place inside 
the person immune from power.”  Rather, in a claim that lies in tension with her earlier 26
statement that “discourse might have effects that are not consonant with our intentions,” 
she argues: 
There is no inner world independent of discourse or power from which opinions 
or beliefs spring. Our statements are always manifestations of discourses that have 
their origins in the discursive space and its historicity that people inhabit.  27
 Applebaum describes Foucault’s understanding of power as that which “is not static but 24
constantly circulates through society and through the subject it constitutes” (Being White, Being 
Good, 99). See Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality: An Introduction Volume 1 (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990); Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1977).
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For Applebaum, understanding discourse as a source of power rather than an act of 
representation is central to helping white students understand that resistant responses are 
not simply expressions of opinion but “part of a pattern of beliefs and practices that 
benefit certain groups of people and are socially sanctioned.”  Conceiving of discourse 28
along Foucauldian lines resolves, in Applebaum’s view, the tension between intent and 
impact of our speech. 
Response to Applebaum: The Persistent Conundrum of Subjectivity 
 Applebaum’s reading of poststructural accounts of power with regard to behavior 
and discourse norms is employed in service of her challenge to the traditional conception 
of morality held by most white students—that morality is primarily a matter of conscious 
intention and the ability to do otherwise. Rather, she maintains that our words, behaviors, 
and emotive responses reflect broader social patterns and practices in a way that implies 
group complicity in injustice. Her framework makes an important contribution to the goal 
of de-centering the individual, and challenging not only ideologies which are taught and 
inculcated among whites in U.S. society, but how those ideologies are experienced as 
intuitive and common-sense on a deeply felt, embodied level. 
 I nevertheless find that her analytical framework results in tensions that approach 
the level of self-contradiction, especially in a context of helping white students 
understand the relationships between the intention and function of well-meaning actions 
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and discourse. One instance of this tension in her framework comes in her discussion of 
white ignorance, and how it is employed to deflect understanding of white complicity in 
systemic racism. Applebaum stresses the importance of understanding how “white people 
actively, even if unconsciously, protect their white innocence through denials of 
complicity and prevent white ignorance from being interrogated.”  The challenge here is 29
how to engage white students in self-analysis that can make intuitive sense of what it 
means to engage in self-protective behavior “actively, even if unconsciously,” and how 
one goes about the work of transformation given that state of affairs. 
 I affirm with Applebaum that challenging white supremacy requires adopting an 
ethos that sees corporate responsibility as more salient than individual intentions, and I 
share the premise that “power works through our very being.”  My own analysis of the 30
role of psychodynamics in reiterating white normativity rests on these assumptions that I 
share with Applebaum. But I find that the affirmation of critical theory, that subjects do 
other than that we consciously intend, insufficient to speak to white subjective experience 
where resistant statements of doubt or ignorance about the prevalence of white 
supremacy are experienced as sincere and plausible. While protestations of 
colorblindness or moralistic arguments that students of color are “too sensitive” certainly 
“encourage a refusal to engage with any material that challenges the student’s 
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worldview,”  the regularity of such comments does not make them any less sincere, just 31
as their sincerity does not make them any less harmful. While I concur with the 
conceptualization of discourse as a site of power, that analysis often does not have 
sufficient explanatory power for why white students should understand their spontaneous 
reactions in terms of strategic derailment. 
 I am interested in the subjective disconnect itself, and the resulting distress and 
disorientation, and this is where I believe developmental psychology and the study of 
affect have a legitimate role. Theories of practice analyze how human behavior aligns 
with our underlying interests, even as we may believe our motivations are otherwise; 
developmental psychology generates theories to account for how formative experiences 
and relationships shape our thinking and behavior in particular directions. Applebaum 
fluctuates between the language of discourse operating in spite of intentions and the claim 
that intentions are shaped by discursive communities, in a way that stops short of an 
account that fully integrates both. My interest in this tension turns my own analysis back 
to how white moral intuitions with regard to racism are formed within a social context 
that generates intuitive comfort with white normativity. 
Jennifer Mueller’s Theory of Racial Ignorance 
 While the poststructural approach in critical whiteness studies emphasizes the 
function of behaviors and discourse to reinforce inherited norms, another strain focuses 
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on the question of epistemology, specifically regarding white claims to be ignorant of the 
workings of systemic racism. Many whiteness scholars (like Applebaum) integrate both 
trajectories of thought, but there is a growing body of literature which researches and 
theorizes the epistemological questions specifically. Jennifer Mueller focuses her work on 
white ignorance of systemic racism, specifically the investment white people have in 
ignorance and the efforts made in order to remain so. In her article, “Racial Ideology or 
Racial Ignorance? An Alternative Theory of Racial Cognition,” Mueller expounds her 
Theory of Racial Ignorance (TRI), in which she conceptualizes ignorance with regard to 
white supremacy as “a cognitive accomplishment grounded in explicit and tacit practices 
of knowing and non-knowing.”  The language of “accomplishment” signals that 32
Mueller, in a way similar to Applebaum, is interested in challenging commonly held 
understandings of concepts like implicit bias and ignorance as largely passive 
phenomena, thinking of them instead as expressions of white interests and white agency. 
Charles Mills and White Ignorance 
 Mueller’s work develops a line of thinking about white ignorance formulated by 
racism theorist Charles Mills, whose foundational article “White Ignorance” outlines 
several key characteristics of his theoretical analysis of the phenomenon. Mills’s 
formulation of white ignorance is grounded in an understanding of epistemology as 
essentially social, “since individuals do not in general make up [epistemic] categories 
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themselves but inherit them from the cultural milieu.”  To understand how both 33
knowledge and ignorance are socialized, Mills argues, is to understand that the modes of 
gaining and transmitting knowledge are invariably influenced by interests in terms of 
what would be advantageous or disadvantageous for one to know. He explains: 
At all levels, interests may shape cognition, influencing what and how we see, 
what we and society choose to remember, whose testimony is solicited and whose 
is not, and which facts and frameworks are sought out and accepted. Thus at any 
given stage it is obvious that an interaction of great complexity is involved, in 
which multiple factors will be affecting one another in intricate feedback loops of 
various kinds.  34
This account of cognition lays the groundwork for understanding how learning about the 
social world involves choices which occur at the individual level but also at the level of 
institutions and larger communities, concerning what they choose to pay attention to and 
remember, or to minimize and forget. 
 Mills argues that U.S. society has engaged on a program of institutional forgetting 
so thorough that it constitutes an entire cognitive framework, one “inscribed in textbooks, 
generated and regenerated in ceremonies and official holidays, concretized in statues, 
parks, and monuments.”  This historical un-remembering is directly connected to 35
perception of contemporary white advantage, as “the mystification of the past 
underwrites a mystification of the present.”  The societal choice to underplay the 36
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injustices of history functions to make structural racism less plausible as a causal factor 
of present-day inequities. 
 Moreover, Mills adds, “white group interests needs to be recognized and 
acknowledged as a central causal factor in generating and sustaining white ignorance.”  37
Here he incorporates cognitive psychology in his understandings of “self-deception and 
motivated irrationality”  with regard to individual interests, and extrapolates these 38
dynamics to racialized group interests. If the social and economic interests of white 
people are threatened by the prospect of greater racial equality, this inevitably “will affect 
white social cognition—the concepts favored (e.g., today$s #color blindness”), the refusal 
to perceive systemic discrimination, the convenient amnesia about the past and its legacy 
in the present, and the hostility to black testimony on continuing white privilege and the 
need to eliminate it to achieve racial justice.”  In other words, most of the resistant 39
discourse or ‘distancing strategies’ described in the whiteness education literature can 
best be understood as motivated reasoning designed to preserve the interests of white 
dominant status. 
A “Militant Commitment” to White Normativity: Mueller on Ignorance 
 Mills, “White Ignorance,” 34.37
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 Mueller’s Theory of Racial Ignorance (TRI) is grounded in the premises of 
critical race theory that inform Mills’s analysis, and she shares his conclusion that 
“people in power often have unique capacity and incentive to suppress knowledge and 
nurture ignorance, not just interpersonally but also by using institutions to structure broad 
architectures of non-knowledge.”  She also argues, in a way that reflects another of 40
Mills’s interests, that the conceptual frame of white normativity should not be seen only 
as one narrative among many designed to preserve white hegemony (though it certainly is 
that), but also as objectively inferior to accounts of social reality generated by 
marginalized peoples. Her theory operates on the premise that 
ideological struggles are not simply conflicts between politically different but 
equally believable constructions of reality. From TRI$s perspective, subordinated 
races have greater reason and greater capacity to generate #truer truths” about 
racial phenomena by virtue of second sight (i.e., interpretations that are more 
robust and humane), whereas white people appear committed to #thinking badly” 
on such matters.   41
 This commitment to the objective clarity of the reality of systemic racial injustice 
according to the perspectives of marginalized peoples is central to Mueller$s argument 
that ignorance is an active, creative, committed act on the part of white people. “TRI 
assumes racial ignorance persists as a broad social phenomenon by virtue of white 
people$s militant commitment to an epistemology of ignorance: a way of knowing 
oriented toward evading, mystifying, and obscuring the reality of racism to produce 
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(mis)understandings useful for domination.”  Because TRI assumes that “white thinkers 42
regularly encounter evidence that threatens to confirm the ‘essential social fact’ of 
racism,”  authentic ignorance is ruled out as a plausible epistemological possibility.  43
 Mueller argues that white people generally understand, on some level, that 
“whiteness provides a firmer basis to pursue racially privileged resources, like wealth, 
education, and social networks.”  As evidence that white people do understand how 44
racism satisfies our interests, she cites white student participants in her qualitative 
research who demonstrate a full understanding of how their own pursuit of material 
goods reinforces white supremacy, even as they express confusion and a lack of agency 
as to how to address the problem. One student remarks: 
I admit that when looking for a home with my husband after college, I will 
consider the schools that are present as well as the ethnic background because I 
would like my children to have the best education possible. This is creating 
racism . . . in a circular pattern where even I . . . will unknowingly be racist . . . I 
feel so guilty as I write this paper because I think of all the people that have so 
much less than me.  45
This student, while evincing real understanding and acknowledgment that her self-
interested school consideration is “creating racism,” also directly predicts her own 
ignorance (#I … will unknowingly be racist”) as inevitable. Mueller interprets this 
response as representative of a pattern in which students “could detect, and were often 
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willing to reject, color-blind frames and concede participation in reproducing racism. In 
the wake of such breaches, however, students developed new logics to neutralize these 
troublesome conclusions.”  She interprets the white student’s discourse not as a rueful 46
acknowledgment that learning is never fully sufficient, but rather  as evidence that white 
people are “possessively committed”  to maintaining ignorance due to the attendant 47
benefits it provides. 
 While Mueller does at times use the language of “tacitly if not consciously,” or 
“outside of people’s immediate awareness”  to describe the process of generating 48
ignorance, she emphasizes that it is more important to look at the ends of ignorance as the 
most plausible explanation for how and why it happens: 
TRI leans hard on common wisdom: actions speak, often more loudly than words. 
The [theory] establishes white ignorance as political, specifically racist, by virtue 
of the ends it achieves, not in reference to white people$s self-performances, self-
reflective claims, or declared intentions.  49
It is the utility of ignorance that Mueller is focused on. “In a system of white supremacy, 
ignorance is a valuable resource; it eases the work of maintaining domination practically 
and psychologically and makes it possible to fully enjoy the spoils of racism.”  Given 50
this function, Mueller finds little reason to examine the subjective experience of 
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ignorance. Her theory is designed to “cut through common (and distracting) debates 
about intentionality” and it “underscores white people$s common motivations toward 
‘unintentionality,’ which ensure white people can feel a sense of moral certitude.”  51
Whatever ignorance of systemic racism white people may claim, the relevant fact is our 
incentive to prevent knowledge acquisition due to our material and psychic incentives to 
preserve white supremacy while simultaneously preserving a sense of moral legitimacy. 
Response to Mueller: The Possibility of Authentic, Culpable Ignorance 
 Mueller analyzes the interrelationship between racist systems and individual 
white participation in those systems in a way that seriously challenges approaches such as 
my own, which examine white intentions and ignorance as authentic phenomena that 
exist in real tension with motivations to preserve the status quo. Mueller, by contrast, sees 
TRI as having greater explanatory power for assessing the motivations of ostensibly well-
meaning white people than treatments such as Bonilla-Silva’s Racism without Racists, 
which focus on the role of ideological frameworks that socialize white people into 
colorblindness. Mueller emphasizes the individual benefits and motivations toward “not-
seeing,” and expresses skepticism of analytical frameworks which underplay white 
agency. She critiques accounts that emphasize socialization on the grounds that they 
“characterize white people as passive, unwitting agents overcome by ideology, rather 
 Mueller, “Racial Ideology or Racial Ignorance?” 159. See also Jayakumar and Adamian, “The 51
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as a “preemptive strike that protects him from being called out by others as racist.”
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than possessive defenders of white power, privilege, and wealth.”  One of her primary 52
concerns appears to be that an emphasis on white socialization and habitual perception 
rather than agency, effort, and commitment to white supremacy unacceptably dilutes 
white culpability. 
 Before I articulate my questions with Mueller’s theoretical framework, it is 
necessary to step back again and acknowledge the particular epistemic perspective from 
which I write. As I read Mueller, I am conscious of feeling defensive, and experience an 
impulse to review my own memories of feeling ignorant and disoriented when engaging 
with anti-racist pedagogy. Such memories and feelings necessitate that I take seriously 
Mueller’s claim that my own experiences of confusion or ignorance might best be 
understood as “motivations toward ‘unintentionality,’ which ensure white people can feel 
a sense of moral certitude.”  So my challenges to Mueller’s framework are offered with 53
an acknowledgement that they may well be motivated in part by a psychological need for 
self-exoneration, the very thing both Applebaum and Mueller are trying to expose. That 
said, while I affirm Mueller’s emphasis on psychologically motivated tenacity in 
explaining white resistant discourse and behaviors, I persist in questioning whether 
active, chosen ignorance is sufficient to explain the range of discourses and emotional 
responses observed in the research. 
 Mueller, “Racial Ideology or Racial Ignorance?” 144.52
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 Central to Mueller’s argument is the claim that the operations of systemic racism 
in U.S. society are so apparent and multiple that neither authentic ignorance nor lack of 
understanding is a plausible hypothesis. While she affirms that the “field of white social 
life often makes sustaining colorblindness easy,”  she cites her own findings concerning 54
white distancing strategies and rationalizations to show that increased knowledge of 
systemic racism does not necessarily lead to changed convictions or changed behaviors.  55
This conclusion of her research is unquestionable, yet I suggest that it is one thing to 
observe that many white people remain resistant upon learning more about systemic 
racism, and another to posit that white people are so fully cognizant of the mechanisms of 
systemic racism that any claimed ignorance should be assumed to be a calculated move. 
Here I favor the analysis of Crowley and Smith that structural analysis is in itself difficult 
if the society both explicitly and tacitly teaches its members not to think in those terms. 
In the dominant culture of U.S. society, they argue, “individuals think of themselves and 
the obstacles (or privileges) they encounter in individual terms, rather than through a 
structural, sociological framework.”  Mueller recognizes this, referring to a “cultural 56
infrastructure that enables white fantasies,”  but she tends to downplay its influence in 57
favor of emphasizing individual white commitments to remain ignorant out of conscious 
awareness of our advantaged position within the structure. 
 Mueller, “Producing Colorblindness,” 233.54
 Mueller, “Producing Colorblindness,” 233-35.55
 Crowley and Smith, #Whiteness and Social Studies Teacher Education,” 171.56
 Mueller, “Racial Ideology or Racial Ignorance?” 159.57
137
 This emphasis on ignorance as a commitment raises the question of people of 
color who adopt dominant white logics (such as affirming that systemic racism is largely 
in the past and present disparities reflect group cultural deficiencies). Mueller argues that 
they generally do not do so willingly, but primarily out of the need to survive in a white 
supremacist system.  People of color who question the reality of systemic racism should 58
be understood as doing so because “the totalizing power white people hold over 
racialized groups under white supremacy” requires that they “cynically perform 
ignorance to access resources controlled by white people.”  Mueller further argues that 59
“TRI predicts people of color can seldom be fully sincere in their racial ignorance and 
will, on general principle, choose racial consciousness over white people$s #magic” when 
conditions allow.”  While the motivations that Mueller describes are certainly real, and 60
may well account for many cases, the assumption of a lack of sincere agency on the part 
of people of color who adopt these logics is concerning. Social contexts, particularity of 
life circumstances, and other reasons for gravitating toward particular ideologies may all 
be in play when people who are not white adopt social analyses. I suggest that diversity 
of interpretation of experience allows for a plethora of sincere (though in my view, 
erroneous) ideological approaches regarding the nature of racism in society. 
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 My primary interest in engaging with Mueller is less to disagree with her on core 
premises than to expand in more detail on potential mechanisms for the ignorance she 
describes. I share Mueller’s goal that critical whiteness theory work to the end of 
“encouraging students to identify discursive patterns and white epistemic maneuvers in 
their social worlds, and indeed, their own thinking.”  Mueller’s theoretical framework is 61
ultimately uninterested, however, in describing the psychological processes behind the 
pursuit of ignorance, nor is she interested in what might account for individual 
differences between white people in terms of willingness to self-interrogate and recognize 
complicity in white supremacy. What I am interested in analyzing more closely is the 
nature of the psychic gap between white expressions of confusion or earnest desires to 
learn further, and what Mueller sees as a driving motivation to preserve white supremacy 
and continue immiserating of people of color. 
 Ultimately, while I concur that white ignorance acts to preserve white material 
interests, I see a need to pursue more detailed psychological accounts that read white 
experiences of ignorance and confusion as more genuine than Mueller seems willing to 
allow. I believe her move to emphasize the flexibility and creativity of white 
rationalizations is necessary in examining how white normativity perpetuates itself, but I 
also believe that socialization processes are more comprehensive and produce more 
genuine experiences of ignorance than Mueller concludes. This is why my approach 
focuses on the question of how to inculcate a greater sense of corporate culpability that 
 Mueller, “Producing Colorblindness,” 235.61
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both acknowledges authentic ignorance and confusion, and helps white people trace our 
intuitions of “normalcy” to historically contingent processes of segregation, exclusion, 
and structured advantage. 
“Tacit Knowledge Carried in the Body”: Linda Martín-Alcoff and the 
Phenomenology of Racial Identity 
 In Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Linda Martín-Alcoff presents a 
sustained argument in favor of social identity (such as race or gender) as an 
“epistemically salient and ontologically real entity.”  She crafts her account of identity in 62
response to prevalent political philosophical trends which see valuing identity as granting 
too much power to socially constructed categories, in a way that is detrimental to political 
solidarity. In response to conservatives, leftists, and even postmodernists who see concern 
with identity as inherently divisive, Martín-Alcoff counters that “it is the refusal to 
acknowledge the importance of the differences in our identities that has led to distrust, 
miscommunication, and thus disunity.”  Central to her argument is the claim that the 63
experience of raced and gendered identity within the social order shapes the horizons 
through which we perceive and interpret the world.  “Can we really make a neat 64
 Martín-Alcoff, Visible Identities, 5.62
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separation,” she asks, “between racial ideology, psychic processes of internalized 
superiority, and the economic hierarchy of resource distribution? Clearly these are bound 
up together, mutually reinforcing.”  But she takes a step further, positing that in order to 65
fully account for what socialization accomplishes, “we need to understand the 
situatedness of horizons as a material and embodied situatedness, and not simply 
mentally perspectival or ideological.”  To elucidate what she means by “embodied 66
situatedness”, Martín-Alcoff turns to phenomenology. 
 Martín-Alcoff’s interest in the physical body in her account of the experience of 
racialized identity is twofold. First, there is the more obvious point that visible 
recognition is an essential dimension of how racial identities are constructed. She points 
out that “social identities of race and gender operate ineluctably through their bodily 
markers; they do not transcend their physical manifestation because they are their 
physical manifestation.”  The reason that we cannot ‘transcend’ racial identity, at least 67
within the context of the actual society in which we live, is because U.S. society for 
centuries has categorized people within a hierarchy and ascribed differential value to 
people based upon physical characteristics. Inevitably, then, movements for equal rights 
and dignity have organized themselves around these identity categories. 
 Martín-Alcoff, Visible Identities, 33.65
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 The other way that identity is embodied is somewhat more complex, but no less 
significant—the value placed upon race by society is internalized by everyone born into 
this society with varying effects, not only on a cognitive level but on an embodied level. 
Differentials in social valuation generate different social experiences based upon 
constructed identities, which influence attitudes and beliefs about the social order. But 
these differing experiences and power relationships within the social order also constitute 
who human beings are at the level of habitual, unconscious behaviors. To expound on the 
way racial identities and attitudes are embodied, she turns to Merleau-Ponty and his 
concept of the “habitual body.” 
 Martín-Alcoff describes the habitual body as “the default position the body 
assumes when performing various commonly experienced circumstances that require 
integrated and unified movements, such as driving a car.”  Habitual sets of movements 68
and behaviors not only facilitate the use of particular tools, but shape social relations as 
well. There is “a wealth of knowledge we take entirely for granted, knowledge lodged in 
our bodies and manifest in smooth mannerisms and easy movements. Similarly, race and 
gender consciousness produces habitual bodily mannerisms that feel natural and become 
unconscious after long use; they are thus very difficult to change.”  Nevertheless, in 69
Martín-Alcoff’s reading of Merleau-Ponty this obstinance of habitual mannerisms does 
not mean that our behavior is determined. “However tacit and unconscious, we have 
 Martín-Alcoff, Visible Identities, 108.68
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agency in the constitution of our experience.”  On this account, Merleau-Ponty is 70
navigating an inherent tension or dialectic between agency and social influence, and that 
tension generates an understanding of knowledge as “a kind of immanent engagement, in 
which one’s own self is engaged by the world—touched, felt, and seen—rather than 
standing apart and above. One not only changes but is always changed as well.”  There 71
is no subjective agency that is in any way distinct or separate from the socially formed 
self—agency is itself generated in relation to social context. 
 Martín-Alcoff proceeds to explain how understanding the self as constituted in 
relationship with the social environment has ramifications for how we understand racial 
identity, and how racialization shapes reflexive attitudes and behaviors. All cognition, 
learning, and interpretation of the world happens not in disembodied minds but in bodies 
in particular times and places. White people’s vested interests in the status quo manifest 
themselves not only in the narratives we tell ourselves but also in our intuitive judgments. 
For example, when processing historical injustices grounded in racist oppression, identity 
“may be playing a role over whether we feel the past is being “dredged up again for no 
good purpose” or whether we view it as a necessary facing up to responsibilities.”  The 72
issue of how to think or feel about addressing historical injustices illustrates how 
questions that are often presented as primarily intellectual have irreducible elements of 
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intuitive feeling, driven by personal or group interest. The way we assess what history 
should be emphasized, and to what end, is inextricably tied into emotional responses to 
narratives that permeate the social air in which we are formed. 
 Martín-Alcoff points out that because history making is a collective enterprise, 
and because individuals are formed within a historical context, it follows that “what the 
collective praxis creates are aspects of the self. Our preferences, our dispositions toward 
certain kinds of feelings in certain kinds of situations, what typically causes fear, anxiety, 
calmness, anger, and so on, are affected by our cultural and historical location.”  Here 73
Martín-Alcoff represents a tradition that emphasizes the body as the site of emotional 
experience. She shares this concern with other whiteness theorists like Alison Bailey, who 
affirms that the emotions of white resistance “sit in our bodies: our hearts beat faster, our 
muscles tighten, we scowl, and our minds chatter.”  Just as our agency and reflexive 74
behaviors are formed in relationship to the social environment, so too are our embodied 
emotional responses to that same social milieu. 
 For example, a white churchgoer who resonates with calls for racial equity may 
nevertheless feel uncomfortable worshiping in a predominantly black church setting, as 
Mary Fulkerson describes in her participant observation work. Or a white elementary 
school teacher may react defensively to a black student’s expression of frustration 
 Martín-Alcoff, Visible Identities, 115.73
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differently than they would to a white student, perceiving a threat to their authority that 
they might rationally recognize as unfounded but which holds an emotional power 
inculcated by social stereotypes and reinforced by lack of familiarity with the black 
student’s cultural mode of expression. These responses do not simply dwell in our minds; 
they manifest in our breathing, our movements, a constriction in the gut. What Martín-
Alcoff and other phenomenologists contribute to whiteness theory is the insistence that a 
racialized worldview permeates the body, including our most intuitive reflexes and 
emotional responses. 
Response to Martín-Alcoff: Agency and the Habitual Body 
 In conceptualizing the body as inherently interrelated and constituted by the social 
environment, phenomenologist approaches to racial identity argue for the importance of 
everyday micro-phenomena in sustaining racism and white normativity. These micro-
phenomena—a glance, a shift in body language, a ‘snap judgment’ made about why a 
person who looks a certain way might be inhabiting a certain space—are on this account 
absorbed from the cultural milieu in ways that are difficult to identify, much less resist. 
Phenomenological accounts thus constitute a distinct approach to understanding how 
white people who desire to dismantle white supremacy invariably continue to reproduce 
it. As Martín-Alcoff points out, “approaches that define race by invoking metanarratives 
of historical experience, cultural traditions, or processes of colonization and that take a 
third!person perspective can be inattentive to the microinteractions in which racialization 
145
operates, is reproduced, and is sometimes resignified.”  Phenomenological accounts 75
have the advantage, in my view, of taking white subjective experience at face value rather 
than assuming disingenuousness or dismissing such experience outright. 
 Each of the approaches reviewed thus far—poststructural, epistemological, and 
phenomenological—ultimately conclude that white behaviors and reactions operate in 
accord with white supremacist interests and ends. What I find helpful about a 
phenomenological analysis of white normativity is its exploration of the reflexes and 
proximate motivations of white subjective experience, in which I find potential of 
nuanced analysis of the subtle machinations of systemic racism. I share Martín-Alcoff’s 
hope that “Noticing the way in which meanings are located on the body has at least the 
potential to disrupt the current racializing processes,”  because one aspect of the 76
racializing process is how it obscures the relation between proximate motivations and 
ultimate ones. 
Summary: The Relationship between White Interests and White Conscious 
Intention in Emotioned Responses 
 The purpose of my analysis and response to Barbara Applebaum, Jennifer 
Mueller, and Linda Martín-Alcoff is to lay out a range of theoretical interpretations of 
emotioned white resistance and position my own theoretical analysis in relationship to 
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this ongoing conversation. Specifically, I am interested in describing the relationship 
between white people’s experience of defensiveness and confusion in the face of anti-
racist pedagogy, and critical analysis which posits that we are acting purposefully to 
preserve white supremacy even as we disavow that is what we are doing to others and 
perhaps to ourselves. While a preponderance of critical antiracism approaches maintain 
that subjective experience is irrelevant next to the pressing concern of how white people 
act to pursue our racial group interests, I believe the question of white interiority remains 
salient in developing anti-racist pedagogy. While the goal of such pedagogy is to foster an 
understanding of the social dynamics of oppression, white people can only come to 
understand through the inherent epistemic limitations of our social location. So 
understanding the social and psychological mechanisms which shape white perceptions 
and embodied reactions has pedagogical value, in my view. 
 The account of white normativity formation that I present in the following chapter 
is an attempt to move toward reconciling the tensions in the literature between white 
resistance as “privilege-preserving” and white resistance as a genuine disorientation in 
the face of challenges to taken-for-granted values and norms. My argument is that even 
committed anti-racist white people are trying to preserve our privilege, even when we do 
not cognitively understand it as such, specifically in the sense of preserving our affective 
attachment to the social milieu and cultural norms in which our comfort is grounded. The 
status quo carries an inherent sense of legitimacy within white intuitive emotions and 
embodied sense of comfort—what feels normal cannot be all that bad—even in more 
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progressive white contexts which teach the values of material and social equity. Critical 
antiracist pedagogy challenges white people to reinterpret the aggregate of our “normal” 
lived experience as a mechanism of oppression for those marginalized by white 
normativity. 
 My choice of self psychology as a conversation partner in developing my account 
reflects an attempt to integrate the insights of the different streams of critical whiteness 
literature. Self psychology offers insights as to how human beings develop a sense of self, 
and how behaviors reflect core motivations in ways that can contradict our public 
commitments. The discrepancy between conscious intention and underlying motivation is 
one central concern of the various branches psychoanalytic theory, which has been 
applied to behaviors and thought processes on the social as well as the individual level. 
As Phillis Sheppard explains, “just as people sometimes behave in ways that are 
incongruous with how they understand or publicly claim themselves to be, so too there 
are aspects of cultural processes that are disavowed by significant parts of society.”  I 77
find that this field offers potential for tracing the often subtle mechanisms through which 
white normativity is reinforced at multiple levels in society. 
 My use of self psychology, as developed by Heinz Kohut and reformulated by 
Phillis Sheppard, examines the role of the social milieu in fostering a sense of self and 
one’s place in the social order, in a way that takes social location for granted as 
constitutive of the self. This analytical work will then lead in the final chapters to a 
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 13.77
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theological vision of human flourishing that insists upon the importance of intuitions and 
norms as constituent conditions for either flourishing or oppression, and how to best 
incorporate that insight into anti-racist pedagogy. That theological vision also emphasizes 
the need for a consistent opening up of oneself to the abnormal and uncomfortable as a 
necessary condition for generating just, loving relationships of difference. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A PSYCHODYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF WHITE EPISTEMIC 
RESISTANCE 
 The apparent intractability with which many white people, even progressive white 
people, resist and disavow culpability in response to critical antiracism has led many 
whiteness scholars to work with psychoanalytic concepts. The primary aim in working 
with these disciplines is to theorize the underlying impulses and motivations which drive 
racial hatred, hierarchy, and oppression, particularly where white people either deny or 
minimize the presence of those phenomena. In many cases, the use of psychology is 
directed specifically toward understanding white resistant emotioned behavior in the 
classroom. Shannon Sullivan argues that attention to the unconscious is a necessary 
aspect of combatting racism at both the individual and social level: “White unconscious 
resistance to understanding racism as a problem must be tackled if inroads are to be made 
against specific problems of racism. Not only can white people not help challenge racism 
if they do not see it, but non-white people$s attempts to combat racism cannot be 
maximally successful if white people$s unconscious commitments thwart such work.”  1
The range and intensity of white emotioned reactions to critical race analysis suggest 
psychological dynamics are at work that require strategies beyond efforts to persuade or 
convict on the cognitive level. 
 Ultimately, employing psychology with regard to white supremacy constitutes a 
further effort to understand why white people do what we do in the preservation of 
 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 22.1
150
structural racism, and the tensions between our actions and our self understanding. The 
critical whiteness approaches in the previous chapter offer various accounts of underlying 
white motivation, with Applebaum and Mueller in particular emphasizing a dual drive to 
preserve the benefits of white supremacy while preserving a positive moral identity. 
While those two scholars acknowledge a gap between action and conscious intention, 
employing language such as “actively, even if unconsciously”  or describing ignorance as 2
“a mental state that white people are motivated to purse,”  neither engages in 3
psychological analysis to attempt to explain how those tensions and apparent 
contradictions occur. 
 One critical whiteness theorist who incorporates psychoanalytic concepts in 
addressing white resistance is Ricardo Gonsalves, in his analysis of how white teachers in 
training respond to multicultural education. Gonsalves focuses on two of the motivations 
I outlined at the end of chapter 2—preserving moral identity and preserving the 
legitimacy of the social order—and argues that white resistance constitutes a set of 
psychological strategies to achieve those aims. His approach “acknowledges student 
resistance as both a psychological defense of the individual ego and the ideological 
values of the dominant culture,”  and uses the metaphor of hysterical blindness to 4
describe white resistance. The metaphor is based on “a psychosomatic disorder in which 
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an individual defends against a stressful situation by converting psychological distress 
into a physical disability, the loss of sight”  Gonsalves’s use of hysterical blindness 5
“refers to a symbolic form of denial at the level of social cognitive functioning,” which 
“functions to repress knowledge that racial violence and social trauma are prerequisites to 
secure our personal comfort.”  He argues that white emotioned resistance, including 6
claims to ignorance, functions as a defense mechanism analogous to the psychological 
condition of hysterical blindness when faced with unwelcome information. 
 Gonsalves then draws a connection between white emotioned resistance and the 
way one’s sense of self is shaped by commitments to internalized social beliefs and 
ideologies. White people are by and large socialized into believing the basic fairness and 
meritocratic nature of U.S. society, and critical antiracist education directly confronts 
those beliefs by explicating the racial hierarchy embedded in U.S. political structures and 
culture. Therefore, emotional reactions of anger or guilt “may occur when their 
previously held beliefs are rooted in the self-concept of the preservice teacher and the 
expected shift in perspective may initiate difficulty in adapting to new expectations of 
cultural competence as an educator.”  Adapting to changed expectations can cause 7
distress even under the most optimal situations, but in the context of anti-racist education 
unfamiliar conceptualizations of racism and white culpability also challenge one’s moral 
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self-image. “As the very essence of previously held truths is shaken by the possibility of 
error and rival interpretations, cognitive dissonance emerges, and some preservice 
teachers may experience anxiety and emotional distress.”  8
 Moreover, Gonsalves argues that the emotional nature of white resistance points 
to the efficacy of socialization processes. “Focusing on how socialization allows for the 
internalization of prevailing values provides some insight about the source of distress 
exhibited by preservice teachers.”  Predominant societal values of colorblindness and 9
meritocracy are instilled on both intellectual and affective levels. “Dominant culture 
engages in a relentless barrage of propaganda executed at every level of contact between 
the individual and social structure to set aside historical evidence and the contemporary 
assault on humanity. In a sense, the process of denial established by the dominant culture 
is a form of psychological warfare on the citizenry.”  This formative process engages the 10
psyche on the intellectual, aesthetic, and emotional dimensions, so that white resistance, 
while performing a strategic function in ways outlined by critical theorists, can also be 
viewed as “a defense of an ego subsumed by dominant social norms.”  Gonsalves 11
suggests that the white psyche is so immersed in white normative assumptions that 
challenging the ideology results in emotionally charged ego defense. For Gonsalves, the 
psychological is imbricated with the process of socialization. 
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 In this chapter I present a constructive proposal for understanding emotioned 
white resistance to anti-racist pedagogy, specifically regarding the nature of the gap 
between white subjective experience of disorientation and the strategic function of white 
resistance to preserve the interests of white hegemony. Like Gonsalves, I posit a 
connection between psychological development and socialization processes. One of the 
central claims of this dissertation is that an intuitive sense of “normal,” generated from 
infancy in ways that are never completely subject to conscious analysis, exerts a great 
influence on our intuitive sense of moral culpability. This includes both our sense of the 
social milieu itself and also our sense of what constitutes moral responsibility. My use of 
psychoanalysis—specifically self psychology—is an attempt to propose a potential 
mechanism by which intuitions concerning the legitimacy of the social order and cultural 
habits and norms are instilled in white people from our formative years, and how those 
intuitions are integrated into our sense of self. The following chapter then wrestles with 
the theological implications of this analysis, as I lay out a vision for social justice that 
calls upon white people to question our formative attachments to the social order, 
including our social norm preferences and our intuitions about moral responsibility. 
 It is worth emphasizing at this point that this project does not focus on the 
psychological roots of overt racial hatred. Many psychoanalytic accounts do just that, and 
given the ongoing threat posed by avowedly white supremacist organizations and 
political operatives in the U.S., it is a crucial concern. My interest, however, is primarily 
with white people who identify ourselves as advocates for racial equality, in order to 
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focus on how emotioned resistance to antiracism stymies efforts at structural change in 
contexts where such change is an expressed institutional goal.  
 I begin with a brief survey of accounts grounded in the psychoanalytic tradition of 
how racism forms in the psyche, and then proceed to analysis of Heinz Kohut’s self 
psychology and his concepts of cultural selfobjects, cultural mirroring, and narcissism. I 
then turn to Phillis Sheppard$s critique and extension of Kohut$s concept of cultural 
selfobjects in light of the realities of systemic racial oppression. In the process I develop 
my own theory of white narcissistic grandiosity in relation to racial socialization, 
integrating Kohut’s concepts and Sheppard’s interventions. I conclude the section with 
my proposal that white people’s psychological development within a white hegemonic 
social milieu generates a distorted form of what in Kohut’s formulation is described as 
healthy narcissism. This grandiosity naturalizes the universalization of white experience 
(as in, contributes to a comfortable intuition that white experiences and norms are 
“natural” or normal) and inculcates a sense of the legitimacy of white cultural dominance 
as a constitutive aspect of our sense of self. This comfort with a stratified racial order is 
so intuitive and often subtle that it persists and adapts alongside cognitive moral 
commitments to racial equity. 
 I see emotioned white resistance to anti-racist pedagogy as resulting from 
developmental psychological processes which begin in infancy and continue throughout 
our lifespan within a broader social environment that takes white hegemony for granted. 
White emotioned resistance is a reaction to threats to white supremacy even if the white 
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people in question vigorously oppose white supremacy on the cognitive level, in the 
sense that the threat is to a trained and deeply ingrained dependence on status quo norms 
for a sense of security and identity. My hope is that a detailed analysis of the processes 
might offer guidance for how to help white people recognize the extent of our social 
formation in the interest of a more thorough, necessary transformation. 
Psychological Development and White Emotioned Resistance 
Psychoanalytic Interpretations of the Development of Racism 
 The intractability of systemic racism has led researchers and practitioners in 
developmental psychology to examine the underlying reasons for its durability in human 
society. While sociologists and political scientists emphasize the policies and social 
practices which generate inequalities on the macro-level, psychoanalytic approaches 
address how racist attitudes, racial in-group affinity, and racial categories themselves 
develop in the psyche from the earliest years of life. Whiteness scholars in education 
often draw upon psychoanalytic concepts, as in the case of Gonsalves’s use of hysterical 
blindness. 
 In Chapter 1 I briefly reviewed a few psychoanalytic approaches to the 
development of racism. Simon Clarke is one who grounds his theory of racialization in 
Melanie Klein’s concept of phantasy — in which the infant projects positive or negative 
emotions onto an appendage, another object, or person, or rather projects their emotions 
onto a mental image of that object. Clarke argues that the stranger, or outgroup member, 
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emerges from phantasy, because it is “a psychic entity, a construction in phantasy that 
symbolises our fears and anxieties…. We are repulsed by what we see, as we are 
confronted by our own fears and chaos, by the contents of our unconscious mind.”  M. 12
Fakhry Davids posits that this phantasy structure constitutes a racial organizing principle 
that is integral in the ordinary human psyche, in which negative emotions are 
automatically projected onto different racial groups based on difference in appearance. 
Davids argues that “our model of the mind must be extended to incorporate a paranoid, 
us-them, construction involving self and racial other as permanent feature,”  and 13
advocates that such an internal psychoanalytic should inform efforts at addressing 
institutional racism.  14
 Arianne E. Miller and Lawrence Josephs draw upon the classic Freudian concept 
of oedipal splitting, in which “idealized and devalued forms of love and lust” are 
generated as the infant develops.  They posit that “somehow in the course of 15
psychosexual development in a racist culture, blacks come to represent symbolically the 
devalued/socially unacceptable sides of these oedipal splits.”  Miller and Josephs 16
proceed to argue that “white superiority, white privilege, and repudiated white identity 
 Clarke, Social Theory, Psychoanalysis, and Racism, 172.12
 Davids, Internal Racism, 37.13
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reflect forms of pathological narcissism driven, in part, by the desire to be an oedipal 
winner at any price and the dread of experiencing the trauma of being an oedipal loser.”   17
Their arguments share the premise with Clarke and Davids that affinity and aversion to 
racially categorized groups emerges from the earliest years through primal psychic 
structures. 
 The work of Farhad Dalal also summarizes object relations accounts of racism in 
exploring the deep intransigence of racial animus in the human psyche, in which fear, 
disgust, or distrust are projected onto people perceived as racialized ‘others.’  For 18
example, if emotions or traits which the white self finds problematic are projected onto 
the racial ‘other’ this could account for common complaints among whites that non-white 
groups are ‘always taking advantage of the system,’ or are ‘getting all of the benefits at 
our expense.’ Dalal also draws from Klein’s account of envy, in which certain desired 
traits are projected onto the racialized ‘other,’ in a process which involves believing that 
this ‘bad other’ possesses something (for example, exaggerated sexual prowess), that one 
has repressed in oneself, and on some level desire.  19
 Dalal also differs in emphasis from many psychoanalytic approaches, however, in 
that he does not view psychic projections attached to racial categories as emerging from 
any inherent structure in the psyche, but through a general process of in-group attachment 
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that selects for characteristics which are associated with power in one’s social context. 
For Dalal, the social milieu circumscribes the options available to the individual in terms 
of how she conceives of the world, including how she categorizes human beings. While 
“race” is not a biological category, it has been created as a social category signifying 
power relations, and as such it inevitably shapes the options available for projecting 
feelings of idealization and denigration.  He argues that “the projections of all 20
individuals are patterned by the types of power relations that prevail, so that it is almost 
always the case that it is the more powerful that tend to be the idealized ones.”  21
Therefore because the social milieu in which the infant develops is characterized by 
positive affect directed toward lighter skinned people and negative affect directed toward 
darker skinned people, it follows “that as social objects are colour coded, so must be the 
psyche which is formed through their internalizations.”  Thus Dalal offers a model that 22
is socio-psychoanaltyic, in which the social delimits the possibilities for the development 
of emotional attachments. 
 Many psychoanalytic theories of race and racism, including those of Clarke, 
Davids, and Miller and Josephs, draw primarily from classical psychoanalytic theories as 
expounded by Freud and Klein, which focus on intrapsychic dynamics and conflicts such 
as projection and splitting. Dalal’s view moves toward an emphasis on psychological 
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development in interaction with the social environment, in a way that influences my own 
argument about the importance of social milieu as a context for development. In this way, 
my project relies more upon relational psychoanalytic theories which, while diverse in 
their own right, portray the human psyche “not as a conglomeration of physically based 
urges, but as being shaped by and inevitably embedded within a matrix of relationships 
with other people, struggling both to maintain our ties to others and to differentiate 
ourselves from them.”  According to the relational orientation the impulses and desires 23
which shape our behaviors are not only, or primarily, endogenous; rather the development 
of our mental life is inherently social. This model has ramifications for how we 
understand the development of attitudes and impulses with respect to race. 
 Shannon Sullivan, for example, emphasizes the relationship between the 
individual and the social environment as the context in which racialized habits and 
feelings develop, using Jean Laplanche’s theory of “seduction.”  She focuses on 24
Laplanche’s interest in how infants develop unconscious habits in interaction with 
nonverbal signals communicated to them by parents and the adult world, intentionally or 
not. Sullivan argues that “given that the adult world historically has been and continues to 
be both structured by categories of race and riddled with white privilege, then an infant’s 
unconscious habits inevitably will be formed by race and racism.”  Nonverbal emotional 25
 Stephen A. Mitchell, Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis: An Integration (Cambridge, MA: 23
Harvard University Press, 2009), 3.
 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 66-71.24
 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 71.25
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reactions to people considered different or threatening by society are inevitably imbibed 
by the infant as part of the developmental process in relationship with the social world. 
So while it is often observed that messages bolstering white supremacy are transmitted 
through media images or overtly racist behavior, it is also the case that subtle involuntary 
reactions on the part of caregivers are picked up and ingested from infancy, teaching us 
what kind of people or social environments are safe or desirable, and which are to be 
intuitively feared or avoided. This process includes mapping intuitions on to racial 
groups, as Sullivan reminds us of long-standing “associations between non-white people 
and defilement” and “unconscious habits of connecting whiteness with cleanliness and 
blackness with impurity and policing the boundaries between the two.”  26
 Sullivan's theory, like most psychoanalytic accounts of racism, focuses on the 
generation of hostile attitudes and associations to members of racialized out-groups. This 
focus is understandable and important, given the prevalence of obvious out-group 
animus, disgust, and hatred in the historical record of the U.S. and many other societies. 
My decision to turn the focus toward intuitions and affective attachments to a white 
normative social order is not meant to repudiate or even minimize the importance of the 
quest to understand racial animus from a psychoanalytic perspective. What I want to 
explore is how an emphasis on the role of the social environment in psychological 
development might generate accounts of white resistance that consider the power of 
indirect incentives such as those highlighted by Martín-Alcoff in the previous chapter—
 Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 73.26
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emotioned comfortable attachment to social norms and intuitions around individual moral 
responsibility. I suggest that it is important to understand such incentives as real on their 
own terms and not simply ‘cover’ for a concealed motivation to preserve an ideology of 
white superiority, even as it is still fair to characterize such motivations as reinforcing 
white supremacy, in the sense of a comfortable and secure social environment in which 
norms and a degree of social power are assumed. 
 The following account of white normativity, which integrates Heinz Kohut’s self 
psychology and Phillis Sheppard’s intervention in the understanding of cultural 
selfobjects, is an effort apply a theory of psychological development to the process of 
white racial socialization. My premise is that psychological development is a relational 
process that is shaped not only by our closest relationships with caregivers or family 
members, but also by the wider social environments in which we are raised. So while 
growing up in a racialized society does involve developing particular positive and 
negative associations to particular racial categories and groups of people, it also involves 
other aspects of living as a white person, including cultural practices, habitual ways of 
relating to people in one’s social circle, and the very facility with which social spaces and 
institutions are available without facing significant discomfort. These aspects of social 
life are obviously not experienced by all white people to the same degree and in the same 
way, so it is important not to paint with too broad a brush, or essentialize. Nevertheless, I 
argue that there are enough broad commonalities to white people’s experience relative to 
what racially minoritized groups experience, in aggregate, that it is possible to postulate 
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commonalities of a white relational developmental context. Relationship to the social 
environment is an integral part of developing a sense of self and confidence in navigating 
the world, and self psychology provides a useful framework for analyzing that process. 
The Development of Grandiosity and the Selfobject: Heinz Kohut  27
Narcissism and Grandiosity 
 Heinz Kohut, who was born in Vienna and emigrated to Chicago in 1940, is 
known primarily for the development of self psychology, which in the words of Phillis 
Sheppard, “is based on the premise that early caregivers’ empathetic responses to the 
child’s needs lead to the development of a cohesive self whereby one has a sense of self 
continuity and coherence over time.”  Kohut developed many of his theories in 28
conversation with Freudian psychoanalytic theory, but he diverges from Freud, who 
“rejected the idea that the external world influences the contents of the Unconscious,”  29
in that that Kohut “acknowledges the influence of the environment on the formation of 
psychic structure.”  This emphasis placed Kohut within the relational turn in 30
psychoanalytic theory, along with theorists such as Donald W. Winnicott, Margaret S. 
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Mahler, and Stephen A. Mitchell.  Whereas Freud understood the psyche primarily in 31
terms of basic sexual and aggressive drives that experienced frustration in conflict with 
the external world’s failure to satisfy them, Kohut “stressed innate developmental needs 
that we turn to others to meet.”  32
 One developmental structure that occupied a great deal of Kohut’s thinking was 
narcissism.  While the contemporary popular usage of the term tends to refer simply to 33
an excessive self-centeredness, Kohut understood narcissism as “a normal developmental 
phenomenon” which, if developed in a healthy direction, “moves toward consolidation of 
a cohesive self-structure, providing a sense of identity, value, meaning, and permanence 
and promoting the actualization of a person’s potentialities (native talents and acquired 
skills).”  For Kohut, healthy development progressed along three primary axes: 34
grandiosity (involving self-esteem, assertiveness, and accomplishment), idealization 
(developing strong goals and ideals), and alter-ego connectedness (involving the 
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formation of intimate relationships and group ties).  For my purposes in examining 35
patterns of whiteness I will be focusing on the grandiosity axis, as it most directly 
involves one’s felt capacity to navigate the social world with confidence and comfort. 
 According to psychoanalyst Allen M. Siegel, Kohut “postulates that the 
narcissistic experience begins with the infant’s blissful state, which is inevitably upset by 
the expectable failure of its mother’s ministrations.”  The infant then engages in two 36
parallel psychological processes to restore the original state of bliss: one in which 
caregivers are imbued with qualities of perfection and strength, which can be integrated 
through attachment to those figures—this Kohut called the ‘idealized parent imago.’  37
The other developmental process involves an overvaluation of the self, which Kohut 
called the “narcissistic self,” or later, the “grandiose self.” The grandiose self is 
characterized by “a childhood system of grandiose fantasies that always seeks witness for 
the grandeur and perfection of the self by an important ‘other,’”  usually a parent, or in 38
the case of Kohut and his contemporaries, usually the mother.  As Kohut puts it in an 39
interview given months before his death, “One needs to be accepted and mirrored—there 
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has to be the gleam in some mother’s eye which says it is good you are here and I 
acknowledge your being here and I am uplifted by your presence.”  This concept of 40
mirroring is key to Kohut’s understanding of how the need for healthy approval and self-
esteem is met by caregivers. It can involve a range of behaviors, including the attention 
paid to an infant’s emotions through facial cues, verbal expressions of approval, or rituals 
or festivals that communicate value and worth to the child. 
 Kohut focused on the developmental trajectory of the grandiose self, the health of 
which is dependent on the manner in which caregivers respond to their child’s grandiose 
desires and fantasies. “The most important source of a well functioning psychological 
structure … is the personality of the parents, specifically their ability to respond to the 
child’s drive demands with nonhostile firmness and nonseductive affection.”  If a 41
caregiver responds to a child’s grandiose fantasies with harshness on the one hand, or 
insecurity on the other, this results in “the perpetuation of the grandiose self’s archaic 
demands,”  potentially leading to a narcissistic personality structure. On the other hand, 42
a healthier trajectory results if caregivers respond to the child’s grandiosity with a 
firmness characterized by love and affirmation. “The child’s drives are opposed originally 
by the prohibitions of the parents,” Kohut explains. “If these prohibitions are of 
nontraumatic intensity, the child incorporates the parents’ drive-restraining attitudes in the 
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form of innumerable benign memory traces.”  The child’s experience of restraint on their 43
grandiose drives will, if accompanied by positive mirroring, produce a healthy self-
confidence that is appropriately constrained with a healthy respect for limits. 
 Siegel describes this developmental process as one in which “The noisy demands 
of the grandiose self become replaced with pleasure in realistic functioning and realistic 
self-esteem.  The replacement of “noisy demands” with “realistic functioning” reflects 44
Kohut’s framing of the capacity to regulate one’s desires and self-esteem. However, the 
extent to which social functioning or self-esteem is deemed appropriate or “realistic” is 
determined to a large extent by socio-cultural context. This raises questions concerning 
the relationship between individual development and social structures. Specifically, how 
might the social context of white hegemony influence the way white children’s 
grandiosity needs are affirmed, and how might that affect the way white people develop 
our sense of self? What might culturally qualify as “realistic” functioning within 
predominantly white spaces may in fact demonstrate an inadequate respect for limits in 
contexts with greater ethnic and cultural diversity. But in order to make the move 
extrapolating from the caregiver-child relationship to the child’s relationship to the wider 
social context, I first examine how Phillis Sheppard extends Kohut’s concept of the 
selfobject to the broader cultural milieu. 
 Kohut and Seitz, “Concepts and Theories of Psychoanalysis,” 370.43
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The Selfobject and Culture 
 The central role played by the caregiver in the child’s trajectory of development 
toward health or pathology is analyzed by Kohut through his concept of selfobjects. As 
Siegel explains, Kohut uses this term to describe how the young child experiences the 
primary caregivers, not as who they are in themselves as persons, but in terms of the 
child’s experience of them to provide immediate emotional needs. Selfobjects “are 
experienced by the child as part of the self. When they fulfill their functions they are 
taken for granted, as is a limb or any other body part. Only when an object fails in its 
functions does it draw notice.”  As Phillis Sheppard explains, it is “the nature and tone 45
of the relational dynamics between the self and its selfobjects in childhood” that 
determines for Kohut whether the psyche develops a healthy sense of cohesion.  For 46
Kohut, the optimal, healthy trajectory of narcissism is experienced as standard, a matter 
of course—only a failure to affirm the child’s grandiose fantasies in a secure, loving way 
stands out as remarkable, calling attention to the caregiver’s selfobject function. 
 In his later years Kohut expanded his understanding of the selfobject to include 
the role of culture in development, particularly significant cultural figures such as great 
artists, scholars, or religious leaders. Sheppard explains that in Kohut’s thought, “cultural 
imagoes may have a role in the celebration of the self that is integral to belonging, and 
that this experience may function for the individual (and group) as a developmental step 
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toward the formation of a cohesive self…”  However, she extends Kohut’s concept to 47
claim that cultural selfobjects “are not solely individuals. They are also the symbols, 
language, institutions, and cultural productions that meet those needs for individuals and 
groups that are sometimes embodied by individuals.”  She further argues that it is 48
extremely important to frame cultural selfobjects as functioning in particular ways 
relative to specific cultural contexts, for “as cultural productions, the self and cultural 
selfobjects are unique to the context in which development, needs, and care occur.”  49
Sheppard’s expansion of the selfobject concept invites us to a view of development that 
expands beyond the individual relationship between parent and child to a more holistic 
view which includes the relationship between the child and their broader cultural 
environment. One implication of Sheppard’s intervention is that the sense of confidence 
and felt capacity with which a child engages the world is dependent to a large degree on 
the environment and life situations which the child encounters, and this differs greatly 
dependent on social context and one’s social position relative to white supremacy. It is 
this aspect of self psychology which informs Sheppard’s central critique of Kohut, to 
which we now turn. 
Sheppard’s Womanist Critique of Kohut: The Role of Social Location 
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 Sheppard writes both as a psychoanalytic theorist and as a womanist theologian, a 
discipline characterized by how it makes “black women’s experience the privileged 
position for theology of, by, and about black women.”  This prioritization of black 50
women’s experience constitutes not only a theological position but an epistemological 
frame, which challenges the way knowledge has historically been constructed primarily 
through the lens of white heteropatriarchy.  This frame enables Sheppard to challenge 51
Kohut on the grounds that as a white male operating in a white Western intellectual 
environment, “his perspectives emerged out of a context where the cultural myth of 
individualism, as the desired outcome of development, permeates the theoretical air.”  52
Sheppard, in contrast, advocates for “an explicit shift in psychology toward aspects of the 
social and contextual. The self becomes and is maintained, and disrupted, in the relation 
sphere that is always situated in the sociocultural field.”  53
 The implication of this for Sheppard’s understanding of cultural selfobjects is 
grounded in her observation that “Black women in the church and broader society know 
all too well that regardless of where one is situated in terms of education and/or income, 
there is, sooner or later, some experience that challenges one’s sense of self.”  The 54
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 1.50
 For a full treatment of womanism as an epistemology see Stacey Floyd-Thomas, “Introduction: 51
Writing for our Lives: Womanism as an Epistemological Revolution,” in Deeper Shades of 
Purple: Womanist Approaches in Religion and Society, ed. Stacey Floyd-Thomas (New York: 
NYU Press, 2006), 1-16.
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 115.52
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 115.53
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 117.54
170
cultural milieu under a patriarchal, white supremacist system does not reflect to black 
women a sense of affirmation and acceptance of their capacities, regardless of the quality 
of relationship between caregiver and child. In fact, this cultural context in which black 
women grow and develop may constitute “a danger to the development of a healthy black 
female self,” and necessitate a vigilant stance of “active intervention or interference by 
black mothers and fathers on behalf of their children.”  This is a profoundly different 55
mode of relating to the broader social environment, in terms of its selfobject function, 
than that experienced by white people (white men in particular), where it can be more or 
less taken for granted that the social context will encourage and nurture our grandiosity 
needs. 
 Sheppard therefore posits that the predominant models of how selfobjects 
function “have presumed privileged position for the developing child in the family and 
broader culture. These notions were not written with those not at the center of power in 
mind.”  She offers this critique in the interest of developing a self psychology directed 56
toward the needs of black women, one that provides “a sense of belonging that regards 
black women’s individual and communal ways of being as normative.”  However, her 57
project entails not simply an application of established theory to a minoritized 
community, but a challenge to the theory itself: “it will advance a model of self-
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psychology that takes seriously black women’s experiences—embodied, cultural, 
gendered, and sexual experiences—and, in so doing, make a claim to redefine the most 
foundational of self psychological concepts, the selfobject.”  Centering black women’s 58
experiences pushes self psychology to see the relationship between culture, social 
location, and the self as constitutive of the developmental process. 
White Expansive Grandiosity and White Normativity 
 I find Sheppard’s expansion of Kohut’s understanding of cultural selfobjects to 
include the social and cultural environment of psychological development helpful in 
developing an account of white psychological development. While Sheppard emphasizes 
the harms which a white-dominated society inflicts upon black women’s psychological 
development, I believe that her account of those oppressive experiences also challenges 
us to question Kohut’s (and Siegel’s) unqualified positive evaluation of the “normal” 
narcissistic development of the self. This does not entail a repudiation of the need for 
affirmation, self-confidence, and a felt capacity to influence one’s environment. However, 
we ought to exercise caution in accepting Siegel’s framing, which unambiguously affirms 
the grandiose self as healthy: 
I believe that ‘grandiose self’ is an unfortunate name for this configuration 
because of its somewhat pejorative cast; ‘expansive self’ might have been a better 
term to describe the exhibitionistic narcissism of the grandiose self.  59
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 122-123.58
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Siegel’s language of  “expansive self” unintentionally evokes Shannon Sullivan’s notion 
of “ontological expansiveness” (which I describe in Chapter 1) in which white people 
take for granted an access to physical and discursive space, often to the disadvantage of 
people of color. To the extent that caregivers, cultural products, and cultural environments 
help affirm white people’s grandiose fantasies and develop an intuitive sense of 
“expansiveness” within white people, it is worth questioning whether this ostensibly 
healthy grandiosity either empowers or diminishes the flourishing of all people, or 
whether the kind of self-regard it generates qualifies as healthy. 
 My concern here echoes Deepa Bhandaru’s reading of Foucault’s 
conceptualization of racism: “racism is the abandonment of the Other through the 
cultivation of the living Self.”  A model that affirms the expansive self without sufficient 60
regard for how the self impacts others, particularly within a social context of racial 
hierarchy, has the potential to legitimate a comfortable attachment to white hegemony. I 
propose that white people’s developmental process, in which our identities are positively 
mirrored within a white normative society functioning as a cultural selfobject, actually 
works excessively in an important sense. This process of development can be understood 
as “healthy” from Kohut’s perspective only to the extent that equitable relationships 
across racial and cultural difference were not, as Sheppard emphasizes, within his 
purview. What requires interrogation, in light of Sheppard’s account of the importance of 
cultural context, and in light of white normativity as a social pattern woven throughout 
 Bhandaru, “Is White Normativity Racist?” 236.60
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U.S. society, is whether the dominant social position of whites inculcates a degree of 
grandiosity which may feel “reasonable” or appropriate within predominantly white 
environments but perpetuates harmful patterns in relationship to people of color. 
 My proposal thus takes a different approach to whiteness and narcissism than 
Miller and Josephs, who describe white ways of being as a form of pathological 
narcissism that “functions as a kind of denied grandiosity.”  The standard model for 61
pathological narcissism posits that it results from a failure to respond positively to the 
child’s grandiose demands, so that those demands persist in adulthood as a lack of self 
esteem that can manifest in pathological behaviors. In contrast, I propose that positive 
mirroring processes within predominantly white contexts meet grandiosity needs in a way 
that can be experienced as healthy within those contexts but is in fact unhealthy in that it 
creates “white people ill-equipped to share power and space with those whom we have 
oppressed and othered.”  This development of grandiosity is distorted because it 62
operates absent the challenge of encounter with those who are different but of equal 
power to one’s own identity group. For the majority of white people, the experience of 
frustration in social interactions across identity differences followed by encouragement to 
learn and try again is a rare experience relative to that of marginalized groups, due to 
social segregation patterns that limit that process largely within our white in-group. 
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 If one’s sociocultural milieu can be understood as having a selfobject function, 
then intuitive understandings of one’s place in the social order with regard to accessibility 
of education, employment, and physical spaces develop on the unconscious level from 
the earliest life stages and likely shape attitudes and behavior even as anti-racist 
commitments are adopted as one grows into adulthood. While there will certainly be 
significant individual differences between white people’s relationship to the social milieu 
as a selfobject, white people as a population nevertheless imbibe common cultural 
assumptions concerning the naturalness and inevitability of a default status of superiority 
over other groups. As Sheppard says, “social contexts are deeply embedded in the psyche 
and the experiences of the body.”  This means that the white self develops in a social 63
environment characterized by a myriad of micro-experiences which reinforce the 
“naturalness” of the social order. Encountering racially and culturally diverse 
neighborhoods primarily on television, moving easily through predominantly white 
spaces without facing social cues of unwelcome, receiving nonverbal affirmation from 
white peers when proposing meritocratic explanations for inequality—all of these shape 
the development of the grandiose self in addition to the parent-child relationship. 
 This account of white cultural mirroring and grandiosity offers potential for 
understanding how ingrained comfort with white privilege and power can subvert and 
nullify efforts to dismantle systemic racism even as greater awareness is cultivated. If 
racial socialization is imbricated in the development process by which people cultivate a 
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sense of confidence in engaging the social world, this provides a potential account for 
how the racialized social milieu is internalized as the baseline for normality. The role of 
critical antiracist pedagogy, then, is precisely to identify as intrinsically unjust what most 
white people are psychically formed to experience as normal. Being confronted by 
accounts of racism as a systemic force that implicates all white people to varying degrees 
results in high levels of uncomfortable affect and, ultimately, white emotioned resistance. 
In this sense, then, the development of healthy grandiosity among white people in a white 
supremacist society is distorted in two directions. It is overdeveloped in terms of 
developing a sense of one’s central place in and unencumbered agency within the social 
order; and simultaneously underdeveloped in terms of the capacity to regulate affect 
when one’s central positionality is challenged, and to relate across difference with respect 
and mutuality. 
 Self psychology thus constitutes one paradigm through which we can interpret 
how prevalent patterns of racial segregation and social power differentials are inculcated 
in white people’s intuitive criteria for assessing how much racial hierarchy is tolerable or 
“reasonable.” A psychoanalytic approach highlights how one’s sense of self-cohesion and 
self-esteem are generated in relationship with the social order and milieu, in ways that 
provide a compelling account of white emotioned resistance. Critical antiracist analysis 
and pedagogy are often experienced by white people as an attack on one’s personhood, so 
thoroughly is our assumed position within society integrated into our sense of identity. 
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The Psychological Roots of White Emotioned Resistance 
 The proposal outlined in this chapter for the nature of white narcissistic 
development in relation with the white normative social milieu is developed as a 
plausible account for reconciling the spontaneous, authentic nature of white emotioned 
resistance with an account of how that resistance functions strategically. Even white 
people who desire to dismantle white supremacy on the cognitive level still act in 
accordance with psychological incentives to defend a social status quo which we perceive 
on an intuitive level is formative of our sense of self. Defending social norms or a sense 
of the individual nature of moral responsibility is experienced as an identity defense 
rather than an attempt to defend white hegemony, but it is white hegemony that incubates 
our sense of identity in the first place. 
 The power that white emotioned resistance to critical antiracism has to reinforce 
social norms, deflect a sense of shared culpability, and thus constrain human flourishing 
for all, poses theological questions about how to live and pursue justice in light of how 
entrenched white normativity is and how imbricated it is with white identity. The fact that 
these processes operate at the instinctive, subconscious level to meet core psychological 
and emotional needs has ramifications for how we understand ethical agency with regard 
to systemic oppression. As the critical whiteness approaches featured in the previous 
chapter demonstrate, questions regarding the processes of socialization, and how aware 
white people are of those processes, are intimately connected with questions of white 
culpability for systemic racism. Jennifer Mueller, for example, argues that over-
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emphasizing the role of socialization processes in producing ignorance “preserves white 
virtue while minimizing agency and motive.”  Theologian Katie Walker Grimes argues 64
in similar fashion that a focus on oppression as a system in which white people are 
socialized “lets white people off the hook.”  Indeed, the choice to emphasize either 65
individual agency or socialized influence when it comes to white resistance often seems 
driven by considerations of what will generate a sufficiently strong account of white 
culpability.  
 While I share the concerns of Mueller and Grimes, I maintain that developing a 
liberationist practical theology of white emotioned resistance can benefit from 
understanding how throughly socio-psychological development shapes white people’s 
intuitions and sense of moral identity. This analysis can help theologians to undertake the 
pastoral task of helping white people understand the source and the moral implications of 
our disorientation and defensiveness, and the prophetic task of proclaiming the extent of 
personal transformation needed if we are to stop being obstacles to social transformation. 
Feelings of comfort and security in a sense of the social order’s basic legitimacy are 
problematic precisely because norm-generating social mechanisms offer cohesion for 
some at the expense of others. This places upon white people an ethical demand to regard 
our intuitions about what is needed for social or institutional cohesion with a healthy 
degree of distrust. In short, the oppressive function of white resistance to antiracism 
 Mueller, “Producing Colorblindness,” 230.64
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 178.65
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places a responsibility on white people to suspect and interrogate our own formation, 
which includes an openness to the anxiety and vulnerability such questioning entails. 
 In the following chapter, I engage in a theological examination of the three 
implicit goals of white resistance that I presented at the end of chapter 2—preserving the 
legitimacy of the social order, preserving moral identity, and preserving racial hierarchy
—in a way that incorporates my analysis of white psychic attachment to the social milieu. 
These underlying motivations are a significant obstacle to social transformation but they 
are also as an existential conundrum for white people engaged in the work of racial 
justice, as they work to keep white hegemony secure even as white people experience 
them as second nature, even benign. I frame these implicit goals as three questions, which 
illustrate how critical antiracism is experienced by many white people as an existential 
threat: How can intuitions and values that have always felt normal be a source of racial 
oppression? How can I be morally responsible for something I don’t intend? and What is 
wrong with wanting a common culture and standard for everyone? To engage with these 
questions I draw upon the work of Willie James Jennings, Katie Walker Grimes, Mayra 
Rivera, and Mary McClintock Fulkerson, as each of them offer crucial theological 
insights on the nature of whiteness as a system, moral responsibility, relating across 
differences, and the nature of transformation. In the process of this dialogue I work 
toward my central claim—that white people have an obligation to retrain our very 
formation and affective attachments to the social milieu for the sake of a vision of justice 
for all people. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF WHITE RESISTANCE: 
NORMATIVITY, CULPABILITY, AND DIFFERENCE 
 In analyzing the patterns of white people’s emotioned resistance to critical 
antiracism, such as insisting that contemporary society is largely colorblind, or objecting 
to the idea of white shared complicity, or arguing that detailed analysis of racism is 
“divisive,” I identify a common underlying impulse—a basic intuition that what feels 
normal to me cannot be all that harmful. While this impulse surely results from centuries 
of systemic exploitation fed by white supremacist ideologies, I argue that the impulses 
themselves have a latent power to motivate even as white people endeavor to reshape our 
ideological commitments toward antiracism. For most white people, hearing the word 
“oppression” applied to social and institutional life that we have always taken for granted 
feels counterintuitive, even for those of us who affirm the reality of systemic racism writ 
large. In previous chapters, I have proposed that these intuitions reflect just how 
thoroughly socialization processes are intertwined with white people’s psychological 
development, so that our sense of security and identity is tied to a sense of comfort and 
attachment to the social milieu itself. In response to this state of affairs, a liberationist 
practical theology of white emotioned resistance has a mandate to both proclaim and give 
an account of how what feels normal and benign to white people has the power to enact 
harm upon others. 
 The claim that comfortable social norms benefit some at the expense of others 
reflects the dynamics reported by many people of color in progressive, predominantly 
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white religious and academic spaces, as I summarized in the introduction. White 
hegemonic norms and deeply rooted intuitions about whose perspectives qualify as 
central or “reasonable” facilitate white advancement and simultaneously constrain the 
capacity of minoritized people to thrive and contribute on an equitable basis. In his book 
After Whiteness: An Education in Belonging, Willie James Jennings calls this matrix of 
norms and assumptions “the institutional unconscious,”  drawing upon his experiences as 1
a black theology professor in predominantly white institutions. He articulates how the 
social dynamics of white normativity impose a cost on the humanity of scholars of color 
as they navigate pressures to assimilate to these systems: “To be reconciled to the way the 
world is can become a sick wisdom, one that imprisons us even as it allows us to 
function. That reconciliation to the givenness of a situation and to a way of being that 
constantly forms us toward an administrative acquiescence to the world is just as much 
feeling and sensing as it is thinking.”  2
 The significance of this passage for me in thinking through a liberationist 
practical theology of white resistance is twofold: first, it directly names unconscious, 
taken for granted institutional norms as a “sick wisdom” and a source of “imprisonment,” 
thus clarifying the moral stakes of perpetuating an oppressive social milieu. Second, in 
affirming that navigating an institutional system is “as much feeling and sensing as it is 
thinking,” Jennings suggests an important role for subtle psychological dynamics in 
 Willie James Jennings, After Whiteness: An Education in Belonging (Grand Rapids, MI: 1
Eerdmans, 2020), 92.
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 92.2
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reifying social structures. The passage integrates a prophetic statement of moral truth 
about the harm done by oppressive systems with an analysis of the problem that contains 
explanatory power for helping us perceive how such systems work. It is this combination 
of explanation and proclamation which I believe theology contributes to the question of 
white emotioned resistance. 
 In this chapter I address three theological issues raised by my account of white 
emotioned resistance as a means of preserving psychic attachments to the white 
normative social milieu. I frame these theological issues as responses to three questions 
which I believe illustrate the way white people spontaneously experience the underlying 
threats to white identity posed by critical antiracism. I first take up the question, How can 
intuitions and values that have always felt normal be a source of racial oppression? Here 
I employ Jennings’s theological account of the white “aesthetic regime” as a source of 
evil, emphasizing how universal sounding values like “excellence” or “rigor” are often 
assessed on the basis of emotioned responses to white aesthetic and cultural signifiers. 
For the second question, How can I be morally responsible for something I don’t intend? 
I turn to Katie Walker Grimes and her concepts of the “embodied voluntary,” and 
“corporate vice.” While I diverge from Grimes’s analysis of the relationship between 
moral culpability and intention, I develop her understanding of shared corporate 
responsibility as a value more white people need to absorb. Third, I engage Mayra 
Rivera’s account of “relational transcendence” to address the question, What is wrong 
with wanting a common culture and standard for everyone? Her vision of transcendence 
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as a relational encounter with difference grounds the necessity to de-reify white 
normativity for the sake of human flourishing, characterized by authentic mutuality. I 
conclude the chapter with a reflection on Mary McClintock Fulkerson’s examination of 
anxiety as a source of resistance to social change. I suggest that white emotioned 
resistance has the potential to lead to transformation to the extent that antiracist pedagogy 
takes into account the underlying insecurities that animate it. 
Willie James Jennings and the White Aesthetic Regime: Psychic Attachment to 
Cultural Values 
 If, as I argue, white resistance to critical antiracism involves a psychic 
relationship between a comfortable, secure sense of self and the racial hierarchical social 
milieu, it is of vital importance to elucidate the way these connections play out in 
contemporary life, particularly in the formation of institutional culture. With expertise in 
cultural studies, black church studies, race theory, missiology, and history, Willie James 
Jennings focuses his theological analysis on the way that the legacy of colonialism and 
the social construction of whiteness distort healthy identity formation and thwart the 
potential for communion between peoples. Jennings begins with the premise that 
Christianity as a religious tradition possesses “deepest instincts of intimacy,”  and the 3
way he frames the core theological conundrum of white supremacy in The Christian 
Imagination is worth quoting in full: 
 Willie James Jennings, The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race (New 3
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 9.
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That intimacy should by now have given Christians a faith that understands its 
own deep wisdom and power of joining, mixing, merging, and being changed by 
multiple ways of life to witness a God who surprises us by love of differences and 
draws us to new capacities to imagine their reconciliation. Instead, the intimacy 
that marks Christian history is a painful one, one in which the joining often meant 
oppression, violence, and death, if not of bodies then most certainly of ways of 
life, forms of language, and visions of the world. What happened to the original 
trajectory of intimacy?  4
Jennings’s vision of “mixing” ways of life stands as a comprehensive counter-vision to 
colonial visions of universal assimilation to whiteness, and serves as a challenge to all 
white people to open ourselves to re-assess our own intuitions regarding what counts as a 
“normal” cultural milieu. Whiteness, for Jennings, functions on an intuitive and affective 
level to reify white cultural patterns, cloaking white ethnic and cultural chauvinism as 
universal humanism and posing as an objective standard for sophisticated, meritorious 
living.  5
Aesthetic Evaluation and the Creation of Value 
 In “The Aesthetic Struggle and Ecclesial Vision,” Jennings argues that one aspect 
of the burden of oppression borne by black people is a distinctly aesthetic burden, a 
socially entrenched valuation of black bodies as less than worthy of love. This results 
from what Jennings calls the “white (Eurocentric) aesthetic regime,” which “seeks to 
 Jennings, The Christian Imagination, 9.4
 See also Sylvia Wynter, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards 5
the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review 
3, no. 3 (2003): 257–337. Wynter posits that Western Christian colonialism inherently involved a 
“systemic repression ensuring that we oversee (thereby failing to recognize) the culture and class-
specific relativity of our present mode of being human” (282).
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narrate the true, the good, the beautiful, the intelligent, and the noble around white 
bodies.”  This identification of value with visible characteristics was imposed by colonial 6
conquest and chattel enslavement and then passed down generation after generation, 
internalized in white people and also in those who have experienced degradation and 
oppression through this “racializing pedagogy.”  By focusing on how aesthetics 7
contribute to the process of racialization by ascribing value to appearance and cultural 
expression, Jennings includes norms, preferences, and attitudes within the range of what 
constitutes structural racial oppression. 
 Jennings’s account of the white aesthetic regime involves both historical analysis 
and theological proclamation, as he draws on the language of Ephesians 6:12 in naming 
this regime as “nothing less than a principality, a spiritual force of evil in heavenly 
places.”  Jennings goes on to explain: 8
We should therefore … name this concrete power of the racial aesthetic, 
recognizing the demonic at play in this citadel of optical illusions that bind a 
racial calculus to human bodies and human gesture in such a way as to damage 
the way we see God’s creation and see ourselves as God’s creatures.  9
For Jennings, dissecting the workings of aesthetics as they create racial hierarchies of 
value is both an analytical and a spiritual work. Racial socialization that forms aesthetic 
 Willie James Jennings, “The Aesthetic Struggle and Ecclesial Vision,” in Black Practical 6
Theology, ed. Dale P. Andrews and Robert London Smith (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 
2015), 163.
 Jennings, “The Aesthetic Struggle,” 163.7
 Jennings, “The Aesthetic Struggle,” 165.8
 Jennings, “The Aesthetic Struggle,” 165.9
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preferences and invests these preferences with evaluative categories like ugly and 
beautiful, intelligent and simple, should be understood not only as sociological 
mechanisms but as sources of evil. This valuation has ramifications for how I understand 
the relationship between socialization, psychological development, and culpability. 
 When Jennings speaks of aesthetics, he speaks of socially produced and enforced 
preferences for the white body itself, but he also means a wider constellation of habits, 
mannerisms, modes of expression, and artistic tastes: “what a beautiful dress looks like, 
what magnificent architecture looks like, the difference between good and bad wine, what 
are a good cigar, a proper pair of shoes, classic clothing, proper speech, correct writing, 
beautiful comportment, excellent music, proper dance, real art, and much more,” all 
centered around Eurocentric white preferences.  Another crucial function of aesthetics is 10
to providing not only a sense of pleasure and enjoyment but “a sense of and desire for 
order: rightly ordered spaces and rightly ordered relations.”  The dynamics described 11
here by Jennings exceed the idea of simply preferring the culture and norms of one’s in-
group to other peoples and societies. The white aesthetic regime renders the preference 
for white bodies, habits, and tastes “not only a preference for but also a determiner of the 
possibilities of personhood.”  It simply feels normal to the extent that it barely feels like 12
a preference at all, but simply a reasonably objective standard. The white aesthetic regime 
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 63.10
 Jennings, “The Aesthetic Struggle,” 168.11
 Jennings, “The Aesthetic Struggle,” 177.12
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coalesces around an assumption that European society represents the apex of human 
development against which all societies, cultures, and human beings are properly 
judged.  13
 This white aesthetic regime is the world that all of us are born into, the world 
which Phillis Sheppard describes as “a danger to the development of a healthy black 
female self,”  and the world which mirrors to white people an affirmation of our own 14
entitlement to set the standard for human sophistication is defined. The aesthetic regime 
as described by Jennings holds its tenacious power in part because of how pervasively it 
operates upon white psychological development. What makes white resistance so 
insidious, when critical antiracism confronts the white aesthetic regime, is that it is often 
experienced by white people as a spontaneous defensive move just as it actually 
perpetuates a centuries long offensive against the dignity and humanity of millions of 
people. When white people defensively resist that idea that our norms and preferences are 
in fact capable of enacting harm given systemic imbalances of power, we facilitate 
institutional racism. 
Cultural Values as Objects of Affective Attachment 
 While the interests of this project are focused on the psychological dimensions of socialization, 13
it is important to acknowledge the role of Christian theology in the colonizers’ conviction that 
they were God’s elect people chosen to spread their civilization wherever they traveled. “Early 
European Christians coming to new lands saw themselves as the embodied will of God for the 
world,” Jennings explains (“The Aesthetic Struggle,” 169). See also Perkinson, White Theology.
 Sheppard, Self, Culture, and Others, 119.14
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 In After Whiteness, Jennings employs anecdotes drawn from his experiences in 
the theological academy to demonstrate how white attachments to Eurocentric cultural 
expressions propagate power imbalances and reproduce institutional white hegemony. He 
demonstrates this with a narrative of his experience sitting on an academic faculty hiring 
committee, made up of predominantly white men, one white woman, himself, and one 
other African American man. The candidates for the position had narrowed down to two: 
one black female candidate and one white male candidate. The story ends as many 
attuned to the patterns of white normativity might expect: in spite of professed 
commitments to a diverse faculty, the white male was hired. But what Jennings focuses 
on are the aesthetic dynamics present in the interview—as the committee resonates with 
the white male candidate’s visual characteristics and performance: 
His was a beautiful presence that played off his appearance, his comportment, and 
his way of speaking. A tall, dark-haired, baritone-voiced, perfectly groomed 
bearded man dressed like a professor in the middle of a celebrated career, he 
spoke with confidence and polished ease. 
What I saw in [my white colleagues’] faces and what I heard in their voices and 
later in their assessments of him as a candidate was a stunning revelation of a 
singular truth. 
They looked at him longingly and lovingly, admiring his poise, his confidence, 
seeing in him what they longed to be, and seeing what they thought we the faculty 
thought the goal of our shared project of formation ought to be. This is not my 
projection onto their projections. This is what was said as they assessed the 
candidates.  15
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 24.15
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 What Jennings describes so incisively here is how subtly and easily aesthetic and 
affective energies guide decision making processes that purportedly rely on objective, 
dispassionate considerations of merit. The faculty in the room were drawn to an aesthetic 
performance not because they believed that good looks, vocal inflection, or comportment 
were the most important qualifications for a tenure-track professor, but because those 
aesthetic qualities evoked the values that the institution professed—intellectual mastery 
and ability. Indeed, based on Jennings’s description, it could be said that the white people 
on the committee encountered a performance that mirrored their own grandiose fantasies. 
Jennings reports that he was himself not unsusceptible to these influences. “I loved how 
he could gather the love of my colleagues through his performance, and I wanted to 
gather that same love in a performance like his.”  But this love was itself generated 16
through Jenning’s struggles to belong in an academic community thoroughly shaped by 
centuries of regnant whiteness. “I had learned to love an intellectual form that performed 
white masculinist self-sufficiency, a way of being in the world that aspires to exhibit 
possession, mastery, and control of knowledge first, and of one’s self second, and if 
possible of one’s world.”  Jennings’ narrative thus exemplifies the workings of 17
subconscious dynamics—in which a performance of favored aesthetic norms evokes an 
affective response that is interpreted as a guarantor of culturally desired qualities. 
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 28.16
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 29.17
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 These same subconscious dynamics operate equally powerfully to the detriment 
of people who do not embody the preferences of the aesthetic regime, as in the case of the 
black woman candidate for the faculty position. The white male candidate had performed 
what Jennings calls white masculinist self sufficiency, enthusing about “no holds barred” 
debates in seminars in Germany in which he “really saw what rigorous thinking looks 
like.”  The black woman candidate, on the other hand, “showed something more in her 18
interview, but something not wanted. She wanted to talk about herself as integral to her 
work as a textualist, specifically about the racial condition of the West and how ancient 
texts and modern interpretation play in and against that condition.”  Her distinct 19
contributions, however, were devalued in favor of the white male candidate’s celebration 
of “rigor,” a value which the committee took as objective rather than preferential. 
 But what does rigor mean, exactly? It can be defined simply as a thoroughness 
and attention to detail required by complex ideas and tasks. By this standard, the black 
woman candidate’s research undoubtedly required rigor to implement and teach 
effectively, but the definition that held sway in the room was attached to particular 
cultural modes of performance, as well as experience within a particular cultural tradition 
of thought. Values like rigor, rationality, and excellence are often presented in academic 
institutions and in the wider culture matters of objective empirical measurement. 
Jennings’s analysis of the interpersonal and affective dynamics of a hiring committee 
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 26.18
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 27.19
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alerts us to how thoroughly intuitive resonance operates as a criteria for ascertaining the 
presence or absence of those values, often without acknowledgment or awareness that 
that is what is happening. 
 While Jennings is primarily concerned in After Whiteness with the operations of 
the theological academy, I believe the social and affective dynamics that he describes 
apply to a variety of institutional contexts in U.S. society at large. What is central for my 
purpose is to see how thorough the process of the naturalization of whiteness is, so that 
white intuitive responses to aesthetic performances and cultural values are taken for 
granted as universal human perceptions rather than particular cultural values that have 
been internalized. I believe this instinctive universalizing of white preferences reflects 
how the white normative social milieu functions as an array of cultural selfobjects, which 
positively mirror elements of white grandiosity needs and encourage a white expansive 
self. This is the element I would add to Jennings’s analysis of the white aesthetic regime
—the depth and extent of psychological attachment to the social milieu is one element 
that renders the regime so compelling and difficult to dislodge through cognitive-based 
appeals. White resistance to having the assumptions of whiteness dissected does not, in 
my view, need to be employed cynically to be damaging. The white aesthetic regime as a 
cultural selfobject reinforces itself effectively as a set of cultural and aesthetic 
preferences so thoroughly enmeshed in the presuppositions of white normativity that they 
are not recognized as preferences at all, but regarded as universal aspirations to ideals of 
truth, beauty, and capability. 
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 Jennings’s analysis of whiteness in institutional life clarifies the theological and 
ethical stakes of resistant discourses of minimization, or colorblindness. The white 
faculty in his hiring committee would surely resist any notion that race played a role in 
their decision making process. They were simply impressed by the white candidate’s 
embodiment of their image of a scholar, an exemplar of rigor and a distinguished 
presentation of the scholarly values they hold dear. The possibility that the methods 
brought to the table by the black woman candidate might constitute an equal or superior 
form of rigor did not enter into the conversation. The image of the scholar, which as 
Jennings puts it is “as much feeling and sensing as it is thinking,”  is grounded in white 20
cultural aesthetics that are not acknowledged as white. The socialization process 
naturalizes both white aesthetic preferences and the universalizing of those preferences. 
 This is where Jennings’s theological analysis makes its most incisive and 
devastating point—that the aesthetic regime which he names as “evil” operates so 
effectively precisely in the extent to which it is naturalized. What white people have to 
grapple with is how our ethical intuitions with regard to race and identity are on some 
level rendered fundamentally untrustworthy by the workings of the aesthetic regime to 
reproduce itself, or in my own formulation, to reproduce comfortable psychic 
attachments to the racialized social milieu. Jennings’s theological frame demands that we 
understand these social and psychological developmental processes as “a spiritual force 
of evil,” in that they corrupt the capacity for human flourishing and the common good 
 Jennings, After Whiteness, 92.20
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both for the oppressed and, in different ways, for the oppressor. The question of 
culpability then becomes even more acute, as what feels natural must be named as an 
enemy of justice and flourishing for all. 
Katie Walker Grimes: The Embodied Voluntary of White Hegemony 
 The next core question animating white resistance, the one which speaks to the 
question of moral identity, is How can I be morally responsible for something I don’t 
intend? Katie Walker Grimes takes up this question in Christ Divided: Antiblackness as 
Corporate Vice. Grimes focuses her work on the history of antiblackness supremacy  in 21
Catholic ecclesial structures, and claims that habits of socialization into white normativity 
“inhibit the effect and the reception of the sacraments … and otherwise impair the 
church’s ability to be the body of Christ in history.”  Central to Grimes’s theological 22
framework is her conceptualization of racism as an evil that is embodied and corporate—
in that it operates through white people’s individual bodies, but more essentially through 
white people at the group level as a corporate body. For Grimes, both aspects of systemic 
racism fully implicate white people, who she frames not as unwitting participants in a 
system larger than themselves, but as fully interested partners in that system. 
 Grimes uses the term “antiblackness supremacy” in order to “center our attention on the way in 21
which whites and nonblack people of color accrue power and privilege by not qualifying as 
‘black’” (Grimes, Christ Divided, xxvi). While Grimes’s project is centered on “antiblackness” 
rather than white hegemony, I believe her understanding of corporate vice is also applicable to 
white hegemony in general, and I therefore use that language in this chapter.
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 227.22
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 This picture of white culpability in systemic racism is designed to prevent any 
formulation that, in Grimes’s words, “lets white people off the hook.”  For Grimes, the 23
descriptive element of theologizing systemic racism is inherently interwoven with the 
ethical proclamation—put another way, the choices we make in analyzing the 
mechanisms of white normativity must generate a sufficiently satisfactory moral 
accounting. It is precisely this aim which so often generates white emotioned resistance 
to critical antiracist pedagogy, due to the perceived threat to white moral identity. The 
basic desire to be seen by others and to see oneself as good enacts significant 
psychological barriers to the prospect that we as white people contribute to the very 
racism that we have, in most cases, been educated to see as evil. In the whiteness 
education research literature (particularly in Barbara Applebaum’s work), resistance to 
shared culpability often takes the form of emphasizing either good intentions or 
ignorance regarding the systemic nature of racism. 
 The account of white culpability that Grimes develops in Christ Divided does not 
allow for such an objection, for in her understanding of moral freedom, “white people do 
intend antiblackness, even without consciously realizing it.”  Grimes grounds this move 24
to separate intention from awareness in neuroscientific research on consciousness and 
involuntary action, but it is ultimately a move I cannot fully follow. I believe that my 
account of psychic attachments to the social milieu allows for a more nuanced account of 
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 178.23
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the relationship between intention and action, while still affirming white shared 
responsibility for perpetuating the system. Where I find Grimes’s work most helpful in 
addressing white resistance is in her formulation of the “embodied voluntary,” which 
emphasizes the reflexive, non-cognitive dimension of many human behaviors, and in her 
understanding of “corporate vice,” which shifts the focus from individual actions to the 
power of corporate bodies to create and reinforce a habitus of white hegemony. Grimes’s 
accounts of intention and corporate vice help me address the culpability question so 
central to white emotioned resistance, in a way consistent with the theological framework 
of my project to integrate explanation with proclamation. Her analysis of the workings of 
white normativity possesses an explanatory power to help white people better understand 
white shared participation in oppression, and thus hopefully hear the extent of our need 
for transformation. 
The Embodied Voluntary: The Intentionality of White Habituated Behaviors 
 Grimes’s concept of the embodied voluntary combines a model of socialization 
based upon Bourdieu’s concept of habitus with an account of habitual, non-conscious 
action drawn from neuroscientific research. She posits an intimate relationship between 
the predominantly white habitus in which most white people develop and the habitual 
behaviors that perpetuate white advantage and harm black people. “Human beings form 
habits through their bodies’ daily and pre-rational encounter with the surrounding social 
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and material environment,”  Grimes says, echoing critical whiteness approaches 25
grounded in phenomenology. This dynamic accounts for the common observation that 
“although whites frequently deny bias with their mouths, they consistently express 
aversion to blackness with their bodies.”  As an example, she cites survey data of college 26
students showing that while ninety-two expressed no reservation of having a black friend 
over for dinner, nearly seventy percent had never done so.  27
 Grimes’s account of the role of habit in reproducing racism echoes the concerns 
of theorists such as Shannon Sullivan and Linda Martín-Alcoff. For Grimes, however, it 
is of utmost importance not to allow an understanding of social habituation to minimize 
white agency and responsibility in perpetuating systemic racism. To that end she uses a 
Thomistic account of moral freedom in which white responsibility is based not on the 
ability to choose otherwise (because we do not choose the society into which we are 
habituated), but is based on our satisfaction with the results of our behaviors. “Because 
they are at home in their racial habitat, white people typically experience their spatial 
circumstances as neither unpleasant nor unnatural, but comfortable and appropriate.”  28
Therefore on this account white people do intend our racist practices even if we are 
habituated into them. “Even if white people do not consciously choose to begin the 
process of habituation into whiteness, a Thomistic account of moral freedom depicts them 
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 90-91.25
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as capable of voluntarily willing in alignment with the habits they did not deliberately 
decide to acquire.”  This move to sever voluntary action from consciousness, and 29
therefore sever conscious intention from culpability, is central to Grimes’s understanding 
of how the evil of racism is located within white individuals. 
 Grimes conceptualizes white intentionality to perpetuate systemic racism as “a 
decision the body makes and the mind justifies,”  positing that the body, rather than 30
consciousness, is the locus of intention. She acknowledges that this move “seems 
counterintuitive,” since “we still tend to conceive of the body as that which merely takes 
orders from the mind.”  To explain, Grimes turns to a body of neuroscientific research 31
that suggests a “post hoc character of consciousness,”  or put another way, that action 32
precedes awareness and intention.  She cites the example of an experienced driver 33
slamming on the brakes in order to avoid a car crash, in contrast to how a new driver-in-
training reacts to potential threats. In the case of the near-crash, “I either did not 
consciously command my foot to press the pedal or I did not retain the memory of having 
done so. I still acted voluntarily and as I intended to.  A new driver, however, 34
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 94.29
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 95-96.30
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 98-99.31
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is much more likely to consciously think about her actions before she executes 
them. But this new consciousness reflects the driver’s lack of skill and freedom. 
Precisely because she must consciously map her actions out in her head before 
she commits to switching on the ignition or flipping on her turn signal, she is 
actually less free than the seasoned driver who operates her vehicle attentively but 
relatively unreflectively.  35
Grimes here defines trained reflexive actions as a form of freedom and voluntary action, 
because reducing deliberation actually makes the actions more effective in fulfilling our 
ultimate goal. 
 Grimes concludes that the “typically unconscious character of white people’s 
performance of antiblackness therefore renders it more effective and more voluntary than 
most actions that require conscious forethought.”  Because she operates on the premise 36
that culpability is tied to intention, it is important to conceptualize intention in terms of 
the effects of our actions and to separate intention from consciousness of intention. If 
white people experience comfort and security with segregated spaces and socio-economic 
privilege, and suppressing black flourishing is necessary for that privilege to be secured, 
then on Grimes’s model the actions of white people are intended to suppress black 
flourishing, regardless of whatever conscious awareness exists of that intention. The fact 
that attachment to a white normative milieu is inculcated from birth does not make the 
resultant habituated behaviors any less intentional, because intention is not identified with 
conscious awareness of the intention, but rather with satisfaction with the results. 
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Response to Grimes’s Embodied Voluntary: Intention, Awareness, and Habituation 
 Grimes’s description of the embodied voluntary and how it defines white 
culpability in systemic racism is an invaluable contribution to a practical theological 
analysis of white emotioned resistance. It pushes white people to expand our framework 
for moral responsibility for systemic racism beyond individual conscious intentions and 
toward an examination of our deeper motivations to preserve a comfortable, self-
affirming social milieu. In particular, her move to integrate neuroscience in her analysis 
of white habituation is an important contribution to theorizing the influence of social 
location on white people’s habitual behaviors. Her descriptions of the embodied 
voluntary in action, whether it is white students admitting they have no close friends of 
color, or when white people “feel afraid when black men walk towards them on the 
sidewalk,”  or how white “adolescent bodies more frequently evade the disciplinary 37
activities of an antiblackness supremacist judicial system,”  help explain how racism 38
operates much more comprehensively than discrete acts of conscious animus. 
 Grimes’s approach to culpable ignorance also resonates with Jennifer Mueller’s 
approach addressed in chapter 3, that “whites fail to recognize antiblackness supremacy 
not because they cannot, but because they do not want to.”  As I argued in my discussion 39
on Mueller, I think it is important to allow for a degree of authentic ignorance of the 
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mechanisms of white hegemony. However, Grimes’s formulation that white people “do 
not want to” recognize those mechanisms aligns with my account of the psychological 
development of the white expansive self. White people do have an underlying psychic 
incentive to avoid or repress awareness of that which will challenge or disrupt our moral 
identity and our attachment to the social milieu. It is theologically important, then, to 
interpret the reiteration of white ignorance as a move that is simultaneously self 
protective and oppressive in that it functions to bestow a baseline legitimacy upon a 
status quo that is fundamentally unjust. Addressing white moral responsibility for 
ignorance, then, requires an honest self-questioning of why we do not know what we do 
not know, or whether we have succumbed to subtle incentives to pass over available 
opportunities to learn. 
 My primary point of divergence from Grimes lies in her central move to separate 
intentionality so thoroughly from awareness. I affirm that white people are not exonerated 
by an appeal to habituation and ignorance, but I find that her formulation, “white people 
do intend antiblackness, even without consciously realizing it,”  confuses more than 40
clarifies the relationship between conscious awareness and socialization processes. 
Grimes wants to push ethical formulas for white culpability in racism from “we are 
culpable for that which we do not intend” to “we intend the systemic racism which we are 
not consciously aware of intending.” Conversely, my focus on a drive toward preserving 
comfort with a social milieu reflects my pastoral theological interests in helping white 
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 178.40
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people interpret our subjective experience of disorientation, and how that experience 
relates to the common question of how white people can be responsible for something we 
do not intend, or are not aware of intending. 
 At this point I return to self-reflexivity and an analysis of my epistemic advantage 
as a white male. I must reckon with the real possibility that in pulling back from Grimes’s 
formulation of intending systemic racism without consciously realizing it, I am engaged 
in a practice of self-exculpation, and by extension white exculpation. My intention, as I 
perceive it, is to elucidate the nature of white culpability in a way that best accounts for 
the subjective experiences of disorientation that characterize white resistance. Hence my 
interest in looking at the preservation of the social milieu itself as a motivation distinct 
from preserving systemic racism. But both Grimes’s account of intentionality and my 
own account of white psychological development raise the specter of motivated 
reasoning in my own project—the possibility that I intend to preserve white hegemony 
without being aware of that intention. Nevertheless, my hope is that an approach 
emphasizing motivations that white people can potentially identify has greater potential 
for helping us recognize self-protective patterns, and more effectively participate in 
dismantling oppressive structures. 
 Grimes’s analogy of driving illustrates where I think her account does not fully 
capture the dynamics of white social formation. It is true that instinctively slamming the 
brake pedal is a more effective means of self protection than if the action required 
conscious deliberation. In this sense, Grimes’s claim that unconscious action constitutes a 
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form of freedom superior to deliberated action makes sense. It is also true, as Grimes 
claims, that the embodied, reflexive nature of many white behavioral habits is what 
makes them more effective in sustaining white hegemony. White people who did not 
create segregated housing policies, for example, still “typically experience their spatial 
circumstances as neither unpleasant nor unnatural, but comfortable and appropriate.”  So 41
the very ubiquity of white habitual actions helps them elude strict ethical scrutiny. 
 But in the case of driving, the reflex to slam the brake results from a training 
process in which the reflex is the consciously intended end. For white people who are 
more ignorant of the history of structurally racist policies, their habitual moves to 
preserve a comfortable social milieu are not necessarily identical to an intention to harm 
people of color’s prospects for flourishing. Unintended consequences do exist. Certainly 
overt racism is a real and present motivator for many, but where such intentions are not 
consciously present, the conflation of intention with enjoying the benefits of oppressive 
systems is not, to my mind, the most helpful account of agency. A strong practical 
theology of white culpability is necessary, but I believe it lies less with Grimes’s theory 
of intentionality and more with her understanding of corporate vice. 
Corporate Vice 
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 101.41
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 Grimes’s theory of corporate virtue and vice “scrutinizes the racial habituation of 
not just individual but corporate bodies.”  Habituation happens both through and to 42
corporate entities, be it the Catholic Church of which Grimes is a part, predominantly 
white academic or nonprofit institutions, or the United States as a whole. In each of these 
contexts, “human beings do not just sin as individuals. Nor are we saved as such. This 
holds particularly true with respect to the corporate vice of antiblackness supremacy.”  43
This emphasis directly counters what Phillis Sheppard calls “the cultural myth of 
individualism,”  which is part of the cultural milieu that white people imbibe in our 44
process of psychological development. It is therefore necessary to cultivate this 
understanding of sin as corporate as an essential element of helping white people 
understand shared complicity for systemic racism, particularly in Christian or Christian-
influenced social contexts. It emphasizes that one bears responsibility for wider social 
patterns and structures which generate inequitable hierarchies, and it also drives home the 
impossibility of extricating one’s white self from the corporate body as a means of 
individual improvement or exoneration. 
 “As a corporate habit,” Grimes argues, “antiblackness supremacy possesses a self-
perpetuating momentum, instilling in the church’s corporate body an appetite for racial 
stasis.”  Her term “racial stasis” neatly encapsulates what I mean by psychic attachment 45
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to the racialized social milieu, or what DiAngelo calls “racial equilibrium.” If, according 
to my account, white people psychologically develop our sense of self in relationship to 
the white hegemonic social milieu, we have a distinct psychic incentive to preserve 
elements of that social reality in terms of culture, norms, and even racial demographics. 
This psychic incentive can be understood as “corporate” both in the sense that it is 
generated in relationships to the social environment, and also in that white people have an 
intuitive motivation to preserve that social environment through an aggregate of subtle, 
habituated behaviors and decisions. A cultivated understanding of corporate vice is 
therefore a needed element of responding to white emotioned resistance, to help white 
people develop a felt sense of our participation in a wider corporate body and in the 
corporate sin of structural racism. 
 I would suggest that helping white people expand our sense of culpability to our 
participation in inequitable social patterns is preferable to an account of culpability reliant 
on convincing white people to locate desires to harm people of color that we may be 
unable to recognize in ourselves. Learning to identity those motivations which we can 
recognize within ourselves (such as a desire for comfort or the basic legitimacy of society 
as it is) and how they contribute to patterns of injustice has more pedagogical potential 
than nudging us to identify desires that may or may not be present, and in either case we 
are not cognizant of. Racism does not require animus against people of color to function, 
even though animus is one source of fuel and is more widespread than many white people 
want to assume. But analyzing how structural racism can operate without animus need 
204
not function as a way of getting white people “off the hook.” It is rather a way of 
understanding how the hook materializes through social patterns that white people take 
for granted as much or more so than any actions or thoughts that elicit feelings of guilt. 
 My framework here does not deny the psychoanalytic insight that we often are not 
aware of what we desire, and that our actions are often better indicators of our intention 
than conscious awareness and self report. What I do maintain is that desires to preserve a 
particular comfortable social milieu and also preserve a sense of a cohesive, moral self 
are different from repressed desires to immiserate people of color or to preserve an 
oppressive racial hierarchy. In the context of analyzing white supremacy as a system, I 
affirm that these desires have the same effect. In the context of cultivating pastoral efforts 
to reach through white resistance, it is legitimate to recognize the difference between the 
two desires and incorporate that into pedagogical approaches. 
 Addressing white resistance to the idea of shared culpability requires cultivating a 
cognitive and affective understanding of how the psychic incentive to preserve the social 
milieu contributes to systemic oppression. In this way Grimes’s account of corporate vice 
contributes to a liberationist practical theology of white resistance by responding to the 
core motivation of preserving white moral identity. She offers a compelling explanation 
of how racial habituation functions, which lays the groundwork for her proclamation that 
white supremacy “inhabits white bodies as a vice.”  White people do indeed share 46
 Grimes, Christ Divided, 211.46
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responsibility for what we may not intend, because both oppression and liberation are 
inherently corporate. 
Mayra Rivera and Relational Transcendence 
 Both Jennings and Grimes share an emphasis on how white social formation 
contributes to systems of evil and oppression by reproducing white hegemony as the 
norm, and both affirm the need for radical transformation on the structural and spiritual 
level for the sake of liberation. These affirmations, however, presume that human 
flourishing necessarily entails developing the capacity to respect and love across 
differences, or in Jennings’s language, the “power of joining, mixing, merging, and being 
changed by multiple ways of life.”  A liberationist practical theology of white emotioned 47
resistance rests on the premise, shared by proponents of critical antiracism, that the social 
dominance of white people over other groups constitutes a deep, multifaceted injustice. 
 As we have seen in the work of theorists such as Eric Kaufmann, however, this 
premise is not universally affirmed. As discussed in the introduction, Kaufmann argues 
that on the political level, “national cohesion is often a by-product of confident ethnic 
majorities,”  and he insists that “the drive towards cultural equality carries costs in terms 48
of liberty, rationality, equality, and community.”  Karen Stenner is another political 49
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theorist who, while she does not specifically advocate for a robust ethnic majority 
identity, argues that the minimization of cultural and ethnic difference is a non-negotiable 
necessity for a cohesive plural society. Stenner operates on a premise analogous to that 
put forward by some psychoanalytic theorists of race, that there exists an innate psychic 
tendency to separate into groups with a “fundamental and relatively immutable 
predisposition to intolerance of difference.”  In light of this inevitable tendency, she 50
argues, the optimal path for societies with multiple ethnic groups is to intensify efforts 
toward cultural assimilation to the majority. “To put it bluntly,” Stenner says, “those of 
different race can more easily change their seeming difference than their race, and more 
easily than the inherently intolerant can change their predispositions.”  Therefore 51
societies “can best limit intolerance of difference by parading, talking about, and 
applauding our sameness.”  While Stenner does not use the term, her position amounts 52
to a defense of white normativity as the appropriate basis for intergroup relationality. 
 Stenner’s position encapsulates a deeply rooted ideological assumption which 
animates another form of white emotioned resistance, summarized by the question, What 
is wrong with wanting a common culture and standard for everyone? The contemporary 
context of U.S. discourse on racism is characterized by increasing pushback against 
valuing affirmation of difference in favor of emphasizing the positive value of 
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assimilation. Even among white people who affirm the need to value difference, however, 
my model of white attachment to the social milieu anticipates that there will persist a 
deep-rooted incentive to preserve and universalize the cultural norms that have performed 
a selfobject function in our development. 
 Critical antiracist pedagogy therefore requires continued articulation of its core 
values, and theology can help provide ethical grounding for the premise that equity and 
respect for difference is not only possible but essential for human flourishing. Mayra 
Rivera is a postcolonial theologian who takes up this task in her work of constructive 
theology, A Touch of Transcendence. Rivera reinterprets divine transcendence in a way 
that moves away from traditional conceptions which emphasize “the individualistic 
aspiration to attain a positive otherworldly existence.”  She argues that the “ancient 53
intuition” that informs traditional ideas of transcendence also supports “a vision of 
transcendence within creation and between creatures: a relational transcendence.”  In 54
identifying human relationships as a locus of transcendence, Rivera claims that relating in 
a way that fully honors difference is a source of encounter with the divine—a claim of 
“the inextricability of God$s transcendence and the transcendence of the human Other.”  55
Her claim has strong implications for addressing white resistance to critical antiracism, 
for it implies that prioritizing one set of norms as an objective standard for all who 
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participate in an institution or society (as white normativity does) forsakes the growth and 
divine encounter that relational transcendence promises. 
Relating to Other as Other 
 Rivera’s account of relational transcendence is developed in response to 
consistent “failures of the dominant groups to respect the human other as Other.”  She 56
draws from Emmanuel Levinas, who developed his philosophy of the significance of the 
Other in response to the horrors of Nazi totalitarianism. Levinas defines transcendence as 
“the opening of sameness to its Other,”  which requires a posture of receptivity to 57
difference, for “we must resist the tendency to reduce the Other to an object to be 
grasped, comprehended, and assimilated.”  Instead, the Other, be that an Other of 58
ethnicity, gender, class, or any form of marginalization, calls the very totalizing system 
itself into question. For Rivera, Levinas’s account of transcendence points toward a 
vision of relationship that refuses assimilation, a mode of relating “where the 
irreducibility of difference is not in conflict with desire, and where desire does not seek 
the elimination of difference.”  Authentic mutual relationship does not demand that 59
differences be eliminated or minimized, because to do so is a violation of one’s humanity.  
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 This vision directly challenges white resistant discourses of minimization such as 
those described in the whiteness education research literature. For example, the research 
participant who claimed that “If people practiced colorblindness, racial discrimination 
would not be a factor,” and congratulated herself on “the fact that I am able to look past 
race.”  The value of colorblindness so prevalent in U.S. society is antithetical to the 60
vision of relational transcendence, not because racial categories should be reified, but 
because the act of “looking past race” is generally an act of defining the other on one’s 
own terms. Rivera asks: “Unlearning the tendency to look at the Other as an image of 
ourselves or as something derived from ourselves: what kind of preparation does this 
demand?”  As one answer, Rivera advises that an “inquiry into the history of the 61
differences that appear to us as normal is part of our ethical responsibility.”  62
 I suggest that it also requires a willingness on the part of white people to allow the 
narratives and cultural expressions of people of color to dislodge and unseat our 
investment in centering our own preferences and way of life as normative. Embracing 
difference means, for white people, relativizing our own position in the world. This 
process is challenging because the white sense of self is so psychically shaped by the 
social location and cultural milieu in which we are formed, but it can sometimes be 
facilitated simply by challenging assumptions embedded in our language. For example, 
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take Karen Stenner’s claim that “those of different race can more easily change their 
seeming difference than their race, and more easily than the inherently intolerant can 
change their predispositions.”  One question raised by this statement is exactly how she 63
comes to her assessment of how easy it is to change one’s “seeming difference” in a 
society like the U.S., in which physical characteristics are so often accepted as proxies for  
qualities of character. Another question is who she has in mind when she refers to people 
“of different race.” Different than whom? Who is regarded as the default norm against 
which “different race” is defined? Stenner’s formulation illustrates the power of 
normativity to define the relative status of groups without explicitly saying so. 
 What is required for authentic relational transcendence, then, is a commitment on 
the part of white people to deeper questioning of our own identity and our sense of the 
world which we inherit. This involves reckoning with “the implication of our subjectivity 
in the processes of exclusion through which a person becomes a community’s Other in 
the first place. We need to open a space for a more radical questioning of the self and of 
the conditions that exclude the Other.”  This self-questioning undoubtedly does not 64
happen “easily,” and it demands a willingness on the part of white people to open 
ourselves to vulnerability in the process of opening ourselves to others different from 
ourselves. To encounter the other in a way that allows for the potential of relational 
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transcendence requires a willingness to be impacted by the other, to allow the distinct 
realities of the other to reframe our view of ourselves and of the world. 
Transcendence and Vulnerability 
 The kind of vulnerability that allows for relational transcendence is the antithesis 
of white resistance. Rivera argues that embracing vulnerability rather than rejecting or 
repressing it is an essential part of honoring the realities of flesh, and for establishing 
social relations that are generative rather than exploitative. “Bodies are always 
susceptible to the exercise of power. However, the susceptibility to being shaped by the 
world is also the basis of all life and all knowledge.”  Our capacity to be affected by 65
human difference as we are by the material world is not something to be overcome, but 
rather embraced in all of its potential risk. Only through empowering all peoples, 
cultures, and individuals to exist on their own terms can genuine mutual exchange take 
place, and in that mutual exchange lies divine revelation. White emotioned resistance to 
critical antiracism is ultimately resistance to this revelatory potential. 
 “Interhuman transcendence takes place in and contributes to cosmic co-creation,” 
Rivera maintains. “The interhuman, the cosmic, and the social converge.”  Perhaps the 66
depth of potential of revealed divinity in inter-human encounter with difference is part of 
what makes such encounters so emotionally charged. Perhaps this is why white responses 
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to preserve our sense of self and familiar social milieu in the face of the challenge of 
critical antiracism can take on such an anxious character. What white resistance is 
resisting, at the core, is the introduction of a way of being human that directly indicts the 
white aesthetic regime—white normativity itself—and names the status quo as a way of 
living that constitutes a barrier to authentic human flourishing in all of its diversity. 
Rivera’s vision of relational transcendence insists that the white normative, 
assimilationist visions of theorists like Kaufmann and Stenner are unworkable, and in fact 
evil, for two interrelated reasons. First, the white colonial vision of human universalism is 
evil because it is unjust, as it generates a standard for access to resources, power, and 
regard that inherently advantages the white people who imposed it and punishes diverse 
ways of pursuing flourishing. Second, a vision of relational transcendence is essential for 
all people because the assimilationist vision robs humanity of its potential to encounter 
and embody the divine life. The demand for homogeneity and the willingness to impose 
it is ultimately an act of self-impoverishment as well as an act of oppression. 
Mary McClintock Fulkerson: Anxiety, Sin, and Transformation 
 My interaction with Jennings, Grimes, and Rivera has been an attempt to 
assemble pieces of a liberationist practical theology of white emotioned resistance by 
focusing on specific points of that resistance—white attachment to social norms, white 
moral identity, and an intuition that cultural assimilation to the majority is a legitimate 
desire that should not be subject to censure. I argue that a theology of white resistance 
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interprets it as a malformation of white intuitions and affect, in which hierarchy and 
oppression are so taken for granted in their ubiquity that naming them as racism elicits 
reactions of disorientation and indignation. The range of common white responses, from 
assertions of colorblindness to emotional pleas of ignorance and goodness, reveal an 
underlying disturbance and resultant anxiety that manifest when an entire system of 
ethical intuition formation is exposed as a process of distorted cultural mirroring. 
 I close the chapter by turning directly to that experience of anxiety, and how a 
theology of white resistance can offer some guides for processing that experience. Mary 
McClintock-Fulkerson concludes her ethnographic study of a church characterized by 
racial and ability diversity with reflections on how that community and the challenges it 
faced has shaped her theology of sin, grace, and redemption. It is her reflection on the 
connection between sin and anxiety which speaks most directly to my view of white 
emotioned resistance as a manifestation of how white normativity functions as a source 
of security and comfort for white people even as it oppresses people of color, and the 
necessity of forsaking that security in the pursuit of equity. 
 Fulkerson’s self-awareness of her embodied response of anxiety upon entering a 
racially diverse congregation leads her to the conclusion that, when speaking of the 
concept of sin, "it is the more ambiguously harmful practices that require attention.”  67
Her examination of the relationship between anxiety and sin draws upon the framework 
of Reinhold Niebuhr. 
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An anxious response to the world is a natural result of the wish to survive…. A 
fearful response that takes the ‘Other’ as potential threat, however, has 
possibilities besides self-protection. Some perceptions of threat move from 
visceral fear of the unknown and its imagined harms to aversiveness and 
vilification of that which is "Other$…. These reactions and the symbols that come 
to justify them are potential precursors to forms of violence.  68
This understanding of anxiety as a natural result of precarity implies that the generation 
of norms and the enforcement of cultural homogeneity are inevitable responses to the 
precarity of life. But just as Jennings explains in his analysis of the white aesthetic 
regime, the enforcement of norms takes on the character of evil when it finds security 
precisely in exclusion and ingrained assumptions of white superiority. Fulkerson 
continues, “What might be acceptance of this unavoidable insecurity becomes instead a 
desperate attempt to escape it.”  And one method of futilely trying to escape insecurity is 69
found in taking a systemically racist social order, and one’s place atop it, for granted. 
 “On such terms,” Fulkerson argues, “sin as broken relation to God cannot be 
reduced to individual agency. The residuals of historic exclusions represented in these 
typifications create a "naturalized$ universe that does not easily disappear.”  Here she 70
emphasizes the role of habituation to the white hegemonic social milieu, which, as my 
own analysis emphasizes, extends to white psychological and emotional development. 
But if the white hegemonic order represents, as Fulkerson describes it, “a display … of 
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social anxiety gone bad,”  the only way through it into a place of greater equity and 71
relationality is through facing directly the vulnerability that ensues when that order is 
confronted and condemned. 
 The potential for redemption, then, on Fulkerson’s reading, is realized when 
“security is found in something other than a stable fixed sociality.”  The social order 72
itself must be identified as sufficiently problematic to require thorough transformation. 
“Residuals of historic exclusions gain new life in inherited incorporative practices,” she 
argues, “and they shape even the nicest and most enthusiastic would!be agents of 
change.”  In light of this seemingly intractable state of affairs, the necessary 73
transformation must extend beyond beliefs and intentions and into our psychological 
intuitions, emotions, and embodied responses. “For real transformation,” Fulkerson 
argues, “a deep change of consciousness is required, a change of consciousness not 
simply in the form of new ideas, but in newly developing habituations as well—in the 
bones. And transformation will be ever incomplete.”  74
Toward a Practical Theology of White Resistance 
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 My liberationist practical theology of white resistance works from the premise 
that white hegemonic society shapes psychological development through the mirroring of 
grandiosity needs, so as to inculcate a deeply intuitive sense of white entitlement to a 
default, normative status in U.S. society. This enculturation is so thorough that comfort 
with racial hierarchy often does not even register with white people as having an 
oppressive effect on people of color, or as having any real ethical salience at all. A 
theological perspective condemns the systems which generate this sense of entitlement, 
while accepting the disorientation and distress of white people as plausibly authentic 
expressions of white social formation. Holding these realities in tension honors a view of 
the human being as ineluctably influenced by our social environment yet still possessed 
of agency to question those influences when confronted with the face and the rightful 
claim to dignity of the Other. 
 The defensiveness of white resistance, then, reflects not just a defense of racial 
hierarchy itself, but also an avoidance of the prospect that the social environment which 
we experience as normal constitutes a taxing burden on the humanity of people who have 
been marginalized. The formative processes of white normativity naturalize the 
prioritization of white comfort and the imposition of white norms as a universal standard. 
Put another way, white resistance ultimately questions whether the Other does, in fact, 
have a legitimate claim to equality at the level of society’s cultural norms and aesthetic 
regime. Even for white people who affirm in general terms a vision of racial justice, 
common protests that microaggressions do not constitute ‘real racism,’ or that hiring 
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standards which regularly advantage whites are ‘objective,’ reflect guiding intuitions that 
the normative social milieu represents an objective baseline of prosocial behavior. 
 Developing a practical theology of white resistance thus entails holding in tension 
the evil it enacts as a practice and the authenticity of white disorientation and distress, 
and which can speak to the latter without, in Grimes’s words, “letting white people off 
the hook.” One way of navigating this tension is by enlarging the white imagination with 
a vision of human community in which the loss of dominance need not mean the loss of 
the ability to survive and thrive. One of the distinctive features of white identity 
formation is that dominant status is so thoroughly interwoven with identity that any threat 
to that status is experienced on the affective level as a form of social death. A theological 
understanding of human flourishing in diversity interprets that subjective experience as 
authentic, yet fundamentally based on a lie. A vision grounded in love of differences 
exposes the violent nature of privilege-preservation. A refusal to prioritize white 
comfortable attachment to the social milieu is therefore a necessary act of removing 
barriers to human flourishing for all, but also the only way for people identified as white 
to experience relational transcendence. 
 However, training white people to recognize how our intuitive preferences 
constitute obstacles to the thriving of people of color requires a pedagogical approach 
that understands how to address the inevitable vulnerability that accompanies a process of 
internal dislocation. Jennings, in his article “Speaking in Tongues: Language, 
Nationalism, and the Formation of Church Life,” declares that #We must allow the Spirit 
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of God to fuse and confuse our patterns of life.”  The capacity to allow one’s patterns of 75
life to be fused and confused in relationship across difference is precisely what white 
narcissistic mirroring fails to develop. If new systems centered upon empowering people 
of color are to be sustained, it will require at least a critical mass of white people to 
develop this underdeveloped capacity and so weaken persistent patterns of resistance. 
Developing this capacity requires an embrace of vulnerability, precisely at the point of 
the #preservations” that drive white resistant emotioned behavior—preservation of moral 
identity and preservation of the comfortable social milieu itself. 
 The final chapter presents potential avenues for addressing this challenge, drawn 
largely from Megan Boler’s pedagogy of disrupting emotional habits, and Erinn Gilson’s 
description of epistemic vulnerability. I argue that the central art of engaging with white 
resistance, at least in contexts where education and persuasion are goals (and they need 
not always be), involves taking affective reactions seriously as spontaneous responses 
while effectively communicating how those responses are shaped by hierarchical 
structural systems. “Taking seriously” does not require expressing sympathy—holding 
firmly to critique in the face of emotional distress is an important step in the process. 
Reaching through white resistance in the interest of social transformation involves 
helping white people process that some moral sensibilities which we take for granted are 
actually an embodiment of injustice. While social transformation does not require white 
 Willie James Jennings, “Speaking in Tongues: Language, Nationalism, and the Formation of 75
Church Life,” in On Being Christian and Human: Essays in Celebration of Ray S. Anderson, ed. 
Todd Speidell (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), 234.
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people to lead it, sustaining transformation will require a critical mass of white 
participation, and therefore pedagogical and pastoral arts have a role to play. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
IMPLEMENTING A PEDAGOGY OF WHITE VULNERABILITY 
 My process of developing a liberationist practical theology of white emotioned 
resistance has up to this point involved a review of the qualitative research on white 
resistance, theoretical analysis of the social and psychological mechanisms by which it 
operates, and theological interpretation of its driving motivations and moral implications 
for the pursuit of racial justice. In this final chapter I turn to practical concerns and take a 
closer look at the implications of my analysis of white emotioned resistance for 
developing an ethos and approach to antiracist pedagogy. I hypothesize that methods of 
engaging white resistance will be more effective to the extent that they take into account 
both the function of resistance to deflect consideration of white culpability and also the 
subjective, spontaneous experiences of disorientation and defensiveness. I remain 
cognizant of critical theoretical claims that in analyzing white resistant behavior, 
subjective experiences are less than salient relative to the preservation of material 
interests. Nevertheless, I argue that incorporating psychological analysis of white 
resistant experiences of disorientation and distress can elucidate the connections between 
those emotioned responses and the social structures which give rise to them. 
 My analysis is not intended to reduce racism to a matter of individual psychology, 
nor to claim that changing white minds is sufficient to uproot entrenched structures of 
racism. I affirm the analysis of Michalinos Zembylas, who says that “the emotionality of 
whiteness should not be simply limited to the unconscious or innate feelings of white 
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discomfort; rather, white emotionality needs to be also understood as socially and 
politically produced within the material, affective and discursive assemblages of 
whiteness and white supremacy.”  My agenda is more modest, to help white people 1
understand the connections between our own emotional reactions and the social 
structures of oppression in which they are formed, as one part of a much wider effort of 
social transformation. It is my hope that identifying the racialized social milieu as an 
object of attachment can help white people identify the source of the intuitive feelings of 
anxiety which our resistance is designed to protect against, and to better recognize the 
role of those feelings in hindering institutional and social change. 
 The first part of this chapter outlines a pedagogical ethos for addressing white 
emotioned resistance, placing into conversation different emphases prominent among 
scholars involved in social justice education. I argue for the need to engage in a 
“pedagogy of discomfort” as elaborated by education scholar Megan Boler, while 
incorporating values of compassion and attention to vulnerability as theorized by ethical 
philosopher Erinn Gilson. I reflect on how their insights contribute to a theological 
understanding of white resistance, and I summarize how they inform the different 
pedagogical strategies of Barbara Applebaum and Michalinos Zembylas. I argue that 
helping white people develop a sense of shared culpability for structural injustice requires 
cultivating the ability to analyze one’s own distress and disorientation as part of the 
 Zembylas, “Affect, Race, and White Discomfort,” 91.1
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transformational process. In the latter part of the chapter, I conclude the argument and 
offer a few practical pedagogical suggestions as well as directions for further research. 
Megan Boler and Erinn Gilson: Pedagogies of Discomfort, Compassion, and 
Vulnerability 
 Megan Boler is a scholar of social justice education who focuses on the role of 
emotion in classroom dynamics, particularly emotioned resistance when hegemonic 
worldviews are challenged. In her article, “Teaching for Hope,” Boler shares her 
experiences teaching social histories of oppression and disenfranchisement to students 
who “vocally resist attempts to suggest that the world might possibly be other than they 
have comfortably experienced it.”  Boler concludes that an “angry, defensive response to 2
social justice and analyses of power and oppression signals someone who is struggling to 
maintain his or her identity in what feels like a threat of annihilation,”  and encourages 3
attention to these emotional responses as an integral dimension of challenging students’ 
worldviews. Boler’s insight of “a threat of annihilation” among white people informs my 
own framework of white emotioned resistance—that it manifests a psychological need to 
preserve a sense of self and moral identity that is shaped in relationship with a racially 
hierarchical social milieu. 
 Megan Boler, “Teaching for Hope: The Ethics of Shattering World Views,” in Teaching, 2
Learning, and Loving: Reclaiming Passion in Educational Practice, ed. Daniel Liston and Jim 
Garrison (New York: Routledge Falmer, 2004), 115.
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 115.3
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 Boler claims that “by ‘following the affect’ rather than the words people actually 
utter, one can begin to see how emotional investments reflect both the individual’s 
willingness to grow as well as the embedded quality of dominant cultural values.”  This 4
attention to affect will necessarily involve attention to individual differences among white 
students in terms of personality and experience. But pedagogical strategy should also 
attend to the way that critical antiracism challenges a particular comfort zone that white 
people share in common, due to the relative social location of white people within the 
racial social order. For Boler, the comfort zone “reflects emotional investments that by 
and large remain unexamined, because they have been woven into the everyday fabric of 
what is considered common sense.”  Emotioned white resistance reflects a challenge to 5
the comfort zone, which in turn reflects how thoroughly patterns of inequity are taken for 
granted by those who are advantaged by them. 
 In response, Boler proposes a “pedagogy of discomfort,” characterized by training 
students to reflect critically on personal experience and emotions in light of one’s social 
location, identifying and challenging embedded values. A pedagogy of discomfort 
encourages students to “recognize how emotions define how and what one chooses to 
see, and conversely, not to see,”  and it involves “learning to develop genealogies of 6
one$s positionalities and emotional resistances.”  For Boler, these common emotional 7
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 116-117.4
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 118.5
 Megan Boler, Feeling Power: Emotions and Education (New York: Routledge, 1999), 176.6
 Boler, Feeling Power, 178.7
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resistances should be interpreted primarily in terms of the fear of loss, particularly a loss 
of one’s sense of self, and the gravity of this potential loss must be taken into account 
when engaging with white students. “To break these habits that constitute ‘the very 
structure of the self,’” Boler argues, “necessarily faces one with fears of loss, both felt 
losses (of personal and cultural identities) and literal losses.”  The potential extent of the 8
loss explains the intensity of the emotional reaction upon being challenged with analyses 
of white complicity in racism. 
 In light of the psychological and emotional stakes involved for white people 
facing identity threat, Boler advises that “compassion and offering hope are important 
complements to a pedagogy of discomfort.”  She offers the important caveat that the aim 9
is not to “pamper those who have experienced a life of privilege,”  but maintains that 10
compassion is not incompatible with an effective pedagogy of discomfort. “A particular 
compassion might be required for those who feel their #self” is being annihilated and who 
are angrily protesting, not necessarily because they cannot see how power operates but 
because they need something to replace what I am threatening to take away from them.”  11
 While Boler does not write as a theologian, I find a theological character to her 
insight here. What white people are potentially losing is an identity historically 
constructed upon the need to justify oppression and dominance, but one which is taken 
 Boler, Feeling Power, 192.8
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 116.9
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 115.10
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 123.11
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for granted as normal in part due to the thoroughness of the psychological mirroring 
process. The loss of this identity is therefore necessary, but it is still a very real 
experience of loss, and developing a capacity to effectively dismantle white supremacy 
requires understanding the need to offer a new ground of meaning emerging from the 
deconstruction of the old. Boler describes calls the process of developing new meaning 
“critical hope”—which entails an “emotional willingness to engage in the difficult work 
of possibly allowing one$s worldviews to be shattered.”  One characteristic of critical 12
hope is a coming to terms with the reality of change and a refusal to seek security in a 
false hope of stasis, which so often accompanies an impulse to preserve the established 
social order in the face of challenge. There is an echo here of Fulkerson’s understanding 
of redemption, in which “security is found in something other than a stable fixed 
sociality.”  Boler frames critical hope as developing a capacity to accept ambiguity 13
within the self just as white resistance must give way to a release of security in 
established racial and cultural hierarchies. Critical hope requires a “willingness to exist 
within ambiguity and uncertainty,”  a state which requires a degree of compassionate 14
engagement if it is to be sustained. 
 Maintaining an openness to ambiguity with one’s identity requires a commitment 
to persevering in the discomfort of that process, which requires a commitment to the 
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 125.12
 Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, 247.13
 Boler, “Teaching for Hope,” 126.14
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experience of vulnerability. Erinn Gilson, in her book The Ethics of Vulnerability: A 
Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice, says that vulnerability is an “openness and 
affectivity, and such openness entails the inability to predict, control, and fully know that 
to which we are open and how it will affect us.”  Her understanding of vulnerability 15
contrasts with popular pejorative depictions of it as simply defenselessness and 
weakness,  because it involves a more existential threat to identity. This kind of 16
vulnerability can plausibly lead to retrenchment and further self-protection outside of the 
classroom context, unless white people learn to adopt consistent sustainable practices to 
persevere with it. 
 To this end, Gilson advocates a cultivation of epistemic vulnerability as an 
antidote to the ethos of invulnerability which characterizes much of our white hegemonic 
society. She argues that invulnerability is actually a form of cultivated ignorance of the 
vulnerability which is humanity’s natural state. For Gilson, vulnerability simply is—a 
general state of the human condition, and it need not be understood as exclusively 
negative. 
Being vulnerable makes it possible for us to suffer, to fall prey to violence and be 
harmed, but also to fall in love, to learn, to take pleasure and find comfort in the 
presence of others, and to experience the simultaneity of these feelings. 
Vulnerability is not just a condition that limits us but one that can enable us.  17
 Erinn Gilson, The Ethics of Vulnerability: A Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice (New 15
York: Routledge, 2014), 127.
 Erinn Gilson, “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression.” Hypatia 26, no. 2 (2011): 310.16
 Gilson, “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” 310.17
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The choice to recognize and accept vulnerability can make a significant difference in how 
white people respond to the realities of our complicity in racial injustice, and how deeply 
our socialization affects our intuitions and preferences with regard to social norms. 
 Gilson argues that “ignorance of vulnerability functions as the basis upon which 
we build many other kinds of ignorance,”  including the denial that white people’s 18
structured position of power results from historical practices of oppression. “Failing to 
comprehend that one’s knowledge and one’s knowing attitude, indeed, one’s self, has a 
history—has been constituted in and through that history—is to lay the groundwork for 
ignorance of all stripes.”  One common experience of disorientation for white people 19
encountering anti-racist analysis is when what we consider common-sense objections 
(such as “my family never engaged in racial slurs”) are identified as commonplace 
privilege-preserving strategies. The notion that one’s beliefs and attitudes may reflect 
socialization into broader social patterns tied to white racial identity rather than 
representing spontaneous individual ideas is itself a challenge to a sense of individual 
identity. This prospect calls for a posture of humility in response, a willingness to 
relativize the importance of one’s unique individuality and recognize how perspectives 
and intuitions are formed to a large degree within a communal context. 
 The development of epistemic vulnerability can therefore function as a counter-
practice to practices of white emotioned resistance, which are at root efforts to salvage a 
 Gilson, “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” 319.18
 Gilson, “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” 320.19
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sense of invulnerability. Vulnerability must be cultivated, it cannot simply be adopted on 
the spot as an act of will. If the “invulnerable stance is central to … ignorance of 
relationality,”  then practicing vulnerability, for white people, means a commitment to 20
repeated, consistent, openness to relationality with those who have been marginalized.  21
It means consistently recognizing and committing to tolerate the discomfort that 
invariably comes with challenges to core intuitions about white people possessing the 
default prerogative to set the cultural terms for shared social life. Sustained commitment 
to opening oneself to change and uncertainty is necessary, given that white habits of 
invulnerability are not just cognitive, but ingrained in our habits and intuitions. 
 Gilson argues that epistemic vulnerability “is not just to be open to new ideas, but 
to be open to the ambivalence of our emotional and bodily responses and to reflecting on 
those responses in nuanced ways.”  For anti-racist educators, leading white students in 22
the cultivation of vulnerability involves the training of emotional self-reflection—
preparing them and walking with them through the emotional resistance and 
disorientation that will likely emerge. “We might know the facts of racial discrimination 
 Gilson, #Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” 321.20
 A body of literature in the social sciences on cultural humility overlaps significantly with the 21
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and oppression, for instance, but to allow that knowledge really to ‘‘sink in’’ means to 
have it sink into our bodies, into our emotional responses, into our more basic 
interpretation of the world and ourselves and not just to incorporate it into a set of beliefs 
we hold.”  For white people, this means reconciling ourselves to the reality that we have 23
been emotionally trained from infancy to feel comfortable with our own social position, 
and trained in ignorance and indifference to the effects our social habits and practices 
have on those who are marginalized. 
Between Empathy and Discomfort: Emphases in Pedagogical Strategy 
 The realities of vulnerability, insecurity, and disorientation among white students 
place anti-racist educators in a sort of methodological bind, especially when classroom 
settings include white people and people of color. Applebaum points out that addressing 
the emotional reactions of white students in an interracial context can work to the 
detriment of students of color, as it “serves to confirm the position of students of color as 
culprits who are the ‘cause of tension.’”  Even in cases where the class dynamic does not 24
implicitly accuse students of color of causing the emotional distress, the attention and 
energy required to facilitate white reactions draws resources away from tending to equal 
or greater needs of the students of color in the room. As R. Patrick Solomon explains, a 
focus on white “feelings of discomfort, guilt, anger, frustration, etc, serves to ensure that 
 Gilson, “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” 325-26.23
 Applebaum, #Comforting Discomfort,” 865.24
230
there is limited space and energy to address the needs of other groups whose very 
existence is mired in oppression and inequity.”  Nevertheless, many critical whiteness 25
education scholars are concerned with discerning what strategies and techniques best 
facilitate white students’ learning process, even as they attend to the need to create 
pedagogical spaces in which students of color are not burdened with the need to explain 
themselves or process white emotioned reactions. 
 Boler’s call for compassion is echoed, for example, in Zembylas’s emphasis on 
strategic empathy. Zembylas expresses concern that in addressing white emotioned 
resistance, “pedagogies of mere critique are perhaps not adequate to address the varied 
emotional manifestations of this resistance.”  This could involve, for example, taking a 26
posture of sympathy to a white student’s objection that a statement like “all white people 
are racist” is unfair to their individual intentions, as a way of meeting the student where 
they are at and working toward corporate understandings of systemic injustice. 
Zembylas’s call to employ empathy strategically, to the point of temporarily empathizing 
with the very viewpoints anti-racist education is designed to confront, is grounded in his 
experience that “moving these students toward critical emotional reflexivity would 
require more than rational arguments.”  27
 Solomon et al., “The Discourse of Denial,” 155.25
 Zembylas, “Pedagogies of Strategic Empathy,” 114.26
 Zembylas, “Pedagogies of Strategic Empathy,” 122.27
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 Zembylas clarifies that he does not advocate a passive empathy that “runs the risk 
of ignoring active responsibility to one another or failing to take action that confronts 
racism and reduces injustice.”  His strategic approach calls instead for a reconciliatory 28
empathy which “involves a genuine effort to get to know the other and his or her troubled 
perspectives without insisting on placing him or her into predetermined categories.”  29
This approach requires educators to “engage in the difficult work of empathizing with 
views that one may find unacceptable or offensive,” because only this stance “avoids 
premature closure and sustains the possibility of transformation.”  There is a tension in 30
Zembylas’s view between describing this empathy as a sincere attempt to know the 
student on a deeper level and seeing it as a kind of performance, using empathy 
instrumentally to the end of challenging and transform white students’ attitudes. 
 Barbara Applebaum, by contrast, advocates for a strong form of pedagogy of 
discomfort, drawing from Boler’s language but deemphasizing her calls for compassion. 
She counters Zembylas’s proposal of strategic empathy, asking, “Is it possible to support 
white students … and not comfort them? … how can social-justice educators support 
white students to stay with rather than flee from the discomfort that is necessary for 
learning and without appeasing or pacifying their discomfort and without providing 
absolution and redemption?”  Applebaum's distinction between “supporting” and 31
 Zembylas, “Pedagogies of Strategic Empathy,” 120.28
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“comforting” can at first glance seems like a matter of semantics or individual teaching 
style, but Applebaum’s emphasis rests on a particular evaluation of what white students 
are doing when they express distressed emotions. 
 Applebaum objects to accounts of white fragility like Robin DiAngelo’s, which 
she argues suggest that white people have a “low threshold for discomfort.”  The central 32
problem in Applebaum’s view is that “White people actively perform fragility and 
continue to perform it in a way that consolidates white narcissism and white arrogance—
signs of power and privilege, not weakness.”  It is not clear here the extent to which 33
Applebaum believes that the performance of fragility is conscious and calculated—
although her analysis of discourse and power elsewhere  suggests that she finds it 34
irrelevant how conscious the process is. Drawing on Gilson’s analysis, she posits that 
white fragility is actually a performance of invulnerability, because remaining in a state 
of fragility “enables one to ignore those aspects of existence that are inconvenient, 
disadvantageous, or uncomfortable for us.”  Therefore refusing to comfort white 35
students who express fragility forces them to take responsibility for their emotions and 
their contribution to systemic racism—with the aim that “instead of responding with 
violence or tears, white people might respond with vulnerability.”  36
 Applebaum, “Comforting Discomfort,” 868.32
 Applebaum, “Comforting Discomfort,” 868.33
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 I disagree with Applebaum primarily at the level of her understanding of the 
relationship between fragility and vulnerability. Where she sees fragility as a performance 
that inhibits moving into vulnerability, I am more apt to see emotional reactions as 
spontaneous expressions of vulnerability.  This is where I think it is helpful to 37
distinguish between the often oppressive impact of white reactions (which educators in 
diverse contexts must be attentive to), and the subjective experience of the white people 
expressing them, at least for the purpose of determining pedagogical strategies. 
Recognizing genuine vulnerability in white emotioned reactions need not preclude 
pushing white students into a deeper awareness of the social production of those 
emotions or the way they reinforce structural oppression. However, Applebaum’s point is 
well taken that the capacity to tolerate extended discomfort is a necessary aspect of anti-
racist praxis, and best practices would refrain from a rush to comfort in a way that 
enables white students to avoid developing that resilience. 
 Ultimately, I believe that understanding the development of psychic attachments 
to the social milieu supports a multi-pronged, balanced approach exemplified by Boler, in 
which expressions of compassion are not incompatible with a pedagogy of discomfort 
and disruption. The aim is to instill a deeper sense of moral responsibility on a corporate 
level, and to foster the emotional maturity required to interpret our society, our 
 Certainly displays of fragility could express either a performance or spontaneous vulnerability, 37
depending on the individual student. While the interest of this dissertation is primarily in positing 
commonalities in psychological development based on white people’s social location, continuing 
research is also needed on identifying individual differences between white students with regard 
to the capacity for vulnerability.
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communities, our actions, and our very moral intuitions about race and racism, through a 
more critical eye. If the aim of transformation is at the center, then the tactical approach is 
best held loosely and with flexibility, as there will be individuals which respond better to 
the discipline of discomfort and other instances in which an expression of compassion or 
support can facilitate genuine transformation. It is possible to keep white people “on the 
hook” in terms of presenting an uncompromising analysis of white culpability in an 
oppressive system, while helping white people better understand how that culpability 
functions, an unfortunately necessary step given the extent of the distortion of white 
formation. Keeping a focus on the aim of transformation requires, in other words, 
balancing a healthy appreciation of the extensiveness of sin with a critical hope for the 
possibility of change. 
Strategies for Pedagogy and Practice 
 The previous discussion focuses on the underlying ethos that I believe is most 
helpful in performing critical antiracist pedagogy, at least in contexts in which there is a 
critical mass of support for the idea of pursuing racial equity. Here I offer a few practical 
suggestions for critical antiracist educators, including broader suggestions for antiracist 
education as a general practice inside and outside of the classroom. First, however, it is 
important to re-emphasize that the extent to which one spends classroom time processing 
and responding to white emotioned resistance depends upon the make-up of the class. 
Devoting class energies even to the most sincere and open white people in their distress 
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can sap energy and resources from the needs of people of color in the class, and can even 
perpetuate harm by reinforcing a narrative, as Applebaum points out, that people of color 
cause tension when they tell the truth about their experiences of racism. Creating cohort 
groups by racial identity is one strategy for addressing this, to give white people a space 
where we can process our resistant emotions without harming people of color. In contexts 
where that move itself is resisted, it may be possible to create an expectation that white 
people can speak with the instructor outside of class time. This strategy could preserve 
classroom resources while communicating the legitimate need for white people to process 
our experiences and ask further questions. In some situations, it may be most appropriate 
to “refuse to comfort” a white emotioned response, particularly when it directly disrupts 
class proceedings. Developing resilience requires a combination of enforcing boundaries 
and forging emotional connections, and knowing which approach is most appropriate to 
which situation is primarily a matter of experience. 
 With regard to teaching techniques, one potential way to lead white people 
demonstrating resistance toward the material is to ask questions which help excavate the 
assumptions underlying the resistant discourse. For example, Karen Stenner’s argument 
for assimilation cited in the previous chapter includes the language, “those of different 
race can more easily change their seeming difference than their race.” In a case where 
this minimization-based argument arose in a pedagogical context, an instructor could 
probe the language, challenging it on its own terms without beginning with the 
conclusion of the racist assumptions informing the language. Asking “what are the 
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assumptions behind talking about ‘those of different race?’” or “how easy do you imagine 
it is to change ‘seeming difference,’ and how do you know when differences are only 
‘seeming?’” can challenge white students to examine the reflexive assumptions 
underneath our language in a way that invites further participation. 
 Another potential technique would be to ask white students what kind of world 
they imagine that critical antiracism is trying to create, and which aspects of that world 
do they deem objectionable. This tactic may elicit an array of red herrings or cynical 
comments about authoritarianism or “reverse racism,” but it could also illuminate what 
kinds of identity threat white people are experiencing and what those perceived threats 
reveal about how we imagine the society that we believe that we live in. A discussion 
which encourages white people to imagine what we believe we are losing, and how those 
potential losses rate in significance relative to the potential benefits of greater equity, 
could generate self reflection and help white students clarify their own core 
commitments. It could also catalyze conversation about the lived experience of many 
people of color in contemporary U.S. society, and the kinds of double standards white 
people employ when deciding who deserves deference within society and who has the 
responsibility to assimilate. 
 A final suggestion for facilitating class discussion is to find ways to channel the 
confusion and frustration that often characterizes white resistance towards an ethos of 
curiosity, with a focus on explaining the often subtle mechanisms of white hegemony and 
how they impact people of color. Such a posture could create space for anxiously 
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resistant white people by suspending the call for an ethical commitment, and focusing on 
explanations of how white normativity works as an oppressive system, or what is meant 
by shared white complicity. While critical antiracist pedagogy is unapologetically 
committed to its premises and aims to promote justice, pedagogical stances which present 
these premises as given are often experienced by white people as a pressure to convert 
without adequate space to understand the theory through questioning. One implication of 
my psychodynamic analysis of white attachment to the social milieu is the prospect that 
much of the confusion and ignorance that white people express concerning systemic 
racism represents an authentic interior experience. Therefore a willingness to answer 
questions of how seemingly benign actions contribute to structural racism has more 
potential for eliciting further dialogue than approaches which signal to the student that 
the teacher believes their questions represent an unwillingness to engage. 
 Ultimately, the goal of critical antiracist teaching is transformation, which 
requires that white people commit to interrogating how our identity is implicated in the 
larger system of white hegemony. To be sure, no technique is sufficient to defuse 
intentionally disruptive behavior or engage white students who are already committed in 
their resistance. But even in the face of the resistance that Alison Bailey calls “privilege-
preserving epistemic pushback,”  a focus on explaining may encourage more receptive 38
white students to engage rather than resist by acknowledging the reality of their questions 
and the identity threat they are experiencing. 
 Bailey, “Tracking Privilege-Preserving Epistemic Pushback,” 877.38
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 These pedagogical suggestions admittedly demand of students a high capacity to 
self-reflect and process difficult emotions in the classroom or workshop context. One of 
the inherent difficulties of critical antiracist pedagogy is therefore structural: a 
transformation process which requires significant emotion-regulating skills and detailed 
analysis of the workings of institutions is funneled into a discrete classroom experience, 
often isolated from the rest of institutional life. Therefore institutions committed to 
transformation should devise strategies for integrating training on self-awareness, affect 
regulation, and systems thinking throughout the operations and relational dynamics of the 
organization. This could mean encouraging mindfulness techniques when addressing 
institutional conflicts of all topics, or interweaving analysis of systems throughout all 
coursework in a humanities academic program. My emphasis here is not on finding ways 
to reiterate the theoretical teachings of critical antiracism outside of the classroom 
(although that could be helpful depending on the receptivity of the organization), but 
rather promoting the development of emotional maturity and analytical skills in all 
dimensions of institutional life. Honing such skills in classrooms or meetings where the 
emotional stakes are not as high as when addressing structural racism could lay the 
groundwork for more fruitful engagement when racism needs to be addressed directly. 
 Finally, an integrative approach to critical antiracist pedagogy and practice should 
take a more inductive than deductive approach in presenting an analysis of systemic 
racism. This involves beginning with discrete examples of oppressive white normative 
practice and illustrating why critical race theorists come to believe that a systemic 
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theoretical framework is the best way to account for what is happening. The use of case 
studies within the classroom is one strategy for this kind of engagement, but it preferably 
includes working through actual experiences of conflict and systemic oppression within 
the organization as the basis for analysis. This approach follows the general model of 
antiracist facilitators who conduct an initial needs assessment as the basis for their 
teaching agenda, and is geared toward prioritizing concrete needs rather than asking 
participants to first assent to a theoretical model and then apply it to organizational 
dynamics. 
 Central to this integrative pedagogical approach is providing spaces for white 
people to reflect on interracial encounters or instances in which our words and actions 
have been critiqued as racist, with a focus on emotional dynamics. Encouraging white 
people to identify and process our emotioned reactions relative to real encounters, even if 
this simply involves reactions to institutional anti-racist initiatives, can add a needed 
element to the transformation process. Again, a certain population of white people will 
demonstrate persistent resistance to such an approach, but it could prove helpful with 
white people who have a baseline of openness. Shifting the focus from accepting an 
analytical frame to working through community solutions, in such a way that critical 
antiracist analysis can be brought in later as a tool, could help channel the emotioned 
resistance of well-meaning white people toward a problem-solving approach. It can also 
help gradually build emotional regulation skills. 
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Directions for Further Research 
 This dissertation is primarily a work of theory, drawing upon qualitative research 
in education departments to provide data for interpretation. My proposal outlined here, of 
white grandiose development shaped by relationship to the white normative social milieu, 
can serve as the basis for further research of strategies for critical antiracist pedagogy. My 
proposed connection between emotioned resistance, social location, and psychological 
development also constitutes a hypothesis for further psychological research, testing 
relationships between racial attitudes and developmental capacities. 
 With regard to antiracist education, there is a growing interest in research that 
examines the efficacy of classes and workshops for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 
initiatives employed in the private, public, and nonprofit sectors.  Longitudinal studies 39
which test pedagogical approaches designed to address attachment to the social milieu 
could be implemented, which then track progress in racially diverse hiring practices and 
in employing measures for institutional cultural change. Other longitudinal studies could 
similarly track the efficacy of pedagogical approaches which incorporate skills training in 
distress tolerance and affect regulation. Additional studies could also explore the effects 
of integrating theological frameworks such as those developed in chapter 5 in critical 
antiracist pedagogy. Trainings need not employ doctrinal teachings from specific 
religious traditions but could integrate language which emphasizes the potential 
 For a prominent meta-analysis of the effectiveness of trainings over decades, see Katerina 39
Bezrukova, Chester S. Spell, Jamie L. Perry, and Karen A. Jehn, “A Meta-Analytical Integration 
of Over 40 Years of Research on Diversity Training Evaluation,” Psychological Bulletin 142, no. 
11 (2016): 1227-274.
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contained in homogeneous norms to cause harm, or the deep meaning involved in 
weakening one’s attachments to the “normal” social milieu and embracing a culturally 
plural society. Research projects can be designed which test for the efficacy of integrating 
theological ideas in non-confessional settings in bringing about sustained institutional 
changes. 
 Researching the effects of social location on psychological development is a more 
challenging prospect, as most pedagogical contexts like the classroom do not readily 
allow for the kind of extensive analysis of behavioral patterns and emotional attachments 
conducted in therapeutic contexts. Potential qualitative research projects integrating 
participant observation of classroom dynamics with individual psychological assessments 
would be extremely challenging, both logistically and in terms of obtaining informed 
consent. However, a body of empirical psychological research exists which identifies 
relationships between intercultural development, attitudes toward social justice issues, 
and psychological developmental capacities. One study by Steven Sandage and 
colleagues has found that high levels of differentiation of self (DoS), defined as “a self-
aware capacity to manage anxiety related to difference without excessive need for cutoff 
or fusion in relationships,” correspond to high levels of intercultural competence and 
social justice commitment.  Because DoS involves a high tolerance for difference and 40
experiencing one’s identity as distinct from and not enmeshed with close relationships, it 
 Steven J, Sandage and Peter J. Jankowski, “Spirituality, Social Justice, and Intercultural 40
Competence: Mediator Effects for Differentiation of Self,” International Journal of Intercultural 
Relations 37, no. 3 (2013): 367.
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would be useful to research whether white students higher in DoS have greater success in 
processing critical antiracist education material, or are more likely to contribute to 
systemic equity in organizations where education initiatives are implemented. 
 Similar studies from Sandage and colleagues found a negative relationship 
between intercultural sensitivity and “spiritual grandiosity,” which they define as “a 
spiritual superiority which can promote defensiveness and exclusivity related to 
intercultural differences, thereby discouraging the views of others as equals.”  These 41
findings suggest initial conceptual support for the idea that high levels of grandiosity may 
impede the capacity to relate to racial and cultural difference with mutual respect, 
possibly due to a strong psychic association between one’s sense of self and one’s 
formative cultural milieu. Further research could test for relevant relationships between 
intercultural sensitivity and developmental capacities such as spiritual grandiosity for 
white people specifically, to ascertain the role of racial identity in these relationships. 
 Finally, additional theological work is required to further explore the 
ramifications of how deeply white people’s sense of self is psychodynamically imbricated 
in our social location and status within white hegemony. The extent to which white 
emotioned resistance reflects a defense against perceived threats to our sense of identity 
and internal cohesion has implications for how to theologically conceptualize individual 
 Steven J. Sandage, Jason Li, Peter J. Jankowski, Michelle Beilby, and Christopher Frank, 41
“Spiritual Predictors of Change in Intercultural Competence in a Multicultural Counseling 
Course,” The Journal of Psychology and Christianity 34, no. 2 (2015): 170. See also Steven J. 
Sandage and Mark G. Harden, “Relational Spirituality, Differentiation of Self, and Virtue as 
Predictors of Intercultural Development,” Mental Health, Religion & Culture 14, no. 8 (October 
2011): 819-838.
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and social transformation. There may be potential in concepts such as repentance or 
dying to self for helping to communicate the depth and extent of transformation required 
for white people to disentangle our identities from attachment to white normativity, and 
live into a more just and flourishing society for all. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 Scott Lilienfeld, in his critique of the research literature on racial 
microaggressions, uses the hypothetical of a white person asking a person of color 
“Where were you born?” or “Where are you from?” as an example of how critical 
antiracism overreaches in its estimation of harm. Asking a person of color where they are 
from is characterized as but one example of “innocuous statements or actions that do not 
stem from implicit racial biases.”  Lilienfeld’s focus is on the intentions of the 42
questioner being misconstrued, and he contends that attention to microaggressions will 
“lower the threshold for what is considered hostile or offensive … thereby generating 
high rates of false-positive identifications of innocuous behaviors.”  He cautions against 43
the “potential risks” of encouraging social norms “in which statements and actions that 
were previously regarded as innocuous are now widely interpreted as baleful.”  44
 Lilienfeld, “Microaggressions,” 158-59.42
 Lilienfeld, “Microaggressions,” 162.43
 Lilienfeld, “Microaggressions,” 163.44
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 What is most interesting to me about Lilienfeld’s argument, for the purposes of 
this project, is how he assumes rather than articulates what kind of comments or actions 
should be defined as “innocuous,” and presumes that naming racism in a higher 
percentage of discourses and behaviors would be a net negative for society. These 
premises reflect prevalent intuitions among white people in U.S. society, intuitions that I 
argue form the context for white emotioned resistance because they are core elements of 
white identity development” “Racism should be understood exclusively as conscious 
animus rather than in habitual actions and social norms.” “Individual intention matters 
most when assessing the presence of racial oppression.” “Societies operate on a common 
culture and those who stand out should not object to eliciting curiosity or mistrust.” All 
of these core assumptions flow from the premise that the racialized society of the U.S. is 
fundamentally good, if flawed, and the sin of racism constitutes an aberrant threat to the 
social order rather than an intrinsic characteristic of the social order itself. 
 In the case of the question, “Where are you from?” directed toward U.S. citizens 
of color, Lilienfeld’s focus on whether or not one can ascertain racial animus or 
disrespect behind the question misses the point. It is not necessarily a matter of proving 
that the question masks specific racist attitudes (though that may well be the case), but 
that U.S. society itself is such that people who are read as white are assumed to inherently 
“belong” and are thus rarely if ever asked the question. It is  the regularity of the question 
and the differentiation of who gets asked and who does not which both reveals and 
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reinforces the underlying structure of inequity, and it operates less through specific 
pernicious beliefs than through what many take for granted as a norm. 
 Lilienfeld’s arguments against the importance of microaggressions may appear 
tangential to the focus of this project on emotioned white resistance. But I believe at the 
core of his objection to problematizing “innocuous” discourse is the same impulse behind 
the white emotioned resistance catalogued in chapter 2—the impulse that what feels 
normal to me be cannot be all that harmful. My central argument is that understanding 
this impulse in a context of white hegemony involves exploring how white people’s sense 
of self, in the Kohutian sense, is tied to an attachment to the goodness of the social 
context which formed us and which recognizes, affirms, and mirrors us as fundamentally 
worthy. Additionally, the social order does not demand of white people the capacity to 
relate equitably and mutually across racial and cultural difference, so white people 
develop a grandiose or expansive self that does not perceive that lack of capacity as a 
detriment. Psychological development involves a myriad of variables including 
personality and the specifics of one’s relationship with caregivers, but I argue that one of 
those variables is the influence of the white normative social milieu, and that 
understanding this can help explain why so many white people persist in sustaining white 
hegemonic patterns of behavior as we profess with our lips our sincere intentions to 
dismantle it. White people’s core sense of ourselves and our place in the social order is 
formed from our earliest years. 
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 An emphasis on the thoroughness of white socialization diverges to an extent 
from many critical whiteness scholars, who focus on theorizing white material group 
interests as the primary factor undergirding white emotioned resistance. My proposal, 
which focuses on social and psychological factors beyond individual agency, has the 
potential to exonerate white people of too much ethical responsibility. I affirm the 
importance of emphasizing white culpability in systemic racism, to keep white people 
“on the hook,” but I focus on psychic attachments to the social environment and 
ingrained cultural values as a proximate set of motivations, in a way that accepts a degree 
of white ignorance and disorientation as authentic rather than primarily performative. 
This does not mean that white emotioned responses to antiracist pedagogy, or white 
identity development, are benign—they decidedly are not. Critical whiteness theory is 
invaluable in helping us understand how the construction and defense of white identity is 
integral to creating and reinforcing systems of oppression. What I argue is that critical 
whiteness theoretical and pedagogical approaches which emphasize the structural 
realities to the exclusion of white interiority ultimately minimize the possibilities for 
white personal transformation as an integral element of structural transformation. 
 Here again, my project’s approach reflects an epistemic advantage based on 
personal experience learning about the nature of racism and white culpability within the 
environment of a nurturing interracial faith community. I retain an abiding interest in 
framing the issue of white hegemony in a way that is intelligible to white people, whose 
perceptions and intuitions have been shaped by the systems and socialization processes I 
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describe. My focus on “well-meaning white people’s racism”—and on how socialization 
and habituation work through psychological development—emerges in part from 
reflection on my own ongoing process of transformation. This focus also has a theoretical 
aim, however—to analyze the extent to which evil and oppression can be enacted through 
behaviors which are genuinely believed by the perpetrators to be benign. I therefore 
conclude with reflections on what is required for white personal transformation, with the 
understanding that such a project is but one element in a wider project of social 
transformation. 
 I propose that white transformation entails both a pedagogical and theological 
element. This is why my liberationist practical theology of white emotioned resistance 
has returned to the formulation of containing a descriptive and ethical component. 
Transformation requires both the understanding of how to change and the motivation to 
do so. Regarding the pedagogical element, I maintain that transformation requires a 
commitment to education, even persuasion, as a core element of addressing white 
resistance. The depth of white socialization and psychological attachment to the social 
milieu means that many white people do not intuitively grasp the extent to which the 
reflexive repetition of social norms performs an exclusionary function. For example, 
telling white people that “your personal kindnesses toward people of color are not 
changing the system” is indeed telling us the truth. But helping white people to 
internalize this truth involves helping us develop a greater awareness of how our 
seemingly spontaneous value judgments and decision making processes emerge from 
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ingrained cultural attitudes and habits. This entails a willingness to examine and 
challenge the tacit content invested in terms like “normal,” “reasonable,” “excellent,” 
“rigorous,” “nuanced,” “proportional,” to help white people recognize how our criteria 
for those values reflect cultural norms that ought to be up for negotiation rather than 
presumed as universal. It is important to reiterate that this form of education should never 
be expected of any person of color who does not choose to do so. White people share a 
different responsibility for educating, both on a formal and informal basis. 
 Of course, education must be paired with conviction in order to effect structural 
change. Enhancing white people’s understanding of the way social norms advantage 
whites at the expense of people of color must be undergirded with a theological 
framework that recognizes the harm enacted by white normativity as unacceptable. 
Contra Lilienfeld, it is good when an increasing number of attitudes and practices 
“previously regarded as innocuous” come to be seen as instruments of harm, and 
obstacles to the human flourishing of all people. This is why it is crucial for white people 
to accept the need to cultivate a healthy sense of distrust in our own moral intuitions 
when it comes to which voices, experiences, and perspectives we consider to be the most 
“reasonable” in discussions over institutional culture. The predominantly white faculty 
hiring committee which Jennings participated in largely refused to see how their affective 
response to a white performance of a particular brand of excellence enacts structural 
injustice. But it does. White transformation therefore requires an element of repentance, a 
willingness to forsake the comfort of white normativity in favor of Jennings’s vision of a 
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society characterized by “joining, mixing, merging, and being changed by multiple ways 
of life”  45
 Mary McClintock Fulkerson proclaims that “a deep change of consciousness is 
required, a change of consciousness not simply in the form of new ideas, but in newly 
developing habituations as well—in the bones.”  This perspective focuses, as I do, on 46
the role of the transformed white individual within the broader context of structural 
change. Just as my project is open to the charge of de-emphasizing white agency, so is it 
vulnerable to the criticism that its emphasis on white psychology and interiority over-
emphasizes the individual at the expense of the structural. Many critical antiracist 
analysts maintain that emphasizing personal transformation is misguided and draws 
energy away from efforts toward systemic change. Margaret Andersen argues, “The idea 
that whites just individually give up their whiteness seems ludicrous if one understands 
that racial identity is not just an individualized process but involves the formation of 
social groups organized around material interests with their roots in social structure.”  47
Given this broader reality, a theological analysis of the interiority of white people’s 
anxiety and possibility of redemption could be considered at best a distraction and 
improper allocation of resources. 
 Jennings, The Christian Imagination, 9.45
 Fulkerson, Places of Redemption, 246.46
 Andersen, “Whitewashing Race,” 29-30.47
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 My response is that I believe it is simply not possible to thoroughly change 
structures in a sustainable way that does not include cultivating consent or “buy-in” from 
a critical mass of stakeholders, and this demands a concurrent project of encouraging 
white people to change ourselves—our intuitions, our attitudes, our behaviors. While 
changing policies and practices at the institutional level should properly be seen as the 
first priority, it is difficult to conceive of a structure that runs so independently of human 
intention or influence that it does not require a certain amount of internal transformation 
in order to function as intended. In Courtney Goto’s analysis of the intransigence of 
white, Western paradigms within practical theology, she concludes that “Our primary 
work must be to strengthen our emotional capacity and moral will to challenge, enlarge, 
and complexify our respective assumptive worlds on an ongoing basis.”  In other words, 48
personal transformation is an integral dimension of addressing structural power. 
 Individual transformation—the journey of learning to embrace vulnerability in the 
face of difference—is neither a replacement nor a precondition for structural change. But 
only with such personal transformation will new structures throughly facilitate the human 
flourishing of all people, including those that white normativity stifles and starves. 
Ultimately, the personal and social are different dimensions of the same system, one 
which we must relentlessly persist in working to change, for all of our sakes. In order that 
institutional life might liberate and cultivate the full range of human expression and ways 
of life, those of us who have presumed an entitlement to dictate the terms for our 
 Goto, Taking On Practical Theology, 245.48
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common life—white people—must learn to recognize that presumption in ourselves and 
commit to learning a better way. The process is intrinsically unsettling for white people 
precisely because our very formation communicates to us that our worth and settledness 
as human beings is tied to the normativity of the world that colonialism created. If that 
world is to change, white people will need to find ways to stop resisting it, and to be at 
peace with ourselves within it, which entails coming to trust that our removal from the 
center need not mean our annihilation. In fact, it may lead to new life. 
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